1987-1988 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law by unknown
Boston College Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 3
12-1-1988
1987-1988 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and
Employment Discrimination Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Survey is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
, 1987-1988 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 30 B.C.L. Rev. 130
(1988), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol30/iss1/3
130	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 30:99
LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds..
United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.'
The limited nature of judicial review of arbitrators' decisions is
a well-established feature of federal labor law. 2 Generally, courts
may not reconsider the merits of an award when asked to review
an arbitrator's decision.' Federal labor law confines the role of
reviewing courts to determining whether the arbitrator's decision
interprets the collective bargaining agreement in any conceivable
way, and whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of his or her
authority as defined by the agreement. 4 As a result, courts reviewing
arbitration decisions may not decide claims of factual or legal error. 5
The United States Supreme Court, however, recognizes a few
narrow exceptions to the general rule that courts limit their review
of arbitrators' decisions.° For example, courts may overturn arbi-
trators' awards for fraud or dishonesty.' Additionally, a court may
overturn, and in fact may not enforce, collective bargaining agree-
ments or arbitrators' awards that are contrary to some explicit public
policy. 8 Therefore, while judicial review of arbitrators' awards is
limited, courts have discretion to overturn arbitrators' awards for
fraud, dishonesty, or because they are contrary to public policy.
The United States Supreme Court set out the role of courts in
reviewing arbitrators' awards in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp. (' The Court limited judicial review to the issue of
whether the arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.'° The Court stated that federal policy
II` By Kristin E. McIntosh, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 108 S. Ct. 364, 126 L.R.R.M, 3113 (1987).
See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v, Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764, 765, 113
L.R.R.M. 2641, 2644 (1983); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960).
3 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596.
Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 371, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
5 Id. at 370, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
See id. at 371, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M, at
2695.
7 Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 371, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
8 W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
9 363 U.S. 593.
I' Id. at 597.
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favored private settlement of labor disputes because the settlements
require specialized knowledge and because the parties specifically
bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation." Basing its decision
on these policies favoring private settlement of labor disputes, the
Court held that judicial review may neither encompass the merits
of an arbitration award nor question the validity of the arbitrator's
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.t 2 Thus, the
Court limited judicial review of labor arbitration awards to avoid
undermining the strong policies behind federal labor statutes fa-
voring private dispute settlement.
Although the United States Supreme Court subsequently re-
affirmed the limited nature of judicial review of arbitration'
awards,' 3 in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers it. also indicated that
courts could, in some cases, overturn awards on public policy
grounds." The Court held, however, that the arbitration award at
issue did not compromise public policy.' 5 While stating that courts
must resolve the issue of public policy, the Court held that arbitra-
tion awards must violate "some explicit public policy" before courts
could overturn awards on public policy grounds. 16 The Court fur-
ther noted that such a public policy must be "well defined and
dominant," and courts must glean it from "laws and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." 17
The Court thereby established courts' authority to overturn arbi-
tration awards if enforcement of such awards would violate explicit
public policy.
Following W.R. Grace, the courts of appeals divided on when
the judiciary could overturn an arbitration award as contrary to
public policy.Ig The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits broadly viewed
the courts' power to overturn awards on public policy grounds and,
for this reason, more frequently overturned awards.'`' In contrast,
1 ' Id. at 596, 599.
' 2 Id. at 596.
13 461 U.S. at 764, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
' 1 Id. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
15 Id. at 767, 771, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645, 2647. The Court identified obedience to judicial
orders, id. at 766, 1 I3 L.R.R.M, al 2645, and voluntary compliance with Title V11 as the
public policies that potentially might be compromised. Id, at 770, 113 1- 12,R.M. at 2647,
15 Id. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
17 Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
" NliWO, 108 S. Ct. at 369, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
' 9 See id. at 369 n.7, 126 L.R.R.M, at 3116 n.7 (discussing First and Seventh Circuits).
See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Local 1069, 815 F.2t1 178, 125 L.R.R.M,
2086 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 108 S. Ct. 497, 126 L.R.R.M. 3360 (1987), on
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the Ninth and Distict of Columbia Circuits subscribed to a narrower
view of the courts' powers in this area and overturned awards less
frequently. 2° Thus, although courts were free to overturn arbitra-
tion awards as violative of explicit public policy, courts split regard-
ing when they could overturn awards appropriately.
'During the Survey year, in United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the limited nature of ju-
dicial review of labor arbitration awards. The Court ruled unani-
mously that, before a court may overturn an arbitration award on
public policy grounds, it must formulate the public policy with
reference to statutes or to judicial precedent." While the Misco
Court held that only public policy based on statutes or judicial
precedent is sufficient to overturn an arbitration award, the Court
did not address what appropriately formulated public policies
would justify overturning an award on public policy grounds. 22
Consequently, after Misco, courts clearly are unable to overturn
arbitration awards based on poorly documented public policy."
When courts may overturn awards based on properly formulated
public policy, however, remains unclear."
The dispute in Misco stemmed from the discharge of a machine
operator for violating the employer's rules against the presence or
use of drugs on plant property. 25 The employer, Misco, operates a
paper converting plant in Louisiana. 26 Misco's collective bargaining
agreement with the United Paperworkers Union, covering produc-
tion and maintenance employees, provided for final and binding
remand, 845 F.2d 3, 128 L.R.R.M. 2175 (1st Cir. 1988) (award reinstating dangerous equip-
ment operator possessing drugs overturned); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western
Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 114 L.R.R.M. 2001, reh'g denied, 717 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983)
(award reinstating truck driver dismissed for drinking alcohol overturned); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 110 L.R.R.M. 2805 (7th Cir. 1982) (award
allowing employer to lmbid employees from reporting sanitation violations directly to the
government overturned).
Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 369 n.7. 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116 n.7; see, e.g., Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, lnel, 808 F.2d 76, 124 L.R.R.M. 2300 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (award
directing reinstatement of alcoholic pilot upheld); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986. 791
F.2d 1391, 122 L.R.R.M. 2666 (9th Cir. 1986) (award directing reinstatement of undocu-
mented aliens upheld), req. denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987) .
2L 108 S. Ct. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
22 Id. at 375, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3120 (Blackmun,,., concurring).
23 See id. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
21
 See id. at 375, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3120 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 368, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
26 1d. at 367, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3114.
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arbitration of any grievance arising from the agreement's interpre-
tation or application." The agreement limited the arbitrator's au-
thority to the interpretation and application of the agreement's
terms.28
The collective bargaining agreement reserved to Misco the
right to establish and to enforce rules for employee discipline or
discharge. 29 Misco's longstanding rules addressed the presence and
use of intoxicants, narcotics and controlled substances on plant
property." The company rules specified bringing any of these sub-
stances onto plant property, consuming them on plant property, or
reporting for work under the influence of any of these substances
as causes for discharge."'
The collective bargaining agreement covered Isiah Cooper, the
discharged employee." Cooper operated a slitter-rewinder machine
which uses blades to cut rolling coils of paper." On January 24,
1983 Cooper informed Misco that he had been arrested, at his
house, for possession of marijuana. 34 Three days later Misco learned
that police had found Cooper, on plant property, in the backseat of
another employee's car with a lighted marijuana cigarette in the
frontseat ashtray." Misco discharged Cooper on February 7, as-
serting that Cooper's presence in the car with the lighted marijuana
cigarette violated its rule against having drugs on plant .property."
When it discharged him, Misco was not aware that police also had
27 a
25 Id.
29 Id.
9u Id. at 367-68, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3114.
9 ' Id.
32 Id. at 368, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
33 Id. Misco reprimanded Cooper twice for deficient performance within a few months
immediately preceeding his discharge. Id.
34 Id. On January 21, 1983, police searched Cooper's house pursuant to a warrant and
found a substantial amount of marijuana. They subsequently arrested Cooper and charged
hint with marijuana possession. Id.
"Id. The police had assigned an officer to keep Cooper's car under observation at
Misco's parking lot. The officer observed Cooper and two other men briefly enter Cooper's
car and then enter a second car, /d. After the two other men had left, the police apprehended
Cooper in the backseat of the second car. A lighted marijuana cigarette was in the front-seat
ashtray. Id.
sus
	 The police searched Cooper's own car after finding him in the car with the lighted
marijuana cigarette and found marijuana gleanings. Id. Misco became aware of the marijuana
found in Cooper's car on September 21, five days before the arbitration hearing was sched-
uled. Id.
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found marijuana in Cooper's car while it was parked in Misco's lot."
Cooper filed a grievance on the clay of his discharge and the dispute
went to arbitration. 38
The arbitrator ordered Misco to reinstate Cooper with backpay
and full seniority. 39
 The arbitrator found that there was not just
cause for Cooper's dismissal because Mika failed to prove that the
employee had possessed or used marijuana on plant property. 4 °
The arbitrator found that Cooper's presence in the second car was
insufficient to establish a violation of Misco's rules.'" The arbitrator
did not admit into evidence the fact that the police found marijuana
in Cooper's car because Misco was unaware of this fact when it
discharged him. 42
Misco filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana seeking to vacate the arbitration award
on public policy grounds. 43 The district court agreed with Misco
and set aside the award as violative of the general public policy
against operating dangerous machinery while under the influence
of drugs and violative of criminal laws against drug possession."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
and held that the arbitration award violated the public policy against
operating dangerous machinery while under the influence of
drugs. 45
 Additionally, the court of appeals found that the arbitrator
erred both by failing to consider that marijuana had been found in
Cooper's car and by not reaching the conclusion that the facts
established a violation of Misco's rules. 4° The United States Supreme
Court granted the Union's petition for a writ of certiorari because
the courts of appeals had split on the issue of when courts may set
aside arbitration awards on public policy grounds."
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts and
upheld the arbitration award. 48 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed
" Id.
'8 Id.
39 Id.
4° Id. at 368-69, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
41 Id .
42 Id. at 369, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
43 Id .
.' Id. The arbitrator found that the machine Cooper operated was hazardous and had
caused a number of injuries. Id. at 368, 126	 at 3115.
43 Id. at 369, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115.
4° Id. at 369, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3115-16.
47
 Id. at 369, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
49 Id. at 375, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3120.
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the very limited role of the courts in reviewing arbitration awards. 49
The Court emphasized that a court may not reject an arbitrator's
findings of fact or interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator. 5° According
to the Court, as long as an arbitrator is arguably interpreting or
applying the agreement and acting within the scope of his or her
authority, a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of'
the arbitrator even if it is convinced the arbitrator committed a
serious error in interpreting or applying the agreement."
The Court held that the Fifth Circuit had exceeded its authority
by substituting its own factfinding and interpretation of the agree-
ment for that of the arbitrator. 52 The Supreme Court stated that
the court of appeals exceeded its authority when it determined that
Cooper's presence in the second car was a violation of Misco's rules,
when it considered evidence that the arbitrator deemed inappro-
priate to consider, and when it set aside the award because it viewed
discharge as the correct remedy." The Court stated that the court
of appeals' action in considering evidence the arbitrator refused to
consider was improper because, even assuming the arbitrator erred,
his error was not affirmative misconduct or in bad faiths'
Even if the court below properly considered evidence the ar-
bitrator excluded, the Court noted, a court's substituting its own
remedy for an arbitrator's remedy is clearly substituting judicial
judgment for that of the arbitrator. 55 The Court emphasized that
the arbitrator's role is to apply informed judgment to a dispute in
order to achieve a fair solution. 5" The Court stressed that courts
should be especially cautious about reformulating the remedies an
49 Id. at 370, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116-17.
5° Id. at 370-71, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
m Id, at 371, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117.
52 See id. at 371-72, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117-18.
53 1d.
" Id. at 372, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3 118. The Court cited the Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 10(c))
as empowering federal courts to set aside arbitration awards only when "the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct ... in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy." Id. (quoting 9 § 10(c)). Additionally, the Court indicated that excluding the
evidence of marijuana in Cooper's car did not "forever foreclose the Company from using
that evidence as the basis for a discharge." Id.
55 See id. The Court noted that the parties themselves appointed the arbitrator as the
agent to resolve disputes by determining facts and interpreting the agreement. See id. at 371,
379, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117, 3119.
56 Id. at 372, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3118.
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arbitrator awards.57 Thus, the Court reaffirmed the extremely lim-
ited role that judicial review plays in labor disputes.
The Court next held that, in addition to exceeding its authority
on judicial review, the court of appeals advanced a formulation, of
the general public policy against operating dangerous machinery
while under the influence of drugs which was insufficient to justify
overturning the arbitrator's decision. 58 The Court emphasized that
while courts might overturn awards if contrary to explicit, well-
defined public policy, this is a narrow exception to the general rule
of judicial review." This narrow exception, the Court stated, does
not give broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards." The
Misco Court found that the public policy formulation advanced by
the court of appeals made no attempt to review existing statutes
and judicial precedents but, instead, relied on common sense and
"general considerations of supposed public interests." 51 The Court
held that under W.R. Grace, such a formulation of public policy did
not justify setting aside the arbitration award."'
Even if the source of the Fifth Circuit's public policy had been
proper, the Court continued, no violation of that policy was shown."
The arbitrator's award, the Court noted, did not create an explicit
conflict with other laws and legal precedents." The Court found
little, if any, conflict between reinstating Cooper and a public policy
against operating dangerous machinery while under the influence
of drugs. 65 Thus, the Court held that setting aside labor arbitration
awards as contrary to public policy is only a very narrow exception
to the broad, general rule mandating limited judicial review of
arbitration awards." Because the public policy exception is narrow,
the Court stated, policies must be explicit and clearly supported by
$7 Id. "This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies." Id. (Court's emphasis in
quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597). The Court indicated that the parties could limit
the discretion of the arbitrator by agreement. Id.
'6 Id. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
" See id. at 373, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
6° Id.
61 Id, at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119 (quoting Musehany, 324 U.S. at 66).
62 Id.
6' Id,
6'4 Id. at 374, 126 L.R.R.N1. at 3119.
65 Id. The Supreme Court stated the court of appeals could not infer that Cooper would
ever be under the influence of marijuana when operating dangerous machinery on the job
because the police found marijuana in his car. Id. Drawing such an inference is impermissible
on judicial review, the Court held, because it is an exercise in factfinding properly performed
only by the arbitrator. Id,
66 See id. at 373, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
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statutes and judicial precedent.67 The Court noted that a court's
refusal to enforce an award must be based on more than an as-
sumption that enforcement would violate public policy.°
J ustice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred, stress-
ing the narrowness of the Court's holding.° The concurring opin-
ion stated that the Court did not decide whether the judiciary may
set aside an arbitration award on public policy grounds only when
"the award itself violates some positive law or requires unlawful
conduct by the employer." 70 Justice Blackmun presented three al-
ternative rationales for the Court's decision. 7 t First, the court of
appeals exceeded its limited authority on judicial review by setting
aside the arbitration award. 72 Second, the award did not violate the
public policy advanced by the court of appeals. 73 Third, the court
of appeals did not adequately formulate the public policy." Thus,
Justice Blackmun indicated clearly that the Court did not decide
the question of what type of violation of an appropriately formu-
lated public policy would justify setting aside an award on public
policy grounds.
Misco reaffirms the broad, general principle that judicial review
of labor arbitration awards is limited:73 Additionally, Misco clarifies
that setting aside awards on explicit public policy grounds is a
narrow exception to this general rule. 76 Because setting aside arbi-
tration awards on public policy grounds is a narrow exception, Misco
requires that both parties challenging awards and courts carefully
formulate such public policy by reference to statutes and judicial
precedent, not merely common sense. 77 Misco indicates, however,
67 Id. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
"3 Id.
69 Id. at 375, 126 L.R.R.M, at 3120 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7" Id. The Court itself indicated that it did not decide the question of when a court
validly might set aside an arbitration award on policy grounds. Id. at 374 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M.
at 3120 11.12. Justice Blackmun also stated that the Court did not distinguish how setting
aside a labor arbitration award as violative of public policy differs from refusing to enforce
a non-labor agreement which violates public policy. Id. at 375, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3120 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
7 ' Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
"Id. Justice Blackmun indicated that properly formulating public policy is only the
initial step in refusing to enforce an award on public policy grounds. Id. at 376, 126 L.R.R.M.
at 3121 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 370, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3116.
76 See id. at 373, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
77 See id. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
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that this formulation is only a preliminary step. 78 After the party
or court properly formulates a public policy, it must show or deter-
mine that enforcement of the award creates an "explicit conflict"
with the public policy. 70 In other words, enforcement of the award
must circumvent public policy."
The Misco Court, on the facts presented, properly decided the
issue of judicial review of arbitration awards. The court of appeals
clearly substituted its judgment as to the facts for that of the arbi-
trator by considering evidence the arbitrator, in his discretion, re-
fused to consider. The Fifth Circuit determined that Cooper did
violate Misco's rules, and directed a remedy different from that
ordered by the arbitrator." Such substitution of judicial judgment
for an arbitrator's judgment is impermissible under Enterprise Wheel
and W.R. Grace. 82
The Misco Court also correctly evaluated setting aside the ar-
bitration award on public policy grounds." In order for a public
policy to be explicit and well-established, it must be evidenced in
statutes or judicial precedents." W.R. Grace previously established
the need to formulate such public policies with care and by refer-
ence to laws and legal precedent. 85 The court of appeals, having
made no such effort, improperly set aside the arbitrator's award on
a public policy formulated through common sense and "general
considerations of supposed public interests."88 Such a formulation
seemingly ignores the holding of W.R. Grace."
While the Misco Court indicated that an arbitration award must
create an "explicit conflict" with established public policy, the Court
did not decide when this requirement would be met. 88 Because the
Court only reiterated the principle that judicial review must be
limited and that public policy must be explicit and well-established
to justify setting aside a labor arbitration award, what type of vio-
lation of an appropriately formulated public policy would justify
78
 See id.
" See id. at 373, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
8° See id. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
81 See id. at 371-72, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3117-18.
" See ril.; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 764, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2644; Enkrprise Wheel, 363 U.S.
at 599.
85 See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
84 See id. at 373-74, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
" See W.K. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
86 Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3119.
" See id.; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
88 See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M. at 3120 n.12.
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setting aside an award on public policy grounds remains to be
decided." Thus, the split in the circuits remains despite the fact
that the Misco Court granted certiorari specifically to resolve this
issue."
In summary, Misco upholds the supremacy of arbitration as a
mechanism for resolving labor disputes. It reaffirms the limited
nature of judicial review of labor arbitration awards. Misco clarifies
the holding of W.R. Grace and emphasizes that setting aside awards
as violative of public policy is only a narrow exception to the broad
general rule. This view is necessary to prevent improper judicial
meddling with arbitration awards. Misco, while properly decided,
did not raise or address the issue of when an award may be set
aside on public policy grounds.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. * A Successor Employer's Obligation to Bargain: Fall River Dyeing
& Finishing v. NLRB'
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides
that an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the represen-
tatives of his employees constitutes an unfair labor practice. 2 Under
the successorship doctrine, a new employer qualifying as a successor
employer assumes its predecessor's obligation to bargain with a
properly recognized or board-certified union that represented its
"" See id. at 375,126 L.R.R.M. at 3120 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
ge See, e.g„ Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. I.B.E.W. Local 204, 834 F.2d 1424, 127 L.R.R.M.
2049 (8th Cir. 1987) (setting aside award reinstating employee who violated nuclear safety
rules was against public policy favoring strict observance of federally-mandated nuclear safety
regulations).
* By Maureen Hogan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 107 S. Ct. 2225, 125 L.R.R.M. 2441 (1987),
2 National Labor Relations Act 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(5) (1982). Section 8(a)(5)
provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — ...(5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a)
of this title. Id, Section 159(a) provides:
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment or other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § I59(a) (1982).
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predecessor's employees. 3 A new employer must qualify as a suc-
cessor employer to justify the law's imposition of this duty to bar-
gain. 4 Successorship and the concomitant obligation to bargain exist
where the new employer conducts essentially the same business as
the previous employer and a majority of the new employer's work-
force are former employees of the predecessor. 5 The legal pre-
sumption underlying the successorship doctrine is that because the
union previously represented a majority of the successor's employ-
ees under essentially the same working conditions, a majority of the
successor's employees continue to support and are adequately rep-
resented by that same union. 6 Accordingly, because a mere change
in ownership, without substantial changes in the business or the
composition of the workforce, does not defeat this presumption of
the union's continued majority status, the successor employer as-
sumes the duty to bargain with the union certified as the represen-
tative of its predecessor's employees.'
In the 1972 case of NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,
Inc., the United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether a successor employer inherits the obligation to bargain with
the union certified to represent the employees of its predecessor. 8
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225, 2235, 125 L.R.R.M.
2441, 2447 (1987); NLRB v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 278, 281, 80 L.R.R.M.
2225, 2226, 2228 (1972); NLRB v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459, 463, 118 L.R.R.M.
2681, 2684 (9th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates, 639 F.2d 865, 869, 106
L.R.R.M. 2313, 2315 (2d Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 3, 92 L.R.R.M.
2001, 2003 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921, 93 L.R.R.M. 2570 (1976); Tom-A-Hawk
Transit, Inc, v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1026-27, 73 L.R.R.M. 2020, 2020-21 (7th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1960).
See, e.g., Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2236, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447; Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 463,
118 L.R.R.M. at 2684; Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1100, 107 L.R.R.M. 2011, 2015
(9th Cir. 1981).
3 Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2236, 2237, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447, 2448; Burns, 406 U.S. at
281, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2228; Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 463-64, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2685; Premium
Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623, 627, 113 L.R.R.M. 3261, 3263 (9th Cir. 1983); Kallmann,
640 F,2d at 1100, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2015;Band-Age, 534 F.2d at 3, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2003; Tom-
A-Hawk, 419 F.2d at 1026, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2020-21. •
° Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2233-34, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445-46; Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 463,
118 L.R.R.M. at 2684; Premium, 709 F:2d at 627, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3263; Band-Age, 534 F.2d
at 4, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
7
 Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2235, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446-47; Burns, 406 U.S. at 279, 80
L.R.R,M. at 2227; Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 463, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2684; Aircraft Magnesium, 265
N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984); Premium, 709 F.2d at 627,
113 L.R.R.M. at 3263; Tom-A-Hawk, 419 F.2d at 1027, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2021.
° Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2232, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2444; Burro, 406 U.S. at 274, 80 L.R.R.M.
at 2226. The first Supreme Court decision addressing the rights of a union in a successorship
situation was John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, in which the Court held that under some
December 1988] ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
	 141
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1972 Burns decision, the courts of
appeals in several circuits consistently held that a successor em-
ployer is bound by its predecessor's obligation to bargain with the
certified representative of its employees because a mere change in
ownership does not constitute such an unusual change as to affect
Board certification. 9
 Signifying its approval of the rulings of these
circuit courts, the Supreme Court in Burns held that a successor
employer is obligated to bargain with the incumbent union where
the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a recently certified
bargaining agent represents a majority of the employees hired by
the new employer.m
Although Burns clearly established a successor employer's duty
to bargain, several issues remained unresolved after Burns." First,
because the Burns Court focused on the recent election and board
certification of the union,' 2
 courts might reasonably have inter-
preted the Burns holding narrowly as limited only to situations
where the union was recently certified before the transfer of own-
ership: 5
 Second, limiting its resolution to the specific facts in Burns,
the Burns Court did not precisely delineate the circumstances which
justify the imposition of an obligation to bargain upon a new em-
ployer." Guided by the Burns Court's focus on continuity of the
bargaining unit and continuity of the workforce, however, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) developed a successorship
analysis, which various courts accepted, to determine whether a new
employer qualifies as a successor employer upon which a court may
justifiably impose an obligation to bargain.' 5
 Under this NLRB suc-
cessorship analysis, a new employer is a successor employer only
circumstances a successor employer may be required to arbitrate under the predecessor's
collective-bargaining agreement. 376 U.S. 543, 548, 55 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2772 (1964). The
Supreme Court, however, first addressed the issue of a successor's obligation to bargain
under §8(a)(5) of the NLRA in NLRB v. Burns, 406 U.S. 272, 274, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2226
(1972).
9 Burns, 406 U.S. at 279, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2227; Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 463, 118 L.R.R.M. at
2684; Aircraft, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1345; Premium, 709 F.2d at 627, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3263; Tom-
A-Hawk, 419 F.2d at. 1027, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2021.
i° Burns, 406 U.S. at 278-79, 80 L.R.R.M, at 2227.
" See GORMAN, LABOR LAW 125-31 (1976).
12
 Burns, 406 U.S. at 278-79, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
13
 See Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2232-33, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445; Band-Age, 534 F.2d at 4,
92 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
14 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 274, 281, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2226, 2227; see also GORMAN, supra
note 11, at 125.
15 See, e.g., Aircraft, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1345; Premium Foods, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 708, 714
(1982), enforced, 709 F.2d 623, 113 L.R.R.M. 3261 (9th Cir. 1983).
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where "substantial continuity" exists between the new company and
the predecessor's operations and a majority of the successor's em-
ployees worked for the predecessor employer.' 6
Third, the Burns Court did not address the issue of when the
obligation to bargain matures.' 7 The Burns Court preserved the
successor employer's freedom to set unilaterally the initial terms
upon which to hire the predecessor's employees by holding that the
successor's obligation to bargain with the union did not mature until
it had selected its workforce. 18 As the Court indicated, the obligation
to bargain depended upon the composition of the workforce and
arose only because a majority of the successor's workforce were
former employees of the predecessor.'`' The Burns Court indicated
that the exact point in time at which a successor employer's obli-
gation to bargain matures depends upon the particular circum-
stances of each situation. The Court, however, did not offer any
guidelines for identifying the date upon which to examine the
composition of the workforce to determine if the new employer
possesses an obligation to bargain with the incumbent union. 2° After
Burns, the NLRB developed the "substantial and representative
complement" rule for identifying the date upon which the Board
should examine the composition of the successor's workforce. 2 ' Ad-
"Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 463, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2685 (9th Cir. 1985); Indianapolis Mack Sales
& Serv., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 690, 693 (1984), enforcement denied on other grounds, 802 F.2d 280,
123 L.R.R.M. 2543 (7th Cir. 1986); Aircraft, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1345; Premium, 260 N.L.R.B. at
714; NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates,1639 F.2d 865 869, 106 L.R.R.M. 2313, 2315-16
(2d Cir. 1981); Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1100, 107 L.R.R.M. 2011, 2015 (9th Cir.
1981).
17 Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2237, 125 L.R,R.M. at 2449; see GORMAN, supra note 11, at
129.
L Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2233-34.
is Id. at 278-79, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
24 Id. at 294-95, 80 L.R,R.M. at 2233-34.
21 Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 464, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2685; Indianapolis, 272 N.L.R.B. at 694;
Premium, 709 F.2d at 628, 113 L.R,R.M. at 3264 (9th Cir. 1983). Pursuant to the Board's
rule, the appropriate time at which to examine a successor's workforce to determine whether
the successor possesses a duty to bargain is when the successor has achieved a substantial
and representative complement of workers on the job. See, e.g., Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 464, 118
L.R.R.M. at 2685; Premium, 709 F.2d at 628, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3264. To determine whether
the employer has hired a substantial and representative complement of workers upon any
specified date, the Board has articulated several factors for consideration, including whether
the employer has substantially filled the job classifications For the operation, whether the
operation has begun normal production, the size of the complement, the time expected to
elapse before a larger complement of workers begin work, and the relative certainty of the
employer's expansion. Jeffries, 752 F.2d at 464, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2685; Premium, 709 F.2d at
628, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3264. After identifying the date upon which a successor employer has
achieved a substantial and representative complement of workers by reference to these
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ditionally, in fixing the date upon which to examine a successor's
workforce, the Board requires not only the presence of a substantial
and representative complement of workers, but also a demand for
bargaining by the union. 22 Consequently, the Board has adopted a
"continuing demand" rule under which a premature bargaining
demand, which is a union demand prior to the attainment of a
substantial and representative complement, remains in force until
the date when the employer attains the substantial and represen-
tative complement. 23
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court in
Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB held that a successor's
obligation to bargain is not limited to a situation where the union
was only recently certified, but applies in all situations. 24
 The Court
reasoned that because a certified union is entitled to a one-year
conclusive presumption of majority status following certification
and a rebuttable presumption thereafter, a successor's bargaining
obligation does not depend upon recent certification. 25
 The Court
ruled that, provided the new employer is in fact a successor em-
ployer and the majority of its workforce were employees of its
predecessor, the new employer possesses an obligation to bargain
with the incumbant union that is presumed to have majority status. 26
Additionally, the Court in Fall River approved three rules adopted
by the NLRB to guide successorship analysis. 27
 The Court approved
the Board's "substantial continuity" approach to determine whether
a new employer qualifies as a successor and, applying the analysis
to the facts before it, held that Fall River Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation (Fall River Corporation) was a successor employer. 28
Furthermore, the Court in Fall River held that the Board's "sub-
stantial and representative complement" rule, designed to identify
the date upon which a 'successor's obligation to bargain with an
incumbent union matures, is reasonable in the successorship con-
factors, the Board thereafter examines the successor's workforce upon that date to decide
whether the successor is obligated to bargain with the incumbent union. Jeffries, 752 F.2d at
464, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2685.
22 Indianapolis, 272 N.L.R.B. at 694.
23 Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2241, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2451; Spruce•Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B.
194, 197 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975).
" Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2235, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
" Id. at 2233, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445.
25 Id. at 2235, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447.
22 Id.
26 Id. at 2236, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447.
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text.29 Applying this "substantial and representative complement"
rule to the facts, the Court identified the date upon which to ex-
amine the successor's workforce and held that because a majority
of the workforce at that moment were former employees of the
predecessor, Fall River Corporation's obligation to bargain arose at
that point in time. 3° Finally, the Fall River Court ruled that the
Board's "continuing demand" rule, which establishes that a union's
premature bargaining demand continues in force until the moment
when the employer attains a substantial and representative comple-
ment, is reasonable in the successorship situation. 31
Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB involved an own-
ership transfer of a textile dyeing and finishing plant in Fall River,
Massachusetts. 32 For thirty years prior to 1982, the Sterlingwale
company operated the textile dyeing and finishing plant which
engaged in both commission dyeing and converting dyeing. 33 Severe
adverse economic conditions and foreign competition in the late
1970s forced the Sterlingwale company to reduce its workforce. 54
Sterlingwale's economic situation steadily declined until finally, in
February 1982, the company laid off all of its production employees,
retaining only a skeleton crew to complete its remaining orders and
to maintain the building and machinery." Sterlingwale finally went
out of business in the late summer of 1982 after which Sterlingwale
made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors and and hired
a professional liquidator to dispose of its remaining assets."
During the months following the February 1982 lay-off, a for-
mer employee of Sterlingwale and the president of one of Sterling-
wale's major customers formed the Fall River Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation." The promoters of Fall River Corporation intended
to engage exclusively in the commission dyeing business and to
benefit from the availability of Sterlingwale's assets and workforce."
Accordingly, Fall River Corporation acquired Sterlingwale's prop-
erty and equipment and purchased Sterlingwale's remaining inven-
29 /d. at 2240, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
90 Id.
" Id. at 2241, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
32 Id. at 2230, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2443.
" Id. at 2229, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2442.
" Id.
"Id.
'4 Id. at 2230, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2443.
" Id.
38 Id.
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tory at the liquidator's auction." Fall River Corporation began op-
erating out of Sterlingwale's former plant in September 1982 and
advertised in a local newspaper for workers and supervisors to fill
its workforce." Initially, Fall River Corporation planned to hire one
full shift of workers, fifty-five to sixty employees, and to expand to
two shifts if business were successful.'" Fall River Corporation first
hired twelve supervisors who assisted in the hiring decisions for the
production employees. 42 Eight of these twelve supervisors were for-
mer supervisors of Sterlingwale and three were former Sterlingwale
production employees." During the hiring process, Fall River Cor-
poration entertained recommendations from these supervisors and
considered a prospective employee's former employment with Ster-
lingwale in its hiring decision. 44
Fail River Corporation's workforce - steadily expanded. By No-
vember 1982 the company had filled a complete range of job clas-
sifications, had started production operations and was processing
customer orders." In mid-January 1983, the company achieved its
initial hiring goal of one shift of workers consisting of fifty-five
workers, thirty-six of whom were former employees of Sterling-
wale." Fall River Corporation's workforce reached two full shifts
by mid-April at which point, for the first time, former Sterlingwale
employees constituted a minority of the workforce, 52 or 53 out of
107 employees. 47
The United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 292
(Union), represented Sterling-wale's production and maintenance
employees for practically thirty years." In 1978 the Union negoti-
ated the last collective-bargaining agreement before Sterlingwale's
decline. 49 Although this collective-bargaining agreement was due to
expire in 1981, appreciating the financial difficulties of Sterlingwale,
the Union agreed to amend the 1978 agreement to extend its ex-
piration date until April 1, 1982 without any wage increase and
19 Id.
4(' Id.
41 Id.
4'4'
" Id.
44 Id.
48 Id. at 2231, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2443.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2229, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2442.
49 Id.
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with a commitment to improving productivity. 50 Nevertheless, the
collective-bargaining agreement ultimately expired and Sterling-
wale went out of business in the late summer of 1982. 5 '
After Fall River Corporation began operations, the Union de-
manded in a letter dated October 19 that Fall River Corporation
recognize it as the bargaining representative of its employees and
begin bargaining. 52 At this point in time, eighteen persons out of a
twenty-one person workforce were former employees of Sterling-
wale." Fall River Corporation, however, refused the request." Con-
sequently, the Union filed an unfair labor practice claim with the
National Labor Relations Board on November I, 1982. The Union
alleged that Fall River Corporation violated sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act by its refusal to bar-
gain. 55 The administrative law judge hearing the case decided that
Fall River Corporation was a successor employer possessing a duty
to bargain. 56 The judge further decided that Fall River Corpora-
tion's obligation to bargain matured in mid-January when it attained
a substantial and representative complement of workers because
former Sterlingwale employees then constituted a majority of the
successor's workforce and the Union's October bargaining demand
remained effective until this date. 57 The Board affirmed the admin-
istrative law judge's ruling, 58 and the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit enforced the Board's order, finding the Board's determi-
nation reasonable. 59 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of its interest in the successorship rules developed
by the Board and the importance of the successorship issue in labor
law.°
Broadening its ruling in Burns that a successor employer is
obligated to bargain with the union representing the predecessor's
employees, the Supreme Court in Fall River held that a successor's
,° Id. at 2229-30, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2442.
" Id. at 2230, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2443.
52 Id.
55 Id.
54 Id.
" Id. at 2231, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2444.
59 Id.
" Id,
"272 N.LR.B. 839, 840 (1984).
59 NLRB v. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 775 F.2d 425,430-31, 120 L.R.R.M.
2825, 2829 ( I st Cir. 1985).
ou Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. at 2232, 125 L.R.R.M. at
2444.
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obligation to bargain is not limited to situations where the union
representing the predecessor's employees received certification only
shortly before the transfer."' Rather, the Court held that a certified
union is entitled to a one-year conclusive presumption of majority
status following certification and a rebuttable presumption of ma-
jority status thereafter. 62 Therefore, the Court held, a new employer
has an obligation to bargain with that union provided the new
employer is in fact a successor and a majority of its workforce were
employees of its predecessor.° The Court reasoned that a mere
transfer of ownership does not affect the force of the Board's
certification within the normal operative period, nor defeat the legal
presumptions of majority status following certification." Although
these presumptions do not rest upon an absolute certainty that a
union's majority status continues after certification, the Court stated
that the National Labor Relations Act's overriding policy of indus-
trial peace supports these legal presumptions. 65 As the Court indi-
cated, these presumptions further industrial peace by enabling a
union to establish stable bargaining relationships with employers
through which to pursue its members' goals." The presumptions,
the Court observed, remove a union's fears that it will lose majority
support unless its bargaining efforts produce immediate results and
prevent employers from attempting to avoid and delay bargaining
to undermine a union's support."'
The Court stated that the policy and rationale underlying these
presumptions of majority status following certification particularly
apply in the successorship situation." During a transfer of owner-
ship, the Court noted, a union is particularly vulnerable because it
does not possess a bargaining relationship with the new employer
and is uncertain as to the new employer's plans and the existence
of an obligation to bargain. 69 The Court stated that a presumption
of majority status during this transition period is necessary to assist
the union in protecting its members' rights and establishing a re-
lationship with the new employer." Furthermore, without a con-
"' Id. at 2235, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
as
" Id. at 2233-35, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445-47,
".a Id. at 2232-33, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445.
"5 Id. at 2233, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445.
Id.
"7 Id.
Id, at 2233, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
"id at 2233-34, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
"Id, at 2234, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
148	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:99
tinuing presumption of majority status, the Court found that a
transition between employers may undermine employee confidence
in and support for a union." The Court reasoned that employees
may perceive their union choice as controlled by the vagaries of a
company's transformation." During the initial period of employ-
ment for the successor, the Court noted, the employees may avoid
supporting their former union because they fear losing their new
jobs or blame the union for their employment problems caused by
the transition." As the Court stated, the presumptions prevent an
employer from using a successor enterprise either to negate an
existing labor contract or to encourage the employees' aversion to
the union and to eliminate the union's presence. 74 Accordingly, the
Court ruled that a successor employer's obligation to bargain is not
limited to situations involving recent certification before the tran-
sition." Rather, the obligation to bargain with the incumbent union
arises where an employer qualifies as a successor and the employees
of the predecessor comprise a majority of its workforce."
Although the Court expansively construed its Burns ruling and
established a successor's obligation to bargain, the Fall River Court
also preserved some freedom for new employers to rearrange their
new businesses independently." As the Court previously stated in
Burns, new employers are usually free to establish the employment
terms upon which to hire the predecessor's employees and are not
obligated to hire these employees provided they do not discrimi-
nate." Additionally, as the Court held in Burns, a successor is not
bound by the substantive provisions of an existing collective-bar-
gaining agreement." Accordingly, the Fall River Court maintained
some freedom for new employers. 86
After establishing that a successor's obligation to bargain is not
limited to situations where the union is only recently certified, the
Court examined whether Fall River Corporation qualified as a suc-
n Id.
72 Id.
78 Id.
74 Id.
78 Id. at 2235, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
"Id.
" Id. at 2234, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446 (quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414
U.S. 168, 182, 84 L.R.R.M 2839, 2844 (1973); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 549, 55 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2772 (1964)).
7, Id. (quoting NLRB v. Burns, 406 U.S. at 294, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2233).
7"Id.; Burns, 406 U.S. at 284,.80 L.R.R.M. at 2229.
8"Id. at 2234, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
December 19881 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 149
cessor. 8 ' The Supreme Court approved of the Board's "substantial
continuity" analysis for determining whether a new employer qual-
ified as a successor employer. 82 Applying this fact oriented inquiry
which considers the totality of the circumstances and focuses upon
the existence of substantial continuity between the business enter-
prises, the Supreme Court ruled that Fall River Corporation qual-
ified as a successor of Sterlingwale. 83 The Court indicated that the
analysis involves a number of factors, including essential similarity
between the two businesses, maintenance of employees in the same
job positions under similar working conditions and continuation of
the same mode of production, the same products and a similar body
of customers. 84 The analysis emphasizes the employees' perspective,
the Court stated, focusing upon whether the employees retained by
the successor view their jobs as basically unaltered." The Court
noted that if employees perceive no change in their situation, but
do not receive continued representation by their chosen union,
employee dissatisfaction may instigate labor unrest and disrupt in-
dustrial peace. 8"
Applying this analysis to the facts of Fall River, the Court ruled
that substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that
Fall River Corporation was a successor employer because substantial
continuity existed between the business of Sterlingwale and the
operations of Fall River Corporation. 87 The Court found that Fall
River Corporation acquired Sterlingwale's property, equipment,
and inventory, and that Fall River Corporation continued the same
product line and maintained the same production process despite
its exclusive involvement in commission dyeing. 88 From the em-
ployees' perspective, the Court noted, the nature of their jobs re-
mained unchanged because they retained the same job classifica-
tions, worked on the same machines, and received direction from
many of the same supervisors." Significantly, the Court stated, Fall
River Corporation intended to exploit the availability of its prede-
" Id. at 2236, 125 L.R.R.M, at 2447.
Id.
" Id. at 2236-37, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447-48.
" Id. at 2236, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447.
a Id. (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. at 184, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2845;
Jeffries, 752 E.2d at 464, 118 LR,R.M. at 2685).
"6 Id.
" Id. at 2236, 125 L.R.R.M at 2448,
" Id.
" Id.
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cessor's workforce in establishing the new enterprise. 90 In applying
this totality of circumstances analysis, the Court ruled that the seven-
month hiatus between the expiration of Sterlingwale and the start-
up of Fall River Corporation did not undermine the Board's deter-
mination of substantial continuity." Because a hiatus is only one
factor in the analysis and because the hiatus in this situation con-
stituted a normal start-up period and its duration was uncertain,
the Court determined that the other factors suggesting substantial
continuity required a conclusion of successorship because additional
indicia of discontinuity did not exist. 92
After establishing Fall River Corporation as a successor, the
Court addressed the issue of whether Fall River Corporation, as a
successor, possessed an obligation to bargain with the incumbent
Union and when such an obligation arose." The Court held that
the Board's "substantial and representative complement" rule for
determining the moment at which a successor's obligation to bargain
matures is reasonable in the successorship situation." The Court
stated that the composition of the successor's workforce was the
dispositive factor triggering the bargaining obligation. 95 The Court
noted that in the present case and similar situations involving a
start-up, during which the new employer gradually builds its op-
erations and workforce, the issue of when a successor employer's
obligation matures necessarily requires determination. 95 The Court
noted that because the composition of the successor's workforce
may depend upon the moment at which examination of the work-
force takes place, the Board developed the "substantial and repre-
sentative complement" rule to identify the appropriate date to con-
duct the determination.97
Pursuant to the "substantial and representative complement"
rule, the Court observed, the appropriate moment to conduct a
majority representation examination and to impose the bargaining
duty is when the new employer attains a substantial and represen-
tative complement of workers on the job. 98 Fulfillment of designated
9° Id.
91 Id. at 2237,125 L.R.R,M, at 2448.
92 Id.
9' Id. at 2237-39,125 L.R.R.M. at 2448-50.
94 Id. at 2240,125 L.R.R.M. at 2251.
9' Id. at 2237,125 L.R.R.M. at 2448-49.
96 Id. at 2238,125 L.R.R.M. at 2449.
97 Id.
9' Id. at 2238-39,125 L.R.R.M. at 2449-50.
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job classifications, establishment of normal production, the size of
the complement, the length of time expected to pass before the
employment of a larger complement and the relative certainty of
the employer's expansion plans are among the factors the Board
considers in determining whether a substantial and representative
complement is on the job. 99 In upholding the Board's rule, the
Court rejected Fall River Corporation's argument that the "substan-
tial and representative complement" rule violates the representation
rights of employees who did not work for the predecessor and
places an unreasonable burden on the employer."' Rather, the
Court stated that the rule appropriately balanced the goal of max-
imum employee participation in the selection of a bargaining rep-
resentative against the objective of assuring employee representa-
tion as quickly as possible. 1 °' The Court also held that the
"substantial and representative complement" rule did not unrea-
sonably burden a new employer because the successor occupies the
best position to apply the criteria outlined by the Court. 102 Accord-
ing to the Court, the employer is the appropriate person to know
when all the job classifications are substantially filled, when normal
production begins and when a majority of its expected workforce
are employed.'"
In addition to concluding that the "substantial and represen-
tative complement" rule is reasonable in the successorship context,
the Court ruled that substantial evidence supported the Board's
application of the rule to the facts and its conclusion that mid-
January was the period during which the Fall River Corporation
achieved a substantial and representative complement.'" By mid-
January Fall River Corporation had attained its initial hiring goal
of one full shift, had hired employees in a full range of job classi-
fications and employed a majority of its expected total workforce.'°'
Because a majority of this full shift worked for the predecessor,
Sterlingwale, the Court agreed with the Board that Fall River Cor-
poration's obligation to bargain with the incumbent Union, AFL-
CIO Local 292, arose at this point.i"Ci
99 Id. at 2239, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2449-50.
10G Id. at 2239, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
1 °' Id. at 2238, 125 L.R.R.M, at 2449.
in Id. at 2239-40, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
1 " Id. at 2240, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
1 °4 Id. at 2240, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
1 °5 Id.
LGh Id.
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•	 Addressing the additional requirerhent that the union must
issue a bargaining demand to trigger the employer's obligation, the
Court upheld the Board's "continuing demand" rule under which
a premature demand retains its force until the successor attains a
substantial and representative cam plement.'° 7 The Court stated that
the rule is reasonable and practical considering the union's position
in the successorship situation and the minimal burden which the
rule places upon the employer. 108 As the Court noted, because an
established relationship does not exist between the union and the
employer, the union very likely will issue a premature bargaining
demand.'" The Court reasoned that requiring the union repeatedly
to renew its bargaining demand despite its naivete as to the em-
ployer's plans and its inability to gauge when a representative com-
plement exists is nonsensical."° The Court stated, in contrast, that
requiring the employer to view a premature demand as a continuing
demand is reasonable because once the employer attains a substan-
tial and representative complement, the employer need only deter-
mine whether the union has issued a demand."' Therefore, pur-
suant to the "continuing demand" rule, the Court held that the
union's demand of October 19 continued in force until mid-January
when Fall River Corporation attained a substantial and represen-
tative complement and its obligation to bargain consequently ma-
tured. 112
Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion' 13 in Fall River, disagreed
with the majority's application of the successorship analysis and the
Board's "substantial and representative complement" rule. 1 E 4 The
dissent agreed with the majority that a conclusion of successorship
requires a finding of substantial continuity between the two enter-
prises. 15 The dissent disagreed, however, with the Court's holding
that the Fall River Corporation qualified as a successor employer
because in the dissent's view the evidence did not establish substan-
tial continuity between the Fall River Corporation and Sterling-
wale. 116
107 Id. at 2241, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2951.
1 " Id.
1 " Id.
no Id.
LH Id .
L12 id,
115 The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell's dissent.
114 Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2242, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2452 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 2243, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116u.
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According to the dissent, the Court ignored the overwhelming
evidence of discontinuity including evidence that the two businesses
were completely separate entities, that no contractual or other busi-
ness relationship existed between the two enterprises, that a seven-
month hiatus disrupted business operations, and that Fall River
Corporation purchased Sterlingwale's inventory on the open mar-
ket, and the purchases involved only tangible assets, not Sterling-
wale's goodwill or trade name.' 17 Viewed from the employees' per-
spective, the dissent added, the evidence also revealed that the
employees could not reasonably, perceive their new jobs as simply
continuations of their Sterlingwale positions. 18 These facts persua-
sively indicated, the dissent stated, that the Board's finding of sub-
stantial continuity was incorrect. 119 Consequently, the dissent con-
cluded that the majority misapplied the successorship doctrine
because of the break in continuity between the enterprises and
because neither the employer nor the employees could have antic-
ipated such an application. 12"
The dissent also disagreed with the Court's application of the
Board's "substantial and representative complement" rule and its
conclusion that mid-January was the appropriate date upon which
to measure the composition of the successor's workforce."' The
dissent noted that the "substantial and representative complement"
analysis performs a necessary function when future expansion of
the successor's workforce is speculative or hiring is sporadic.' 22 The
dissent indicated, however, that the "substantial and representative
complement" test merely estimates the percentage of employees
from the predecessor who will eventually work for the new em-
ployer and involves obvious risks if the complement examined on
a particular date contains a disproportionate number of workers. 128
As the dissent stated, the full workforce may not receive union
representation that a ,majority favors or may receive representation
that a majority does not support.'" The dissent stressed that in
prior decisions, the "substantial and representative complement"
analysis considered the time expected to pass before a larger com-
1 " Id.
"B id, at 2244, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 2243, 125 L.R.R.M, at 2453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 2244, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2954 (Powell, J., dissenting).
L21 Id. at 2245, 125 L,R.R.M. at 2454 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122 Id.
its Id.
12.1 Id.
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plement began work and the definiteness of the expected expan-
sion.' 25 Consequently, the dissent argued that in Fall River and
similar situations where the expected expansion was imminent and
definite, the Board should conduct the determination upon the
successor's attainment of a Full completnent.' 26 The dissent rejected
the majority's application of the "substantial and representative
complement" rule in Fall River as unfair both to the employer who
could not reasonably have identified mid-January as the period
during which its obligation to bargain arose and to most of Fall
River Corporation's employees who did not receive the opportunity
to choose their union. 127 According to the dissent, the Court's ap-
plication of the "substantial and representative complement" rule
in Fall River overprotects the goal of early employee representation
while sacrificing maximum employee participation in union selec-
tion. 128
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Fall River does not
dramatically alter existing law, the Court clarified the appropriate
analysis to determine whether a new employer possesses an obli-
gation to bargain with the incumbent union and when such a duty
arises. Under the Fall River decision, application of the successor-
ship doctrine involves a two part analysis. First, the new employer.
must qualify as a successor under the "substantial continuity" test
established by the Board and approved by the Fall River Court.' 29
After identifying the employer as a successor, the analysis focuses
upon the composition of the successor's workforce to discover
whether imposition of a bargaining obligation is justified.'" The
appropriate date to examine the composition of the workforce is
the date.upon which the employer attains a substantial and repre-
sentative complement of workers.' 3 ' The successor's obligation to
bargain with the incumbent union arises if upon that identified
date, a majority of the successor's workforce are former employees
of the predecessor.' 32
The new employer substantially controls the applicability of the
successorship doctrine.'" In Fall River the Court protected a new
125 1d. at 2245, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2454-55 (Powell, J., dissenting).
in Id, at 2245, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2454 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
I" Id. at 2246, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2455 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 2236, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2447-48.
15° Id, at 2237, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2448-51.
15 ' Id. at 2238, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2449.
'" Id. at 2240, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
i" Id. at 2234, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
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employer's prerogative to arrange the new enterprise indepen-
dently.'" The new employer may thus resist imposition of the ob-
ligation to bargain by avoiding substantial continuity between the
new and the old businesses. 135 Additionally, provided the employer
does not discriminate against union employees, the employer may
avoid inheriting its predecessor's obligation by filling its workforce
with employees not previously employed by the predecessor.' 3  Un-
der the Court's decision, imposition of a duty to bargain requires a
conscious decision by the new employer.'" If the new employer
decides to maintain substantially the same business and to hire a
majority of its employees from the predecessor, and thus takes
advantage of the predecessor's demise and the availability of a
trained workforce, the new employer justifiably inherits the bar-
gaining obligation of its predecessor.' 38 Because of the continuity
of the enterprise and the continuity of the workforce, both the
employer and the employees can reasonably expect the employer
to inherit the predecessor's obligation to bargain. Consequently, the
new employer has the option of either avoiding or assuming the
bargaining obligation , of its predecessor.
Although a new employer can avoid qualification as a successor,
where the employer continues substantially the same business and
employs a majority of its predecessor's workforce, the employer
cannot avoid the bargaining obligation simply because the union
did not receive certification shortly before the transfer. The Fall
River Court held that a successor's obligation to bargain is not
limited to situations where the union was only recently certified
before the transfer, but arises because the law presumes that a union
possesses majority support where the new employer qualifies as a
successor and the predecessor formerly employed a majority of the
successor's workforce." 9 Yet, as the dissent indicates, the date of
certification is not unimportant in determining the strength of the
presumption of majority status. 14° As the dissent states, the more
remote the certification, the weaker the presumption that the union
retains majority support. Accordingly, because recent Board certi-
fication strengthens the legal presumptions underlying the succes-
"4 Id,
ass Id.
Isii
Is, Id.
1 " Id. at 2234-35,125 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
'" Id, at 2235,125 L,R.R.M. at 2446-47.
'" See id. at 2242 ri.11,125 L.R.R.M. at 2452 n.l.
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sorship doctrine, the date of certification must factor into any de-
termination of whether a successor is obligated to bargain with an
incumbent union.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's holding in Fall River places
the burden of determining if and when its obligation to bargain
arises upon the new employer. 141 Under the Court's decision, a new
employer must monitor its own workforce to identify the point at
which it attains a substantial and representative complement of
workers. The employer therefore is responsible for applying the
various factors of the "substantial and representative complement"
test. 142
 A substantial burden accompanies the responsibility which
the employer thus assumes.' 43 The employer risks violating Section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA if it refuses to bargain after it attains a rep-
resentative complement of workers.' 49 Additionally, by recognizing
a union prior to the attainment of a substantial and representative
complement, the employer may violate Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
under which employer support for a labor organization constitutes
an unfair labor practice.' 45
Despite these substantial risks, however, the Court in Fall River
concluded that the "substantial and representative complement"
rule does not unreasonably burden an employer because the em-
ployer is in the best position to apply the criteria outlined by the
Court. 146 The Court did not appreciate, however, the uncertainty
of the factors analysis outlined for determining whether a substan-
tial and representative complement exists. The analysis' uncertainty
is illustrated by the dissent's argument that the court's application
of the rule ignored two essential factors: the time expected to elapse
before the employment of' a larger complement of workers and the
certainty of the employer's expected expansion plans.' 47 Clearly, the
"substantial and representative complement" rule is not as straight-
forward as the Court claimed.'" If the Court cannot even agree on
a proper application of the test, the Court cannot require an em-
ployer to apply the analysis without allowing the employer some
flexibility in setting the date. Recognizing this problem, the Court
' 1 ' Id. at 2239, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
142 Id. at 2239-40, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
' 45 Id. at 2239, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
144 Id.
"5 Id.
' 46 1d. at 2239-40, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
"7 See id. at 2245, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2454-55.
"' See id. at 2'239-40, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
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indicated that an employer is only expected to determine whether
a substantial and representative complement is achieved with "tol-
erable certainty." 149
 This language indicates that courts should allow
employer's some flexibility in their selection of the date provided
they make a good faith effort and the evidence does not indicate
that the employer manipulated the date to avoid bargaining.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court decision of Fall River intro-
duced some certainty into the law regarding a successor employer's
obligation to bargain with the union of its predecessor's employees.
First, the Fall River Court approved the Board's "substantial con-
tinuity" analysis to establish a new employer as a successor. Second,
the Court accepted the Board's "substantial and representative com-
plement" rule as reasonable for determining the date upon which
a successor's obligation to bargain matures. Third, the court upheld
the Board's "continuing demand" rule under which a premature
bargaining demand by the incumbent union retains its force until
the successor employer attains a substantial and representative com-
plement of workers on the job. The Fall River decision also estab-
lished that the new employer bears the burden of applying the
"substantial and representative complement" analysis to determine
if and when its obligation to bargain with the incumbent union
matures. Because the analysis the Court outlined for discovering
whether a representative complement exists involves substantial un-
certainty, the burden placed upon the new employer is great. The
new employer, however, occupies the best position for engaging in
this analysis and therefore should shoulder the burden imposed.
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1. *Handbilling of Secondary Employers as "Signal Picketing":
Catalytic v. Monmouth & Ocean County Building Trades
Council'
Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act") provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
engage in "secondary boycotting." 2
 A secondary boycott occurs
"' Id, at 2240, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2450,
*By Lisa M, Ropple, Staff Member, Bosionr COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 829 F.2d 430, 126 L.R.R.M. 2425 (3d Cir. 1987).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982). Section 8(b)(4)(ii) prohibits threats, coercion, and re-
straint of persons engaged in commerce to force or require them to cease doing business
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where a union, through threats or coercion, persuades an employer
with whom it has no dispute, the "secondary employer," to terminate
its business relationship with the employer with whom the union
has the dispute, the "primary employer." To insure that this stat-
utory prohibition on secondary activity would not conflict with first
with any other person. The "publicity proviso" to section 8(b)(4)(ii), however, exempts certain
informational activities. Id, Section 8(b)(4)(ii) provides in pertinent part:
lilt shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where ... an object thereof is —
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organi-
zation as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of
section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall
he construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing;... Provided further, That ... nothing contained in
such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by
an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an
effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the pri-
mary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver,
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of
the employer engaged in such distribution ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
In 1959, Congress enacted section 8(b)(4)(ii) (the "Landrum Amendment") as an amend-
ment to the Act to prevent coerced involvement of neutral employers in the labor disputes
of others. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 ("Tree Fruits"), 377 U.S. 58, 63-
71, 55 L.R.R.M, 2961, 2964-67 (1964) for an exhaustive discussion of the amendment's
legislative history.
3
 A "primary employer" is the employer with whom the union has a labor dispute; a
"secondary employer" is a neutral person or business who has no labor dispute with the
union. C. Cornelia, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 33 Ohio App. 2d 61,
72, 292 N.E.2d 647, 656, 82 L.R.R.M. 2503, 2508 (1972).
Secondary activity refers to union conduct directed against third parties who are not
concerned in the union's dispute with the primary employer. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 690, 586 F.2d 1234, 1239, 99 L.R.R.M.
3321, 3323 (8th Cir. 1978). The courts routinely interpret section 8(b)(4)(ii) as prohibiting
union secondary activity, such as secondary boycotting and picketing. R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT OF LABOR LAw 240 (1976).
A secondary boycott is one in which the union directs its activities toward neutral third
parties that deal with the primary employer, such as secondary employers, to bring economic
pressure upon the main disputant. See id.
Secondary picketing is a form of picketing in which pressure is put on one business
establishment with which there is no dispute in order to induce the business to put pressure
on the primary employer with which the union has a dispute. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1213
(5th ed. 1979).
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amendment rights, 4 Congress included a "publicity proviso" that
exempts from the section 8(b)(4)(ii) ban certain union conduct de-
signed to inform the public of the union's dispute with the primary
employer. 5 Under the terms of the proviso, handbilling is protected
union activity if it truthfully advises the public that the secondary
employer distributes the primary employer's products and does not
induce the neutral employees to engage in a sympathetic work
stoppage. 6
Courts agree that handbilling is permissible if it falls within the
protection of the publicity proviso.? Handbills satisfying the terms
of the proviso, courts have concluded, must contain truthful
information 8 and must describe accurately the nature of the union's
dispute with the primary employer and the relationship between
the secondary and primary employers. 9 Most importantly, the hand-
The legislative history reflects that Congress' concern that § 8(b)(4)(ii) not violate first
amendment rights partially motivated the adoption of the publicity proviso, See Tree Fruits,
377 U.S. at 69, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2966; Boxhorn's Big Muskego Gun Club, Inc. v. Electrical
Workers Local 494, 798 F.2d 1016, 1021, 123 L.R.R.M. 2139, 2143-44 (7th Cir. 1986);
GORMAN, SUpra. note 3, at 261. Among other reasons, the legislature drafted the amendment
to avoid the first amendment "problems" associated with the House Landrum-Griffin bill,
See Hospital & Serv. Employees Union, Local 399 v. NLRB ("Delia Airlines"), 743 F.2d 1417,
1423 & n.3, 117 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2722 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1984).
5 Sec supra note 2 for the text of the publicity proviso.
" Id.
See MOFtR1S, 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1111 (2d ed. 1983); Briggs & Mack,
Secondary Handbilling: The Need for a New Response, 17 AKRON L. REV. 211, 211-12 (1983).
" As per the language of the publicity proviso, the handbills must be truthful. See Solien
v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 623 F. Supp, 597, 602-03, 122 L.R.R.M. 3088, 3093 (F.D. Mo,
1985); Local No. P-9, United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. George A. Hormel &
Co. ("Hormel"), 281 N.L.R.B. No. 135, slip op. at 6, 123 L.R.R.M. 1225, 1226 (Sept. 30, 1986).
The handbills also must be informational in nature. See Honolulu Typographical Union No.
37 v. NLRB, 40] F.2d 952, 957-58, 68 L.R.R.M. 3005, 3008 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
The secondary employer's status as a "producer" or "distributor" of the primary em-
ployer's products under section 8(b)(4)(ii) has been frequently litigated. See, e,g., Boxhorn, 798
F.2d at 1016, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2139; Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545, 106 L.R.R.M, 2477
(8th Cir. 1981); Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M.
2369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002, 62 L.R.R.M. 2392 (1966);Hormet, 281 N.L.R.B.
No. 135, 123 L.R.R.M. 1225. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the context of
secondary consumer picketing and handbilling. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 71-73, 55 L.R.R.M.
at 2967; NLRB v, Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46„55-56, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2960 (1964). For a
discussion of these cases and consumer secondary handbilling generally, see Annual Survey of
Labor Law, 23 B.C.L. REV. 166, 166-77 (1981); Briggs & Mack, supra note 7, at 211-28.
"See, e.g., Boxhorn, 798 F.2d at 1019, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2142 (handbill must tell customers
dispute is with an identified primary employer); Delta Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1922, 117 L.R.R.M.
at 2721 (at the very least the handbills must advise the public of the nature of the primary
dispute and the secondary employer's relationship . to it); Solien, 623 F. Supp. at 604, 122
L.R.R.M. at 3094 ("If the handbill contains information unrelated to the primary dispute,
the handbill falls outside the protection of the publicity proviso.").
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bills cannot threaten or coerce the secondary employer'° or induce
any of its employees to engage in a work stoppage."
The National Labor Relations Board and several Circuit Courts
of Appeal have disagreed, however, on whether section 8(b)(4)(ii)
bans all handbilling except that specifically protected by the public-
ity proviso.' 2
 The Supreme Court recently resolved this conflict in
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construc-
tion Trades Council, where the Court ruled that union handbilling
directed against a neutral employer may be lawful even if the pub-
licity proviso does not exempt such activity.' 3 The Court affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the publicity proviso as an
interpretive, explanatory section, rather than as an exception to an
"otherwise-all-encompassing prohibition on publicity." 14
 Therefore,
the Court ruled, section 8(b)(4)(ii) only applies to situations involv-
ing nonpicketing communications directed at the secondary em-
ployer's customers and consequently does not ban handbilling ac-
I° Boxhonz, 798 F.2d at 1019, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2142 (handbill coercive where object was
to put pressure on club); Roywood Corp. v. Radio Broadcast Technicians Local Union No.
1264, 290 F. Supp. 1008, 1021, 68 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2886 (S.D. Ala. 1968) (handbills, signs,
pickets coercive where calculated to bring economic pressure on secondary employer); Hormel,
281 N.L.R.B. No 135, slip op, at 5, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1226 (handbills coercive where purpose
was to persuade secondary employees to cease doing business).
" The publicity proviso explicitly provides that protection shall not be afforded publicity
that has an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services at the establishment of the employer engaged in such
distribution ...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982). See supra note 2 for the full text of the
provision.
12 MORRIS, supra note 7, Supp. at 372, Prior to the Supreme Court's resolution of this
issue, the NLRB and the Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits held that section 8(b)(4)(ii) prohibits
union handbilling directed against neutral employers unless the handbills fall specifically
within the publicity proviso. See, e.g„ Delta Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1422, 1425, 117 L.R.R.M. at
2721, 2723; Pet, 641 F.2d at 549, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2480; Honolulu Typographical Union, 401
F.2d at 957-58, 68 L.R.R.M. at 3008; Great Western Broadcasting, 356 F.2d at 436, 61 L.R.R.M.
at 2366; International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 139 v. Oak Constr., Inc., 226
N.L.R.B. 759, 760, 93 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1976). The Eleventh Circuit adopted a contrary
view, and interpreted the secondary boycott provision as simply inapplicable to the "peaceful
and orderly distribution of handbills." Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1346, 123 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2015 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 107 S. Ct.
3182, No. 86-1461, 126 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 66 (1987), aff 'd, 56 U.S.L.W. 4328, 4332 (U.S.
April 20, 1988). Under this minority view, union handbilling that targets the secondary
employer can constitute protected activity, even if the leaflets do not fall within the publicity
proviso exemption. Id.
" 56 U.S.L.W. 4328, 4332 (U.S. April 20, 1988) (No. 86-1461).
" Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Trades Council, 56 U.S.L.W.
4328, 4332 (U.S. April 20, 1988) (No. 86-1461).
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tivity not covered thereunder.' 5 The Court thus expressly rejected
the view adopted by the NLRB, and Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits that section 8(b)(4)(ii) prohibits all union handbilling directed
against neutral employers unless the handbills fall specifically within
the publicity proviso.'"
In contrast to the uncertainty prior to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. concerning the status of hand-
billing not within the publicity proviso, courts uniformly recognize
that the publicity proviso's language expressly excludes picketing
from its protection.' 7 In determining when handbilling is imper-
missible, many courts have broadly interpreted this picketing ex-
emption to restrict the distribution of secondary handbills that ei-
ther occurs simultaneously with unlawful picketing's or that
effectively constitutes a picket.' 9 Thus, although the legislative his-
19 1d. at 4332-33.
16 Id.
17 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982). See supra note 2 for the text of the publicity proviso.
La See, e.g., Roywond Corp. v, Radio Broadcast Technicians Local Union No. 1264 , 290
F. Supp. 1008, 1021, 68 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2886-87 (S.D. Ala. 1968) (handbilling, picketing
and distribution of unfair lists constituted unlawful picketing); Cedar Rapids Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Siebke-Hoyt & Co., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 175, slip op. at 2, 125 L.R.R.M.
1270, 1271 (1987); Local 732, 1nel Bhd. of Teamsters v. Servair Maintenance, Inc„ 229
N.L.R.B. 392, 393, 96 L.R.R.M. 1128, 1129 (1977); International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 139 v. Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 759, 759, 93 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1385 (1976)
(simultaneous picketing and handbilling unlawful; subsequent handbilling, unaccompanied
by picketing, lawful because within publicity proviso); Nashville Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Caster-Knott Dry Goods Store, 188 N.L.R.B. 470, 473, 76 L.R.R.M. 1293, 1295
(1971) (handbilling "part and parcel" of unlawful picketing); cf. Local No. P-9, United Food
and Commercial Workers Union v. George A. Hormel & Co., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 135, slip op.
at 8 n.10, 123 L.R.R.M. 1227 n.10, 1226 (Sept. 30, 1986) (where court found handbilling
unlawful when examined separately, it declined to consider whether the publicity proviso is
inapplicable to handbilling because it occurred simultaneously with picketing).
19 See, e.g., NLRB v. National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, Local 31,
631 F.2d 944, 951, 104 L.R.R.M. 3121, 3126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (handbill "extension" of
unlawful picketing); Nashville Bldg., 188 N.L.R.B. at 471, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1294 (consumer
handbills unlawful where "in effect" constituted picketing); Lawrence Typographical Union
No. 570 v. Kansas Color Press, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 279, 284, 67 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1168, enforced,
402 F.2d 452, 69 L.R.R.M. 2591 (10th Cir. 1968) (handbilling unlawful where used as a mere
substitute for conventional picketing to enforce union's demands); Lumber & Sawmill Work-
ers Local 2797 v. Stoltze Land & Lumber Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394, 61 L.R.R.M. 1046,
1048 (1965) (handbills "just as much picketing" as if union members carried a sign); Service
and Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399 v. William J. Burns Intl Detective Agency,
Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 431, 437, 49 L.R.R.M, 1793, 1795 (1962) (marching, patrolling, and
handbilling without placards or armbands not protected activity within publicity proviso);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Jack M. Lohman, ("Lohman"), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 905, 48
L.R.R.M. 1429, 1431 (1961) (handbilling not "tantamount" to unlawful picketing).
How the union members distributing the handbills characterize their activity is not
. diapositive. See, e.g., NLRB v. Knitgoods Worker Local 155, 403 F.2d 388, 390-91, 69
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tory reflects Congress' clear intent that courts distinguish protected
handbilling from unlawful picketing,2° courts have held that this
distinction may disappear in certain circumstances. 21
Courts have been silent, however, regarding whether handbill-
ing may constitute unlawful "signal picketing." "Signal picketing"
refers to activity which, short of a true picket line, signals neutrals
that the union desires their sympathetic action, particularly in the
form of a work stoppage. 22 Traditionally, courts have used this
concept only to distinguish between permissible informational pick-
eting and unlawful "signal picketing."23 Although the courts have
not applied the "signal picketing" notion to handbilling, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the "Board") has considered the issue
in a single decision. 24 In 1973, the Board held in Teamsters Local
L.R.R.M. 2666, 2668 (2d Cir. 1968) ("It is settled, however, that the [NLRB] is not bound to
accept such signs and statements at face value, but is entitled to consider the totality of the
Union's conduct" to determine if it violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)); Teamsters, Local Union No.
688 v. Levitz Furniture Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1133, 84 L.R.R.M. 1103, 1105 (1973)
(member's use of the phrase "informational picketing" to describe union activity did not
transform "mere handbilling" into picketing).
" See, e.g., Lohman, 132 N.L.R.B. at 905, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1431 ("Apart from the language
of the (publicity] proviso itself, the legislative history makes it abundantly clear that mere
handbilling is not picketing but is embraced by the term 'publicity' which is protected by the
proviso."); Briggs & Mack, supra note 7, at 213.
Senator John F. Kennedy, who presided over the conference committee that developed
the Landrum Amendment, explained the content and purpose of the bill as follows:
We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front
of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the
union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other
words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop. can place advertisements
in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all
publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.
105 CONG. REC. 17,898-99 (3959).
21 See MORRIS, supra note 7, at 1114-15. See also supra notes 19 and 20 for cases where
courts found the distinction between handbilling and picketing non-existent.
22 Levitz, 205 N.L.R. B. at 1133, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1104-05. Courts commonly use the phrase
"signal picketing" to refer to activity which, short of a true picket line, signals neutrals that
the union desires their sympathetic action, usually a work stoppage. See NLRB v. Local 825,
A, B, C, D, Operating Engineers, 659 F.2d 379, 387, 108 L.R.R.M. 2480, 2486 (3d Cir. 1981);
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433 v. NLRB,
598 F.2d 1154, 1158 n.6, 101 L.R.R.M. 2440, 2443 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979).
22 See NLRB v. Local 3, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 317 F.2d 193, 199-200, 53 L.R.R.M.
2116, 2120-21 (2d Cir. 1963); Carpenters Local No. 2133 v. Cascade Employers Ass'n, Inc.,
151 N.L.R.B. 1378, 1382, 58 L.R.R.M, 1617, 1618 (1965).
Signal picketing is prohibited insofar as it encourages other unions or union members
not to perform work of the secondary employer or to put pressure on the secondary employer
to influence the primary employer. See MORRIS, supra note 7, at 1104. Publicity picketing,
however, is protected as long as it does not actually interfere with deliveries or communicate
more than the limited information permitted under the publicity proviso. See id.
" Levitz, 205 N.L.R.B. at 1133, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1103.
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Union No. 688 v. Levitz Furniture Co. of Missouri, Inc. that no "signal
picketing" occurred where union members distributed leaflets at a
primary employer's gates. 25 Other than this one Board decision,
however, the concept of "signal picketing" has not been applied to
restrict union handbilling. 26
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Catalytic, Inc. v. Monmouth & Ocean County
Building Trades Council ruled that union handbilling directed against
a secondary employer to protest the primary employer's assignment
of work to non-craft union members constituted "signal picketing"
in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the Act. 27 The court held that,
despite the absence of patrolling and picketing, handbilling does
not fall within the protection of the publicity proviso where inten-
tionally designed to signal the neutral secondary employer's em-
ployees to engage in a work stoppage. 28 Consequently, after Catalytic,
employers may use the concept of "signal picketing" to restrict
unions from conducting secondary handbilling.
The controversy in Catalytic concerned the operation of mobile
cranes at the Oyster Creek nuclear generating plant that Jersey
Central Power and Light Co. ( Jersey Central) owned and CPU
Nuclear, Inc. (GPU) operated. 2" The plaintiff, Catalytic, Inc. (Cata-
lytic), a general contractor, provided engineering maintenance ser-
vice to GPU. 3° Catalytic employed members of various craft unions
as needed to fulfill the terms of its contract with GPU.."
2 ' Id. at 1133, 84 L.R.R.M, at 1104-05. In Levitz, the Board held that no "signal picketing"
occurred where union members (listributed leaflets at a primary employer's premises, during
which they at times walked hack and forth across the driveway, flagged down cars, or placed
themselves in a position that required cars entering the parking lot to stop. Id. at 1132, 84
L.R.R.M. at 1104-05. The Board stated that the union members did not do or say anything
that would "signal" others that the union was picketing. Id. at 1133, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1104.
Thus, the court held that the handbilling was a "subterfuge" for picketing. Id, at 1133, 84
L.R.R.M. at 1105.
25 For examples of the court's traditional use of the "signal picketing" concept, see
International ASS ' Il of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433 v. NLRB,
598 F.2d 1154, 1159-60, 101 L.R.R.M, 2440, 2444 (9th Cir. 1979)(Ninth Circuit held that
unlawful "signal picketing' occurred where union posted officials near reserved gates of
secondary employer); Operating Engineers, Local 825 (RA. L?rukker & Co.), 659 F.2d at 387,
108 L.R.R.M. at '2486 (no "signal picketing" where union members patrolled without signs
across street from neutral gate of employer; did not identify themselves as union members;
did not speak to anyone; and did not prevent anyone from entering the job site).
27 Catalytic v. Monmouth & Ocean County Bldg. Trades Council, 829 F.2d 430, 126
L.R.R.M. 2425 (3d Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 435-36, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429-30.
"Id. at 431, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
"Id.
Id.
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Catalytic entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
the Building Trades Council which represented various craft
unions, including defendant, Local 825 Operating Engineers. 32 The
"General Presidents' Project Maintenance Agreement by Contract"
(Presidents' Agreement) governed the collective bargaining agree-
ment's terms." In recognition of the conditions peculiar to work at
a nuclear plant,"4
 the contract contained no-strike, no-lock-out, and
no-work stoppage clauses."
The agreement acknowledged that GPU could limit the scope
of work assignments and that Jersey Central could choose to per-
form any part of the work necessary on the project." The contract
further stipulated that the parties would not allow jurisdictional
disputes to interfere with the plant's efficient and continuous op-
erations.37
 An addendum to the contract provided that the owner's
specialty shops, such as crane services, would furnish support ser-
vices to the craft unions." The agreement also contained a grievance
procedure establishing arbitration as a forum of last resort." The
presidents of the craft unions, including defendant, Local 825,
signed the contract, and representatives of the various locals ap-
proved the addendum. 4 °
The dispute in Catalytic involved Jersey Central's use of its own
employees to man mobile and stationary cranes at the job site.41
Local 825 insisted that its members be assigned to operate the
mobile cranes. 42 Local 825 picketed the job site over the issue, and,
as a result, other craft union members engaged in a two-day work
stoppage. 43
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. The Presidents' Agreement recited that the parties "recognized there is an essential
difference in the conditions required to perform this type of work." Id.
33 Id. The Agreement stated that "the Contractor and Unions agree that, due to the
particular work covered by the Agreement, there shall be no lock outs or strikes during the
life of this Agreement, and provisions must be made to achieve this end." Id.
36 Id. The contract provided that the "Unions and the Contractor understand that the
owner may choose to perform ... any part or parts of the work necessary on his project with
due consideration given to achieving the highest maintenance standards and harmonious
working conditions." Id,
]7 Id. According to the court, a "jurisdictional dispute" arises when two or more unions
claim the right to a particular work assignment. See id. at 433, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2428.
38 Id. at 431, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
"Id,
14 Id.
4, Id.
82 Id.
45 Id.
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Three weeks later, Local 825 distributed at the plant entrances
handbills that protested Jersey Central's assignment of mobile crane
work to non-craft union employees. 44 The leaflets charged that the
owner, Jersey Central, and the operator, GPU, were being "unfair"
to Local 825. 45 In smaller print, the flyer stated on the bottom of
the page that the union's dispute was only with the plant's owner
and operator.46 The handbill further provided that "fwie do not
seek to enmesh any other employer in this dispute, and we do not
seek to induce or encourage an individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce to cease doing business with any other em-
ployer."4' No member of Local 825 actually had worked at the
nuclear plant since sonic time prior to the union's picketing and
handbilling activities. 45
On Catalytic's application, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey ordered the craft unions to cease a work
stoppage which, the court concluded, Local 825's activities at the
plant's gate had incluced. 49 The injunction ordered Local 825 and
the other unions to refrain from picketing, handbilling, engaging
in work stoppages, or otherwise attempting to interfere with Cata-
lytic's employees' ability to perform their duties. 5° The court di-
rected the parties to arbitrate the dispute according to the grievance
procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement."
Only Local 825 appealed the district court's order. 52 Local 825
argued that the collective bargaining agreement with Catalytic was
not in effect during the period of union activity. 55 Even had the
contract been valid, the union asserted, the district court abused its
discretion in enjoining Local 825's activities because Local 825 itself
had not joined in the work stoppage. 54 Finally, the union claimed
that both the "publicity proviso" of the Act and the first amendment
to the Constitution protected the handbilling. 55 In holding that the
Id. at 431-32, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
45 Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
" Id. The handbill staled "lolur dispute is only with GPU Nuclear and [jersey Central]."
Id.
47 Id.
•1 Id.
Id. at 431, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426-27.
511 Id.
51 Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
52 Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427.
Id,
54 Id,
rr
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union's handbilling violated the Act's secondary boycott provision, 56
the Third Circuit rejected each of the defendant's arguments and
affirmed the district court's injunction."
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding that Local
825 and Catalytic were parties to a valid collective bargaining agree-
ment in May and June 1986, during the union's activity. 58 The court
held that although the contract technically expired on February 28,
1986, the agreement was valid in light of the parties' past practices. 59
Customarily, the court noted, the parties without regard for tech-
nical expiration dates considered the agreement to remain in effect
while they negotiated a new extension. 69 The court therefore re-
jected Local 825's claim that the contract was invalid and held that
the collective bargaining agreement was in effect during the period
in which Local 825 picketed and handbilled. 6 '
The court similarly rejected Local 825's claim that the district
court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. 6  The court
relied on Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, in which
the Supreme Court held that under section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, a federal court properly may enforce an
agreement to arbitrate unresolved grievances and may enjoin a
work stoppage in violation of a no-strike clause if the underlying
56 Id. at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2428.
v Id. at 437, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
rH Id, at 433, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427.
59 1d. at 432-33, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427. The court relied on testimony provided by
Catalytic's director of labor relations that an uninterrupted collective bargaining relationship
had existed since March 1983, notwithstanding that several craft unions had failed to sign
extensions at various times during the three year period. Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427.
The director explained that customarily negotiations often commenced only after the tech-
nical expiration of the previous extension. Id.
"" Id. The court stated that Local 825's previous reliance on the collective bargaining
agreement was inconsistent with its current position that the collective bargaining agreement
was invalid. Id. After the technical expiration date of February 28, 1986, Local 825 in March
1986 had protested the assignment of a job to a member of another craft union under the
collective bargaining agreement with Catalytic. Id. Moreover, the court noted that although
the labor agreement required a party to give notice of termination to end the relationship,
Local 825 had never done so. Id. at 432-33, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427. The court also stated
that all defendant unions except Local 825 had conceded the existence of a valid collective
bargaining agreement with Catalytic, even though several locals had not signed extensions.
Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427. The Third Circuit quoted the district court's comment that
it found "no way to distinguish ... [Local 825] from the other locals on that point." Id.
6 ' Id. at 433, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427. The court also noted that the Building Trades
Council had stipulated in writing that the pre-existing contract extended to September 1,
1988. Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427.
62 Id. at 434, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429.
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dispute is subject to arbitration."' Citing Boys Market, the Third
Circuit stressed that the purpose of a grievance arbitration is to
provide an effective, expeditious means of settling industrial dis-
putes without resort to strikes or other "self-help" measures." The
court found that the work assignment controversy involved in Cata-
lytic fell within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement's
arbitration provisions.t' 5
Although Local 825's dispute was with its primary employer,
Jersey Central," the court classified the controversy as jurisdictional
in nature: whether Local 825's operating engineers or the electri-
cian's union, with whom Jersey Central and GPU had a separate
collective bargaining agreement, should operate the mobile cranes.v
Id. at 433, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427 (citing, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253, 74 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2264 (1970)). Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
29 U,S.C. § I 85(a) (1982).
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court stated that congressional policy underlying section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act favored the voluntary establishment of a
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. 398 U.S. at 253, 74 L.R.R.M. at
2263. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a federal court could use its equitable
powers to enjoin a strike where a collective bargaining agreement subjected the grievance to
arbitration. Id. at 253, 74 L. R.R.M. at 2263-64.
Catalytic, 829 F.2d at 433, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2427-28 (citing Boys Markets, 398 U,S. at
248, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2262). The Third Circuit further stated that the purpose of an arbitration
grievance procedure is largely subverted "'if there is no immediate, effective remedy for
those very tactics that arbitration is designed to obviate.'" Id. at 433, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2428
(quoting Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 249, 74 L.R,R.M. at 2262).
65 Id.
66 Id. Local 825 suggested for the first time on appeal that its handbilling represented
primary activity against Catalytic, and that therefore the secondary boycott provisions of
section 8(b)(4)(ii) did not apply. Id. at 435 n.2, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429 n.2. Although the court
did not consider the issue, it indicated in a footnote that the primary employer's presence
during the disputed activity is not dispositive of that activity's character. Id. The court then
concluded that the union's handbilling constituted secondary activity because "in reality Local
825 sought to coerce GPU Nuclear and Jersey Central through Catalytic." Id.
67 Id. at 433, 126 L.R.R.M, at 2428. The court distinguished Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 92 L.R.R.M. 3032 (1976), where the Supreme Court
struck down an injunction against a sympathy strike that violated a no-strike clause. Id, The
Third Circuit held Buffalo Forge inapplicable because in that case neither the cause of the
strike nor the underlying dispute was subject to the collective bargaining agreement's griev-
ance procedure. Id. The court also indicated that the dispute between Local 825 and Catalytic
was not removed from the collective bargaining agreement's purview merely because the
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Because the Presidents' Agreement explicitly prohibited work stop-
pages, particularly those arising from jurisdictional disputes, the
court ruled that the agreement governed the issue." The court
found that the union's handbilling at the plant gate constituted "self
help" and triggered a work stoppage just as effectively as had the
earlier picketing. 69 Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the union
activity came within the ambit of the Boys Market rationale, and that
the district court had properly enjoined the handbilling and di-
rected the union to arbitrate the dispute.'"
The court next rejected the defendant's contention that the
publicity proviso protected its handbilling. 7 ' Under the proviso, a
union may engage in publicity, other than picketing, to inform the
public that a secondary employer distributes a product that the
employer with whom the union has a primary dispute produces, as
long as the publicity does not induce any employees, other than
those of the primary employer, to engage in a work stoppage:"
Dismissing the union's argument that the absence of patrolling or
an official picket line renders handbilling distinct from unlawful
picketing," the court concluded that the handbilling constituted
unlawful "signal picketing" because it, in fact, caused work stop-
pages. 74 The court defined signal picketing as "activity short of a
controversy also implicated a non-party to the contract (i.e., Jersey Central or GPU Nuclear).
Id.
68 Id.
66 Id. at 434, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2428.
70 Id. The court concluded that "[Ole measure was designed to bring pressure on Cata-
lytic in precisely the same manner as a strike and, consequently, came within the ambit of
the Boys Markets rationale." Id.
The Third Circuit in Catalytic upheld the district court's injunction on an alternative
ground. Id. The union contended that the Boys Markets rule permitting courts to enjoin a
union from engaging in a work stoppage was inapplicable because no member of Local 825
actually took part in any work stoppage. Id. Additionally, the court concluded that even if it
accepted this argument, the injunction against the other craft unions was valid because those
unions unquestionably engaged in work stoppages. Id. The court held that a court properly
may enjoin a third party's conduct that effectively violates an injunction previously issued
against another party, even if that activity might not come within the Boys Market rationale.
Id. at 434, 126 L.R.R.N.I. at 2429. Finally, the court stressed that Local 825 expressly cove-
nanted to administer the agreement "in concert" with other unions, and that its handbilling
activity instead promoted disharmony. Id. at 434, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2428.
7 ' Id. at 435-36, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429-30.
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982). See supra note 2 for the full text of the publicity
proviso.
" See Catalytic, 829 F.2d at 435, 126 L,R.R.M. at 2429. The union contended that
picketing differs from handbilling because of the absence of patrolling and because the
presence of a picket line "may induce action irrespective of the nature of the ideas being
disseminated." Id.
71 Id. at 435-36, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429-30.
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true picket line which conveys to neutrals that the union solicits
their sympathetic action."75 Because the leafletting "signalled" Cata-
lytic's employees to stop work, the court held, the union handbilling
was not entitled to protection under the publicity proviso and thus
violated section 8(b)(4)(ii). 76
The court considered the fact that work stoppages occurred
after the union distributed handbills to conclusively reflect the
union's unlawful intent to cause the secondary employees to violate
the collective bargaining agreement's no-strike clause. 77 In reaching
this conclusion, the court stated that the handbill's actual text is not
dispositive of the union's purpose in distributing the material. 78
Rather the court found, the district court must determine the
union's purpose on the basis of rational inferences drawn from all
the facts. 79
Despite the court's finding that the district court should deter-
mine the purpose of the handbilling, the Third Circuit supported
its holding that the union handbilling unlawfully induced a work
stoppage by examining the actual wording of the leaflets. 8° Without
referring to particular language, the court held that if the union
truly did not intend to persuade the other craft unions to engage
in a work stoppage, the handbills could have specifically requested
that the other employees not do so. 81 The court found that "the
carefully vague and legalistic statement on the flyer carried no such
message and, indeed, its very tone may have been a signal in itself." 82
Finally, the court held that the district court's injunction of the
union's secondary handbilling did not violate the first amendment."
Although acknowledging that the first amendment generally pro-
tects peaceful picketing and leafletting, the Third Circuit stressed
that courts regularly impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions on such activities." The court relied on the Supreme
" Id. at 435, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429.
m Id. at 435-36, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2429-30.
" Id. at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
78 Id.
79 Id.
" See id.
8 ' Id. The court stated that the "simple cause-and-effect of the appearance of leafletters
and work stoppages eloquently testified to the purpose of the enterprise" to persuade the
other craft unions to violate their contractual no-strike obligation. Id. at 435, 126 L.R.R.M.
at 2430.
"' Id. at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
85 Id.
" Id.
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Court's consistent holding that the first amendment does not protect
secondary picketing that violates section 8(b)(4)(ii) and, thus, courts
properly may enjoin such illegal picketing. 85 Because the court in
Catalytic found that the union's distribution of leaflets "in reality"
constituted signal picketing in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii), the
court held that the first amendment provided the handbills no
protection. 86
The court noted that the district court's injunction imposed
only limited restrictions on the leafletting. 87 The injunction, the
court determined, did not contain time and manner limitations and
applied only to the small area of the plant's gates. 88 Moreover, the
court found, the order did not concern the flyer's contents and
ample alternative means remained for the union to disseminate its
views. 89
 The appellate court thus affirmed the district court's in-
junction. 9°
The Third Circuit's finding that secondary handbilling consti-
tuted unlawful "signal picketing" presages a significant curtailment
of permissible handbilling under section 8(b)(4)(ii). Catalytic repre-
sents the only decision where a court has applied the concept of
"signal picketing" to restrict union secondary handbilling. Prior to
Catalytic, virtually no court had addressed the issue. 9 ' Moreover, the
NLRB had expressly rejected a similar claim that handbilling rep-
resented unlawful signal picketing. 92 Instead, the courts and the
as Id, The court cited International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Intl, Inc., 456 U.S.
212, 226, 110 L.R. R. M. 2001, 2006 (1982) ("ivv]e have consistently rejected the claim that
secondary picketing by labor unions in violation or § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the
First Amendment"); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (Court
"recognized the strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even
though such regulation may have an incidental effect on the rights of free speech and
association"; secondary boycotts and picketing could be prohibited); NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619, 104 L.R.R.M. 2567, 2571 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., concurring) ("[Hhe statutory ban in this case affects only that aspect of the union's
efforts to communicate its views that calls For an automatic response to a signal, rather than
a reasoned response to an idea"); Catalytic, 820 F.2d at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
88 829 F.2d at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
87 Id.
88 Id,
89 Id.
9° Id. Surprisingly, the Third Circuit did nut address the remaining first amendment
issues regarding whether any restrictions on secondary handbilling may be unconstitutional.
See id. For a discussion of first amendment issues incident to handbilling, see generally, Note,
Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91
YALE L.J. 938 (1982).
93 See supra notes 22-26 for a discussion of the traditional application of the "signal
picketing" concept.
92 See Teamsters, Local Union No. 688 v. Levitz Furniture Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1133,
84 L. R. R. M. 1103, 1104-05 (1973). See supra note 25 for a discussion of the Levitz decision.
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NLRB traditionally have used the concept of "signal picketing" only
to distinguish between unlawful and acceptable forms of picketing. 93
Courts have prohibited "signal picketing" that encourages other
unions or union members not to perform work for the secondary
employer or to pressure the secondary employer to influence the
primary employer. 91 In contrast, publicity picketing is permissible
to the extent that it does not actually interfere with deliveries or
communicate more than the limited information which the publicity
proviso permits.95 By applying the concept of "signal picketing" to
handbilling for the first time, the Catalytic court expanded the use
of the "signal picketing" theory to condemn union handbilling,
thereby adding a novel device to the employers' arsenal of successful
challenges to union secondary handbilling.
The Third Circuit's reasoning, however, is inconsistent with
Congress' intent to clearly distinguish protected handbilling from
unlawful picketing.96 The publicity proviso explicitly exempts "pub-
licity, other than picketing" from the section 8(b)(4)(ii) ban on sec-
ondary union activity.•" This language plainly indicates that only
secondary picketing is prohibited; handbilling and other informa-
tional activity directed against a secondary employer is allowed."
The legislative history supports the literal interpretation that Con-
gress intended to differentiate permissible informational activity
short of picketing, such as handbilling, from unprotected secondary
picketing."
Contrary to Congress' intent and the Board's position in Oper-
ating Engineers Local 139,' 0° the Third Circuit did not distinguish
Local 825's picketing activity from its later handbilling. The Third
Circuit ignored the three week interval between the initial picketing
and the subsequent distribution of handbills.m The court rested its
holding that the handbilling amounted to "signal picketing" on the
critical fact that the handbills effectively caused work stoppages. 102
93 See .supra note 23 and accompanying text.
" See MORRIS, supra note 7, at 1104.
95 See id.
96 See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative intent to
distinguish handbilling from picketing.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1982),
98 Id.
99 See supra note 20 for a discussion of the relevant legislative history.
10° International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139 v. Oak Constr., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B.
759, 759-60, 93 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1385-86 (1976).
'°' See Catalytic v. Monmouth & Ocean County Bldg. Trades Council, 829 F.2d 430, 431,
126 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2426 (3d Cir. 1987).
192 Id. at 435, 126 L,R.R.M. at 2430,
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The handbilling at issue, however, occurred three weeks after the
other craft unions first engaged in a strike in response to the union's
picketing.'" The court's failure to consider the subsequent hand-
billing separately from the original picketing runs counter to Con-
gress' intent to distinguish the two types of union activity, and
weakens the court's analysis.
In holding that the handbills effectively induced the unlawful
work stoppages, the court suggested that the mere fact that hand-
billing occurred prior to a secondary employees' strike is sufficient
to remove the handbilling from the publicity proviso's protection. 104
The court stated that the "simple cause and effect" of the appear-
ance of the handbills and work stoppages reflected the union's
intent to "signal" other craft unions to strike.'" By gleaning union
intent to induce a work stoppage from the mere appearance of
handbilling, the Catalytic court has established a strong precedent
for severely restricting union secondary handbilling. Catalytic sug-
gests that, to enjoin union secondary handbilling, an employer need
only show that the secondary employer's employees stopped work
following union handbilling. Permitting such minimal evidence to
establish a sufficient causal link between leafletting and a subsequent
strike may frustrate Congress' intent to protect informational hand-
billing.
The Third Circuit's strict construction of the requirements nec-
essary to satisfy the publicity proviso further restricts permissible
secondary handbilling. Had the union not intended the handbills
to induce a work stoppage, the court concluded, the leaflets could
have expressly urged the secondary employees not to do so.'° 6 Local
825, however, tracking the language of the publicity proviso, ex-
plicitly stated in the leaflet that its intent was not "to induce or
encourage an individual employed by any person . . . to cease doing
business with any other employer." 07 The court dismissed this lan-
guage as "carefully vague and legalistic," concluding that the "very
tone" itself may have been a signal to strike.'"
In condemning the handbill as a "signal" because it failed af-
firmatively to instruct Catalytic's employees not to strike, the court
imposed a substantial and novel burden on the union. Prior to
'US hi .
u" Id.
'°' Id.
1156 Id. at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
107 Id. at 432, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
1 °' Id, at 436, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2430.
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Catalytic, courts held that a handbill that clearly identified the pri-
mary employer, described the nature of the dispute, and explained
the secondary employer's relationship to the primary employer
qualified for protection under the publicity proviso.m 9 Catalytic's
facts, although somewhat unclear, suggest that Local 825's handbills
satisfied these criteria. 10 Thus, Catalytic imposed on the union a
significant affirmative duty to direct secondary employees not to
strike. The decision thereby further restricts permissible union
handbilling that targets neutral secondary employers.
Finally, the Catalytic court implicitly interpreted the section
8(b)(4)(ii) secondary boycott provision as prohibiting union second-
ary handbilling unless the handbill specifically falls within the pro-
tection of the publicity proviso. The United States Supreme Court
has expressly rejected this interpretation, however."' Instead, last
term the Court ruled in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. that the publicity
proviso does not apply to handbilling activity that is not covered by
the publicity proviso, and consequently, union handbilling may be
lawful even if it does not satisfy the publicity proviso's require-
ments." 2
In summary, in Catalytic v. Monmouth & Ocean County Building
Trades Council, the Third Circuit ruled that union handbilling di-
rected against the secondary employer to protest the primary em-
ployer's assignment of work to non-craft union members constituted
"signal picketing" in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the National
Labor Relations Act." 3 Catalytic's classification of union secondary
handbilling as unlawful "signal picketing" represents a new method
of limiting permissible union handbilling under section 8(b)(4)(ii)
of the Act. Moreover, the court's strict interpretation of the publicity
proviso's requirements and suggestion that a union must affirma-
tively direct the secondary employees not to engage in a work
stoppage further restricts the scope of permissible secondary hand-
billing under section 8(b)(4)(ii). Consequently, after Catalytic, em-
ployers may apply the concept of "signal picketing" and rely on the
109 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements
necessary to satisfy the publicity proviso.
I" See Catalytic, 829 F.2d at 431-32,126 I—RAN. at 2426.
III See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme COurt's
holding in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. that handbilling not falling within the publicity proviso
nonetheless may be lawful.
"2 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Trades Council, 56 U.S.L.W.
4332-33 (U.S. April 20, 1988) (No. 86-1461).
19 829 F.2d at 435-36,126 L.R.R.M. at 2320-30.
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court's strict interpretation of the proviso's requirements to restrict
union secondary handbilling.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS
A. *Government Employer Not Required to Possess Search Warrant or
Probable Cause for Work-Related Search of Employee's Office: O'Connor
v. Ortega'
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects an individual against unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures and also predicates issuing a warrant on a showing of
probable cause. 2 The fourth amendment, however, applies only to
governmental action; private employers are immune.' Moreover,
the governmental actor must undertake a "search" to invoke fourth
amendment protections. 4 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted "search" to mean an infringement of an expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. 5 While in the past, the
Supreme Court considered searches unreasonable if not supported
by a warrant,fi the Court has in recent years concentrated on a
search's reasonableness when analyzing the fourth amendment is-
sue.' Probable cause and a search warrant are no longer absolute
* By David H. Ganz, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,
' 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1617 (1987).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Id.
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court, in
holding that the fourth amendment proscribed solely governmental activities, states that "it
[the fourth amendment] is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any government official.'" Id. (quoting Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
"Jacobsen, 446 U.S. at 113.
5 Id.
"See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
2 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("The fundamental command of
the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable ....").
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requirements; 8
 they are elements that enter into the reasonableness
calculus."
Thus reasonableness lies at the center of fourth amendment
analysis.'" The circumstances and context in which a search takes
place may determine if a person's privacy expectations are reason-
able." Thus, courts have considered a governmental employer's
announced policies and practices as significant factors in ruling that
an employee does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his or her office or locker.' 2
 Furthermore, courts have intimated
that work-related searches satisfy the fourth amendment's reason-
ableness standard, and, hence, do not require warrants.' 3
 Where
the government impinges an employee's — or an individual's —
legitimate expectation of privacy and thus triggers the fourth
amendment, the Supreme Court, in considering a search's reason-
ableness and whether to require probable cause or a warrant, has
balanced the individual's expectation of privacy against the govern-
ment's need to implement the search,"
8 Id.
9 See id. ("both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on
the reasonableness of a search") (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
" See	 469 U.S. at 337.
II Id.
12 See, e.g., Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1978) ("employer may conduct
a search in accordance with a regulation or practice that would dispel in advance any
expectations of privacy") (citations omitted); United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217, 1219-
20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975) (court upheld warrantless search of postal
employee's locker in part because postal manual informed workers of employer's right to
inspect and search lockers at any lime); Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp, 997, 1000, 1003 (C.D.
Cal. 1972), aff 'd, 484 F.2d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1973) (warrantless search of deputy sheriff's
locker not unconstitutional because commander kept master key and combination to all locks
and in past had searched deputies' lockers); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921, 922—
24 (E.D. Pa.), aff 'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967) (warrantless search of U.S. Mint employee's
locker valid because governmental regulation provided lockers were not to be considered
private, and that lockers were subject to inspections by Mint security guards). But see United
States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362, 364 (3s1 Cir. 1977) (knowledge that police officer's lockers
could be opened by master keys "does not snake an expectation of privacy unreasonable").
" See, e.g., United States v. Nasser, 476"F.2d 111 I, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973) (IRS surveillance
of employee not unreasonable search and seizure because of surveillance's relationship to
work performed by employee); United States v, Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2c1 Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966) (government agent's search of employee's work area was
"constitutional exercise of the power of the Government as defendant's employer, to supervise
and investigate the performance of his duties as a Custom's employee"); United States v.
Blok, 188 17.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (employee's "official superiors might reasonably
have searched (her' desk for official property needed for official use").
14 See New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). See, e.g., id. at 340-41 (school-
teachers and administrators' interests in maintaining order versus schoolchildren's privacy
interests).
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During the Survey year, in O'Connor v. Ortega, 15 the United States
Supreme Court held that a public employer need not possess a
search warrant or have probable cause to conduct a lawful search
of an employee's office for noninvestigatory work-related reasons' 6
or for evidence of work-related misconduct)? In reaching this de-
cision, a plurality balanced the public employer's need to control
the work environment against the employee's reasonable privacy
expectations.'s Applying this balancing test, the plurality concluded
that a warrant requirement would be too burdensome and disrup-
tive and announced that a reasonableness standard should govern
such work-related searches.[' Under the plurality's analysis, both
the search's reason and scope must be reasonable. 2°
O'Connor has broad implications in the area of employer-em-
ployee relationships. O'Connor expands upon a public employer's
right to search an employee's office without a warrant. ACcordingly,
by not requiring a warrant or probable cause, O'Connor seriously
diminishes the fourth amendment protections upon which employ-
ees may rely. Moreover, O'Connor's reach will be extremely expansive
because most governmental searches will fall into one of the two
broad categories announced by the plurality. Finally, even though
the O'Connor opinion denied specifically that it was addressing the
drug testing issue, O'Connor's most far reaching implication is its
potential for justifying random drug testing."
In O'Connor, Dr. Magno Ortega, Chief of Professional Educa-
tion at Napa State Hospital, supervised the doctors' training in
psychiatric residency programs. 22 Hospital officials, concerned
about possible improprieties on Ortega's part, launched an investi-
gation in July, 1981. 23 While Ortega was on paid leave, hospital
officials entered his office several times and thoroughly searched
the area." The hospital officials seized several items from Ortega's
0 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1 [ER Cases (BNA) 1617 (1987).
'" An example of a noninvestigatory work-related search is where an employer enters
an employee's office to retrieve a file or document. See id, at 1501, i IER Cases at 1622.
17 Id. at 1500-02, 1 IER Cases at 1621-23.
1"
	 at 1499, 1 1ER Cases at 1621.
" Id. at 1500, 1502, 1 IER Cases at 1621, 1623.
" Id. at 1502-03, I I ER Cases at 1623.
21 I Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (124 Analysis) 57, 60 (April 13, 1987).
22 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1495, 1 IER Cases at 1617-18.
23 Id. at 1495, 1 IER Cases at 1618. Specifically, the hospital officials thought that Dr.
Ortega may have misled them as to the ful,ding of a recently acquired computer and also
officials had to contend with charges against Dr. Ortega of sexual harassment, Id.
Id. at 1996, 1 IER Cases at 1618. The record does not clearly indicate the specific
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desk and file cabinets and used some of these seized materials at a
California State Personnel Board hearing to impeach a witness tes-
tifying on behalf of Ortega. 25 In September 1981, the hospital ter-
minated Ortega's employment. 25
Ortega brought suit in United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against Dr. Dennis O'Connor, the
Executive Director of the Hospital, and other hospital officials un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the search of his office violated
his fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches. 27 The
district court granted the hospital officials' motion for summary
judgment, holding the search reasonable because of the need to
collect state property in Ortega's office. 28
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part
and affirmed in part the district court's holding. 29 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the granting of summary judgment for the hospital offi-
cials on the Section 1983 claim and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to grant Ortega's motion for summary judg-
ment and hold a hearing for a determination of damages." The
court of appeals based this conclusion on two grounds. First, the
reason for entering the office. Id. The hospital claimed the search sought to retrieve stale
property of a terminated employee but at that time, Dr. Ortega had not been fired. Id.
Moreover, no policy existed as to searching the offices of-employees on administrative leave
and officials made no effort to separate Dr. Ortega's personal property from state property.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 705, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 831, 832 (9th Cir. 1985),
relit!, O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1617 (1987). 42 U.S.C. section
1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
Ortega also brought an action under state law for invasion of privacy and breach of
good faith. Ortega, 764 F.2d at 705, 1 IER Cases at 832.
28 Ortega, 764 F.2d at 705, 1 IER Cases at 832. The district court also concluded that
Ortega's failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act precluded his cause of action
under state law. Id. The Ninth Circuit described Ortega's noncompliance as being his failure
to file his claim with the State Board of Control as required by California law. Id, at 707, 1
1ER Cases at 833.
1' Id. at 707, 1 IER Cases at 834. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that part of the district
court's ruling that barred Ortega's state.law claims, because of his failure to comply with the
state statute. Id., 1 IER Cases at 833-34,
5° Id. at 707, I IER Cases at 834.
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circumstances revealed that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office that society considered reasonable. 3 ' Second,
the hospital had no regulations on inspections that might have
diminished Ortega's expectation of privacy." As a result, the Ninth
Circuit held the search unreasonable and violative of the fourth
amendment, and, therefore, ruled that the hospital officials were
liable.33 The hospital officials petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
which the United States Supreme Court granted."
Although concluding that Ortega had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his desk and file cabinets," the plurality held that
searches conducted for noninvestigatory work-related reasons, and
investigations for work-related misconduct, require neither war-
rants nor probable cause." Instead, stated the plurality, reasonable-
ness standards govern such intrusions. 37 The Court offered a two-
pronged test for reasonableness, requiring both the search's reason
and scope to be reasonable. 38 Because neither lower court applied
this reasonableness test, the Supreme Court remanded the case for
such a determination."
Justice O'Connor, in writing for the plurality, 46 first addressed
the fourth amendment's scope. The Court relied upon past deci-
sions to reject the hospital officials' argument that public employees
have no legitimate expectation of privacy while at work.'" Recog-
nizing that office policies and practices may diminish an employee's
expectation of privacy in his or her office, the plurality ruled that
the circumstances of the employment relationship ought to deter-
" Id, at 706, 1 [ER Cases at 832. The facts that the court of appeals relied upon in this
determination included: that Ortega had worked in the office for seventeen years in which
no one entered the office without his permission; the office was locked; and Ortega kept
confidential information on patients, as well as personal effects in his desk. Id. at 705, 1 IER
Cases at 832.
52 Id. at 706, 1 IER Cases at 833.
" Id. at 707, I IER Cases at 833.
m 474 U.S. 1018 (1985).
" O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1617, 1620 (1987).
"Id. at 1500-02, 1 IER Cases at 1621-23.
" Id. at 1502, 1 IER Cases at 1623.
" Id. at 1502-03, 1 1 ER Cases at 1623.
" Id. at 1503-04, 1 IER Cases at 1623-24.
-10 justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justices White and Powell, joined. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. Justice
Blackmun issued a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
joined,
4' O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1498, 1 IER Cases at 1619 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369, 68 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2450-
51 (1968)).
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mine such an expectation's reasonableness. 42
 Because Ortega did
not share his desk or file cabinets with other hospital employees,
kept personal materials unrelated to hospital business in his office,
and because the hospital had no stated policy discouraging employ-
ees from keeping personal items in their offices, the O'Connor plu-
rality declared that Ortega possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his desk and file cabinets.° Having concluded that Ortega
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, the O'Connor plurality
next determined the proper standard applicable to the search in
question. 44
 Justice O'Connor noted that a balancing test, weighing
the quality of the intrusion against the governmental interests war-
ranting the search, was crucial to this analysis.* The plurality stated
that in the public employer context, this required balancing the
employer's need for control and efficiency against the employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 46 While an employee may have a
substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy in items brought
to work, the Court determined that workplace realities, which in-
cluded an employer's continual need to enter an office for work-
related reasons, demonstrated the impracticality of warrants. 47 Im-
posing a warrant requirement in such circumstances, the plurality
reasoned, was disruptive to the business' everyday operation and
overly burdensome to employers who were unfamiliar with the
warrant process."
After determining that public employers may conduct war-
rantless searches in certain circumstances, the Court next consid-
ered whether probable cause should be the appropriate standard
governing such intrusions. While acknowledging that probable
cause is usually required, the plurality noted that it is not an absolute
42 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1498, 1 IER Cases at 1620. The O'Connor plurality went on to
state that "some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that
no expectation of privacy is reasonable." Id. (citations omitted).
" Id. at 1499, 1 IER Cases at 1620.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1499, 1 IER Cases at 1620-21 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703
(1983); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
46 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1499, 1 1ER Cases at 1621.
47 Id, at 1500, 1 IER Cases at 1621. The Court cited as examples, a supervisor in need
of a report located in an employee's office while he or she is out or an employer desiring to
secure records in an employee's office to be used in a misconduct investigation. Id.
" Id. at 1500-01, 1 IER Cases at 1621-22. The Court went on to explain that "the
imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with 'the common-sense realization that
government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter.'" Id. at 1501, 1 IER Cases at 1622 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143, 1
IER Cases 178 (1983)),
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mandate for all searches. 49 The O'Connor plurality again resorted to
the balancing of interests test. 5°
The plurality rested its holding that public employers' searches
did not require probable cause on several grounds. 5 ' Justice O'Con-
nor first recognized that probable cause meant little when applied
to searches in certain work-related noninvestigatory contexts, such
as obtaining files or retrieving state property from an employee's
office. 52
 Moreover, the plurality stated that requiring probable cause
for searches for employee misconduct would result in significant
delays in eradicating that misconduct, delays which would negatively
affect the workplace. 53
 The Court also acknowledged that public
employers have little familiarity with the complexities of the prob-
able cause standard. 54
 These factors and the employer's interest in
an efficient work environment, the plurality concluded, outweigh
the employees' privacy interest in their workplace. 55
 Accordingly,
the plurality held that the fourth amendment does not require an
employer to possess probable cause prior to conducting a nonin-
vestigatory work-related search or a search for evidence of em-
ployee misconduct. 56
Lastly, rather than requiring probable cause or a warrant, the
O'Connor plurality articulated a reasonableness test to measure the
reasonableness of employee misconduct. searches as well as nonin-
vestigatory work-related intrusions. 57
 Under this standard, both the
4 ' See O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1501, 1 1ER Cases at 1622.
"" See id. at 1501-02, I IER Cases at 1622-23.
51 Id. at 1502, 1 IER. Cases at 1623.
52 Id. at 1501, 1 IER Cases at 1622.
33 Id. at 1502, 1 IER Cases at 162223. The Court stated that because
public employers have a direct and overriding interest in insuring that the work
of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient mannner a probable
cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intol-
erable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the
agency's work, and ultimately to the public interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
"4 Id. at 1502, I IER Cases at 1623. The Court compared the public employer, who is
not expected to learn the subtleties of probable cause when the search is not aimed at
collecting evidence of a criminal offense, and the law enforcement official who is expected
to "'school [himself or herself] in the niceties of probable cause .. . .'" Id, (quoting New Jersey
v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985)).
" See id. While the Court admitted that employees' expectations of privacy in the work-
place were not insubstantial, [they were] far less than those found at home or in some other
contexts." Id.
" Id. at 1502, l IER Cases at 1623.
' 7 Id.
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search's inception and scope must be reasonable." The plurality
indicated that a search is reasonable at its inception where the
employer had reasonable grounds for believing the intrusion would
yield evidence of employee misconduct or where the intrusion was
necessary to collect work documents. 59 Furthermore, a search rea-
sonable in scope, the plurality noted, was one where the employer
used measures tied reasonably to the intrusion's goals and not ex-
cessive relative to the misconduct." Accordingly, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the district
court for an evaluation of the search's reasonableness under the
two-tiered approach articulated."
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with
both the plurality's reasoning and the reasonableness standard."'
First, Justice Scalia criticized the reasonableness standard, claiming
that the standard lacked substance and encouraged uncertainty
because it provided no guidelines for future applications.''' Justice
Scalia then voiced his opposition to the plurality's view that either
extensive work-related reasons for entering an employee's office or
the search party's identity (law enforcement official versus private
employer versus supervisor) could affect the reasonableness of a
search, and thus the applicability of the fourth amendment." In
Justice Scalia's view, the fourth amendment protects privacy and
not solitude; therefore the fourth amendment protects an employ-
ee's office, even if the employer or co-workers were not excluded. 65
In addition, Justice Scalia stated that the searcher's identity affects
only the search's reasonableness and the fourth amendment's ap-
plicability. 66 From this analysis, Justice Scalia concluded that the
fourth amendment's protection extends to a governmental employ-
ee's office, drawers, and files. 67
56 Id. at 1502-03, 1 IER Cases at 1623.
59 Id. at 1503, 1 [ER Cases at 1623.
60 /d. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
61 1d. at 1504, 1 IER Cases at 1624.
U1 1d. at 1505, 1 [ER Cases at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
65 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
"" Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that "Ic]onstitutional protection against
unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government
has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer." Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
67 /d. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cautioned that the fourth amendment covered
"a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, " explaining that "Nile qualifier is
necessary to cover such unusual situations as that in which the office is subject to unrestricted
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Having determined that the fourth amendment's provisions
applied to Ortega's circumstances, justice Scalia directed his inquiry
to the reasonableness of the employer's intrusion. Despite acknowl-
edging the per se unreasonableness of warrantless searches, Justice
Scalia declared that governmental employment provided an excep-
tion to the general rule. 68 Thus, according to Justice Scalia, govern-
mental intrusions to gather work-related items or to investigate
noncompliance with an employer's rules do not violate the fourth
amendment." Because the evidence did not support either of these
justifications, Justice Scalia, like the plurality, reversed and re-
manded the case."
Justice Blackmun issued a lengthy dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, 7 ' which ultimately
found that the plurality's decision undermined public employees'
fourth amendment rights and future constitutional analysis of pub-
lic employer searches. 72 Justice Blackmun's conclusion rested first
upon his disagreement with the plurality's interpretation of the
facts. Contrary to the plurality's assertion that the search's purpose
was either to inventory or investigate employee misconduct, Justice
Blackmun claimed the intrusion clearly was investigatory."
The dissent agreed that governmental employees maintain
their fourth amendment rights and conceded that workplaces may
diminish an employee's expectation of privacy. 74 Justice Blackmun
then expressed, however, his concern over the plurality's intimation
that routine visits into an employee's office might entirely eliminate
one's expectation of privacy in his or her office." This suggestion,
the dissent stated, did not consider the traditional protection the
public access, so that it is 'expose[d] to the public' and therefore not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Id. at 1505-06, I IER Cases at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
"O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1506, 1 IER Cases at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 Id. (Scalia, J,, concurring).
" Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 1506, 1 IER Cases at 1626 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1514, 1 IER Cases at 1632 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1508, I IER Cases at 1627 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent draws upon
the following for its conclusion: that the hospital had no policy of inventorying employees'
offices who were on administrative leave; that the leader of the investigation admitted that
removal of the computer was irrelevant to the decision to search Ortega's office; and that
the character of the search indicated its purpose was not to inventory state property from
Ortega's personal property. Id. at 1507-08, I IER Cases at 1627 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 1508, 1 IER Cases at 1628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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fourth amendment affords to offices,'" the interrelationship be-
tween the employee's expectation of privacy and the nature of the
search," and the reality of the modern workplace:78
The remainder of the dissent's analysis criticized the plurality's
balancing test. Justice Blackmun contended that courts should only
dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements and
turn to a balancing test in exceptional circumstances, such as when
obtaining a warrant based on probable cause would sacrifice the
goals of the search." According to the dissent, O'Connor's. facts did
not merit abandoning the wan-ant and probable cause requirements
because the hospital could have taken evidence of Ortega's mis-
management to a magistrate and secured a warrant without aban-
doning their goal of maintaining an effective health institution. 8°
The dissent also faulted the plurality's balancing of employees'
and employers' interests in arriving at its reasonableness standard. 81
Justice Blackmun, in criticizing the plurality's analysis of the warrant
requirement, acknowledged that warrants should not be obtained
in all searches, but stated that such circumstances did not justify
their total abolition. 82 Justice Blackmun objected to the plurality's
alternative to the warrant requirement because the reasonableness
standard does not distinguish between types of' searches or focus
on a balancing of opposing interests." Moreover, the dissent pro-
claimed that the plurality's attempt to limit their judgment to in-
16 Id. at 1508-09, I IER Cases at 1628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("when the office has
received traditional Fourth Amendment protection in our cases, it has been with the under-
standing that such routine visits occur there").
"Id. at 1509, I IER Cases at 1628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in
recognizing that an individual's expectation of privacy may change depending on the circum-
stances stated:
Thus, although an employee might well have no reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to an occasional visit by a fellow employee, he would have
such an expectation as to an afterhours search of his locked office by an
investigative team seeking materials to he used against him at a termination
proceeding.
Id. (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
" Id. at 1509-10, 1 IER Cases at 1628-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The reality to
which the dissent refers is "the all too true [fact] that the workplace has become another
home for most working Americans." Id. at 1509, 1 IER Cases at 1628 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
79 1d. at 1511, 1 IER Cases at 1629 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 1511, 1 IER Cases at 1630 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
al Id. at 1512, 1 IER Cases at 1630 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82 1d. at 1512-13, I IER Cases at 1631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 1513, 1 IER Cases at 1631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ventory and investigatory intrusions failed because the broad stan-
dard the plurality used could apply to all public employer searches. 84
O'Connor v. Ortega widens a governmental employer's authority
to search its employees' offices, desks and files by not requiring a
warrant or probable cause in employee misconduct or noninvesti-
gatory work-related intrusions." Instead, the Court now simply
demands that a public employer's search be reasonable both in its
inception and scope." The plurality convincingly proffered reasons
for tilting the balance in favor of the employer. The burden on the
employer,87
 the disruption to the workplace," the employer's un-
familiarity with probable cause complexities," and the Court's de-
sire to avoid a constitutional question with every employment
decision" strongly supported the O'Connor judgment.
The implications of O'Connor and its rationale are significant.
The immediate effect is self-evident: public employees now enjoy
less fourth amendment protection because neither a warrant nor
probable cause are necessary for the employer to search his or her
ea
	 The dissent called the plurality attempt at such a limitation "illusory," and stated
that "[t]he plurality describe[d] these searches in such a broad fashion that it is difficult to
imagine a search that would nui fit into one or the other of the categories." Id. (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
The dissent also expressed its concern over the plurality's handling of the probable cause
analysis. According to the dissent, a nexus must exist between the probable cause alternative,
the privacy interests involved, and the employer's interest in the intrusion in order to sustain
a less than probable cause standard. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The plurality's analysis of
investigatory or inventory searches, stated Justice Blackmun, made no attempt to make this
connection. Id. at 1513, 1513 n.12, 1 IER Cases at 1631, 1631 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun concluded his dissent by arguing that the plurality offered no justifi-
cation for choosing a reasonableness standard over probable cause or any other standard
beyond simply making some assertions about an employer's interest in eliminating worker
malfeasance and an employee's reduced expectation of' privacy. Id. at 1513-14, 1 IER Cases
at 1631-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for
those assertions referred to by the dissent in id. at 1514 n.13, 1 IER Cases at 1631-32 n.13.
The dissent responded to these assertions as follows: "[B]ecause the balancing is simply
asserted rather than explicated, the plurality never really justifies why probable cause, ...
would not protect adequately the public employer's interests in the situation presented by
this case." Id. at 1514, I IER Cases at 1631-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Contrary to the
plurality's conclusion, the dissent reasoned that O'Couttar's facts did not merit abandoning
the traditional requirements of a warrant and probable cause prior to conducting a search.
Id. at 1511-12, 1 IER Cases at 1630 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8' Id. at 1500-02, 1 IER Cases at 1621-23.
"Id. at 1502-03, 1 IER Cases at 1623,
" Id. at 1502, 1 IER Cases at 1622.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 1502, I 1ER Cases at 1623.
9° Id. at 1501, I IER Cases at 1622. See supra note 48 for the plurality's reaction to a
possible constitutional question arising if a warrant were required.
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office. In addition, although the O'Connor plurality attempted to
limit its holding to investigatory or noninvestigatory work-related
intrusions, 91
 these restrictions, in all likelihood, will result in little
consolation for public employees. The classifications are broad, and
as the dissent correctly pointed out, any search is likely to fall into
one of the two categories. 92
 Furthermore, the reasonableness stan-
dard that the Court articulated will work in the employer's favor
and result in more employer searches because the burden of proof
to justify such a search does not rise to the level of probable cause. 95
Commentators have suggested that O'Connor's most significant
consequence may be its effect on the drug testing of employees."
Currently, the lower courts are in rough agreement that urinalyses
are searches within the fourth amendment's scope. 95 Additionally,
the lower courts generally agree that some form of "individualized
suspicion" must accompany drug testing of governmental employ-
ees in order not to violate the fourth amendment. 96
Whether O'Connor permits warrantless drug testing of public
employees or testing without probable cause is open to speculation.
91 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1501, 1 1ER cases at 1622.
92 See id. at 1513, 1 IER Cases at 1631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
93 See id, at 1503, 1 IER Cases at 1623. The Court explains that
roIrdinarily, a search of an employee's office by a supervisor will be "justified at
its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct,
or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such
as to retrieve a needed file ... land] it]he search will be permissible in its scope
when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of .. , the nature of the [miscon-
duct]."
Id, (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 409 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
" See I Lab, Rel. Rep. (BNA) (124 Analysis) 57, 60 (April 13, 1987).
93 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732, 1 IER
Cases 1137, 1141 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (citing Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-
CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, I IER Cases (BNA) 945 (E.D. La. 1986), stay denied, 808 F,2d 1057,
1060, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1433, 1435 (5th Cir.), vacated, 816 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir. 1987);
Penny v. City of Chattanooga, 648 F. Supp. 815, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1047 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp, 875, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1041 (E.D. Tenn.
1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 625 (D. N.J. 1986);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C.N.J. 1985), aff , 795 F.2(1 1136, I IER Cases
814 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986, 1 IER Cases 1136 (1986); McDonnel v. Hunter, 612
F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ga. 1985);
Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.V. 1984); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police,
500 A.2d 1005, 120 L.R.R.M. 3294 (D.C. Ct.App. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Ed., 119 A.11/2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Div. 1986); Caruso v. Ward,
506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup.Ct. 1986)).
96 Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 616, I IER Cases at 1140. See also 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
(124 Analysis) 57, 60 (April 13, 1987).
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Proponents of random drug testing are likely to argue that the
broad authority given to public employers to conduct warrantless
intrusions in the work environment supports such testing. 97 Under
this approach, no warrants or probable cause are required; reason-
ableness is the sole gauge in choosing to conduct a urinalysis.
Despite its broad applications, courts will probably not extend
O'Connor to cover drug testing. The O'Connor plurality went to great
lengths to restrict its holding. The Court expressly limited the ap-
plication of its ruling to two particular circumstances, investigatory
and noninvestigatory work-related searches. 98 The plurality specif-
ically declared that it was not addressing the fourth amendment
application to drug and alcohol testing. 99 Moreover, urinalyses dif-
fer qualitatively from office searches — urinalyses are much more
intrusive.m Hence, a work-related standard is inappropriate for
such a serious infringement of an individual's privacy expectations.
Therefore, the Court's careful efforts to limit the holding and dis-
tance itself from the drug testing issue, as well as the more serious
intrusion that urinalyses represent, indicate that O'Connor was not
meant to affect the existing law concerning drug testing. The issue
of drug testing and the fourth amendment is a separate question
that the Court will face at a later time.
After O'Connor, a public employer need not possess a warrant
or have probable cause before searching an employee's office or
desk, even if the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
while at work. As long as the object of the intrusion is to retrieve
work-related materials or is to investigate employee misconduct, the
employer's sole restraint is that both the inception and the scope of
the search must be reasonable. O'Connor represents a continuation
of the Supreme Court's recent stance that warrants and probable
cause are not essential components of the fourth amendment.
O'Connor grants public employers broad powers to conduct war-
rantless searches. As extensive as this grant of power is, however,
' 7 See I Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (124 Analysis) at 60.
" See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1501, 1 IER Cases 1617, 1622 (1987) ("we
undertake to determine the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness only
for these two types of employer intrusions and leave for another day inquiry into other
circumstances.") (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 1504 n.**, 1 1ER Cases at 1624 n.**.
w{' See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732-33, 1
IER Cases 1137, 1141 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (taking urine sample is highly intrusive search;
"qualitatively very, very different from intrusion involved in the taking of fingerprints or
fingernail and hair clippings").
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O'Connor's rationale will probably not be applied successfully to
support random drug testing of public employees.
IV. PREEMPTION
A. *Contplete Preemption versus Ordinary Preemption: Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams'
A plaintiff is ordinarily the master of his or her complaint. 2 If
the plaintiff wishes to bring an action in state court, the defendant
may not remove that action to federal court unless diversity or
federal question jurisdiction exists.' The "well-pleaded complaint
rule" holds that federal question jurisdiction exists only when the
complaint facially presents a federal question; a defense raising a
federal issue does not suffice. 4 Thus, when a plaintiff's complaint
asserts only a state law cause of action on its face, the well-pleaded
complaint rule precludes removing the case to federal court.'
Exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule exist. The United
States Supreme Court has held that occasionally a federal statute's
pre-emptive force is so great that the statute will "convert" a state
common law claim into a federal claim." Accordingly, this "complete
pre-emption" doctrine permits a defendant to remove a case to
federal court even though the plaintiff' has asserted only state law
claims.'
This complete pre-emption doctrine applies with particular
force to cases in which Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act pre-empts state claims. 8
 The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted Section 301 as providing that any suit regarding a collec-
* By Larry Holland, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REviEw.
' Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521 (1987).
2 /d. at 2429, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523.
Id.
4 Id. at 2429-30, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523.
5 See id. at 2429, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523.
Id. at 2430, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.
Ct. 1542, 1547 (1987)).
7 See Id. at 2430, 125 L.R.R.M, at 2523-24.
5 Id. at 2430, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524. Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
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tive bargaining agreement dispute "arises under federal law" re-
gardless of whether a state law cause of action exists in Section 301's
absence. 9 Accordingly, Section 301 converts a state law cause of
action for a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor
organization into a federal claim under the well-pleaded complaint
rule.'° An employer, therefore, may remove a state law claim based
on the collective bargaining agreement to federal court."
The Supreme Court, however, has concluded that Section 301
not only encompasses claims directly based on rights created by the
collective bargaining agreement, but includes claims that are "sub-
stantially dependent" on the interpretation of employer-union
agreements.' 2 In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, for example, the Court
held that Section 301 pre-empted the plaintiff's state law tort action
because the tort involved a determination of the rights and obliga-
tions created by a disability benefit plan in the collective bargaining
agreement.' 3 At the same time, however, the Court noted that in-
volvement of a collective bargaining agreement in a dispute does
not automatically entail pre-emption." According to the Court, Sec-
tion 301 does not pre-empt state law causes of action creating rights
"independent of a labor contract" and only "tangentially" involving
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 15 Leaving the mean-
ing of these terms for future determination, the Court concluded
9 Franchise Tax Board v. Const. Laborers Vac. Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). The Court
stated that:
The necessary ground of decision was that the pre-emptive force of Section 301
is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action "for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization." Any such suit is purely
a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide
a cause of action in the absence of 301.
Id.
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547 (1987).
" See Avco. Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
L2 Intl Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Heckler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2166-67
n.3, 125 L.R.R.M. 2353, 2356 n.3 (1987).
See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352-53
(1985). The plaintiff employee argued that the defendant employer had failed to provide
disability payments in a timely manner. See id. at 205, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3347. Ignoring the
three part grievance procedure for disputes regarding disablity payments created by a "letter
of understanding," the plaintiff brought an action in state court alleging that the employer
violated the state tort law duty of good faith in the carrying out of contract terms. Id. at 206,
118 L.R.R.M. at 3346-47.
14 Id. at 1911-12, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349.
15 Id.
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that courts would determine Section 301's scope on a case by case
basis, ' 6
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, decided during the Survey year,
the Supreme Court held that Section 301 does not pre-empt a state
law cause of action for breach of individual employment contracts
entered into while the plaintiff employees occupied positions out-
side the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement." The
Court reached this holding despite the defendant's federal defense
requiring interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.' 8
Finding that the policies behind the "well-pleaded" complaint rule
were "paramount," the Court held that Section 301's pre-emptive
force does not justify creating an exception to the master of the
complaint doctrine.'" Thus, by carefully drafting the complaint, a
plaintiff, with a claim independent of the collective bargaining
agreement, can prevent a defendant with a federal defense based
on the collective bargaining agreement from having the defense
ruled on by a federal court. 2"
The plaintiff employees in Caterpillar based their cause of action
for breach of contract on oral promises that members of the defen-
dant's management allegedly made while the plaintiffs occupied
positions outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement."
The defendant company, Caterpillar Tractor Company, originally
hired the plaintiffs to work at the San Leandro plant in positions
the collective bargaining agreement covered. 22 Subsequently, how-
ever, Caterpillar elevated each of the plaintiffs to positions outside
the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement. 23 Caterpillar
promoted some of the plaintiffs to, managerial positions and the
rest became weekly salaried employees." The time span of the
plaintiffs' occupation of these positions ranged from three to fifteen
Id. at 1916, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352.
17 See 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2427-28, 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2522-23 (1987).
18 Id. at 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2526.
19 See id. In Tennessee v, Union Planter's Bank, the Court interpreted the acts or 1887 and
1888 to preclude a defendant from relying on a federal defense to remove a case to federal
court. 152 U.S. 454, 461 (1894).
28 See Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2526.
"See id. at 2427-28, 125 L.R.R.M. at '2522. In addition to the breach of contract claim
the plaintiff's also asserted causes of action for breach of the covenants of good faith and fair
dealing as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud. Id. at 2428 n.3, 125
L,R,R.M. at 2522.
22 /d. at 2427, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2522.
" Id.
21Id.
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years with all but two of the plaintiffs serving eight years or more. 25
During this period, the plaintiffs contended, Caterpillar guaranteed
their jobs by promising that if the San Leandro plant were closed,
the company would find jobs for them at other locations. 26 The
plaintiffs argued that this promise of continued employment re-
gardless of the fate of the San Leandro plant was made on several
different occassions. 27
Between May of 1980 and January of 1984 the plaintiffs re-
turned to positions the collective bargaining agreement covered. 28
The plaintiffs alleged that Caterpillar supervisors orally assured
them that the downgrade to unionized positions was only tempo-
rary. 2° On December 15, 1984, however, Caterpillar notified the
plaintiffs that it was shutting down the San Leandro plant and laying
off the plaintiffs. 30 In response to Caterpillar's firing, the plaintiffs
filed a claim in state court contending that Caterpillar's promises
amounted to individual employment contracts which Caterpillar
had in turn breached. 3 '
Although the plaintiffs based their claim solely on state law,
Caterpillar removed the case to federal court. 32 Caterpillar argued
that the collective bargaining agreement superseded the individual
contracts which as a result merged into the collective agreement
when the plaintiffs returned to positions covered by the agree-
ment." The district court agreed with Caterpillar and upheld the
removal. 34 Finding the plaintiffs' state law claims independent of
the collective bargaining agreement, however, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 35 The Supreme Court granted
23 Id,
29 Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Caterpillar made both oral and written promises that
"they could look forward to indefinite and lasting employment with the corporation and that
they could count on the corporation to take care of them," and that "while serving Caterpillar
as managers or weekly salaried employees, [they] were assured that if the San Leandro facility
of Caterpillar ever closed, Caterpillar would provide employment opportunities for [them]
at other facilities of Caterpillar, its subsidiaries, divisions, or related companies." Id.
27 Id. at 2428, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2522. As a result the plaintiffs' claim that they "continued
to remain in Caterpillar's employment rather than seeking other employment." Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
39 Id.
3' Id.
n Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
"See Caterpillar v. Williams, 786 F.2d 928, 935, 938, 122 LR.R.M. 2590, 2595, 2597
(9th Cir. 1986), aff'd 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2526 (1987). The court of
appeals concluded that the defendant's contention of pre-emption of the individual contracts
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certioraris' and unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' holding
that removal to federal court was improper. 37
Caterpillar asserted three distinct grounds for Section 301 pre-
emption of the plaintiffs' state law claim. First, Caterpillar argued
that the plaintiffs' claim was in reality a claim directly based on the
collective bargaining agreement." Caterpillar contended that under
J.I. Case v. N.L.R.B.," the collective bargaining agreement "sub-
sumed" the individual contracts when the plaintiffs returned to
positions covered by the agreement thereby making any claims
based on the individual contracts claims under the collective bar-
gaining agreement.'" Secondly, Caterpillar contended that even if
the plaintiffs' did not base their claim directly on the collective
agreement, the state law action on the individual contracts was at
least "substantially dependent" on analysis of the collective agree-
ment.4 ' Thirdly, Caterpillar argued that Section 301 mandates pre-
emption where a court must interpret the collective agreement to
determine the validity of a federal defense. 42
After initially reviewing the well-pleaded complaint rule, 43 the
Supreme Court dismissed each of Caterpillar's three arguments for
pre-emption." Rejecting Caterpillar's contention that the collective
bargaining agreement automatically subsumed the individual con-
by the collective agreement was not an essential element of the plaintiffs' cause of action. Id.
at 936, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2596. According to the court, federal law did not create the right
that the plaintiffs allege was violated. Id. at 937, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2596-97. As a result, the
court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking whether or not the stale law cause of action
is eventually pre-empted. Id,
' 6 107 S. Ct. 485 (1986).
37 Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2427, 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523, 2526.
" Id. at 2931, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524-25.
39 321 U.S. 332 (1944).11. Case Co. offered individual contracts to all of its employees
and approximately 75% of the employees accepted the terms of the contract. Id. at 333, 14
L.R.R.M. at 502. During the term of the individual contracts the CIO,petitioned the National
Labor Relations Board for certification as the representative of the production and mainte-
nance employees of 1.1. Case. Id. Dismissing the company's argument that representation
elections could not be conducted while the individual contracts were in effect, ihe Board
ordered the elections which in turn resulted in certification of the union. Id. When called
upon by the union to bargain, however, the company refused claiming that it could not talk
with the union concerning any rights under the individual contracts. Id. at 334, 14 L.R.R.M.
at 502. The Supreme Court concluded that the trade agreement superseded the individual
contracts and that employees are entitled to all the benefits conferred by the agreement
regardless of how they were originally hired. Id. at 336, 14 L.R.R.M. at 503.
° Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2431, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524-25.
Id. at 2431, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
42 Id. at 2933, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525-26.
43 Id. at 2429-30, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523-24.
" Id. at 2430-33, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524-26.
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tracts as a matter of federal law, 45 the Court noted that Caterpillar
had based this argument on a misinterpretation of J.I. Case.46 A
correct reading off/. Case, the Court stated, allows for the assertion
of state law contract rights that are "independent" of the collective
agreement provided that the contract relied upon in support of
those rights is not the collective agreement. 47 Concluding that Cat-
erpillar ignored the fact that the plaintiffs' characterization based
the claim on "independent rights" created by individual contracts
and not by the agreement, the Court dismissed Caterpillar's initial
argument. 48
Unpersuaded by Caterpillar's second argument, the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' claim was not "substantially dependent"
on an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. 49 The claim,
according to the Court, neither relied on the collective agreement
nor addressed the relationship between the individual contracts and
45 1d. at 2431, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524-25.
46 Id. at 2431, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525. The Court found the following language of Case
to be conclusive on the question of whether all individual contracts are superseded by the
collective bargaining agreement;
Individual contracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and whether under
some circumstances they may add to them in matters covered by the collective
bargain, we leave to be determined by appropriate forums under the law of
contracts applicable, and to the Labor Board if they constitute unfair labor
practices.
Id. (citing J./. Case v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 339, 14 L.R.R.M. 501, 505 (1944)).
This finding, noted the Court, did not preclude Caterpillar from questioning either the
"legality or viability" of the individual contracts. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2432, 125 L.R.R.M.
2525. The Court noted that Caterpillar could argue that the individual contracts conflicted
with "the principle of exclusive representation in Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act," id. (citing Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commit, 427 U.S. 132, 146,
92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2886 (1976) (quoting Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260, 56 L.R.R.M.
2225, 2228 (1964))), or "that enforcement of this individual employment contract arguably
would constitute an unfair labor practice under the NLRA." Id. (citing San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838 (1959)).
47 Id. at 2431-32, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525.
"e
	
at 2432, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525. The Court noted that in reality Caterpillar was
"attempting to justify removal on facts not alleged in the complaint," by "ignoring the set of
facts (i.e. the individual employment contracts) presented by respondents, along with their
legal characterizations of those facts, and arguing that there are different facts respondents
might have alleged that would have constituted a federal claim." Id. Noting that recharac-
terization of the plaintiffs' claim for purposes of removal is only permissible where the
plaintiff is attempting to avoid federal jurisdiction by phrasing the claim in terms of a state
claim pre-empted by federal law and not where the plaintiff is asserting an "independent"
state law claim, the Court found the invoking of the "artful pleading" doctrine inappropriate.
Id. (citing Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 410 n.6 (1981) (Brennan,.,
dissenting)).
49 1d. at 2431, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
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the bargaining agreement." Moreover, noted the Court, California
state law was unclear whether a state court even had to examine
the collective bargaining agreement in this case. 5 ' Thus, finding the
plaintiffs' state law claim to be "independent" of the labor agree-
ment, the Court denied pre-emption on the traditional grounds of
'either "direct basis" or "substantial dependence." 52
Caterpillar's third and final argument essentially requested the
Court to adopt a new ground for pre-emption in Section 301 cases."
Arguing that Section 301 should pre-empt state law claims where
the defendant raises a federal defense requiring analysis of the
collective bargaining agreement, Caterpillar claimed that an excep-
tion to the "well-pleaded" complaint rule was desirable in this case. i 4
Caterpillar raised the federal defense that the collective bargaining
agreement contained a waiver by unionized employees of any pre-
existing individual contract rights. 55 The Court, however, held that
not even Section 301's pre-emptive force could overcome the "par-
amount" policies the "well-pleaded" complaint rule embodied. 5"
Moreover, noted the Court, Congress long ago declared a federal
defense not a sufficient basis for removal. 57
In Caterpillar, the Supreme Court correctly applied the well
pleaded complaint rule to preclude the defendant from removing
the case to federal court. A defendant may remove a case to federal
court only where the plaintiff's cause of action on its face asserts a
federal claim." Long ago the Supreme Court interpreted the acts
of 1887 and 1888 to prohibit removal based on a federal defense
and one commentator suggests that only a constitutional amend-
ment could change this rule. 59 Thus, whatever the merits of the
arguments for change," denial of removal based on a federal de-
fense is firmly entrenched in precedent.
A confusing aspect of this decision is the two ways in which the
Court talks about federal pre-emption. The Court initially con-
5° Id.
51 Id. at 2431 n.9, 125	 al 2524 n.g.
" See Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2431-32, 125 L.R.k.M. at 2524-25.
55 See id. at 2433, 125 L,R.R.M. at 2525-26.
54 See id.
' 5 Id.
5f;
	
at 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2526,
.57 Id.
5" C. WRrcurr, THE LAW Oh' FEDERAL COURTS 210 (1983).
" See WRIGIIr, supra note 58, at 210.
" See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, S . l'oDY OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 164-68 (1969).
194	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 30:99
eludes that Section 301 does not pre-empt the plaintiffs' cause of
action.° Later in the opinion, however, the Court suggests that the
state court is free to conclude that federal labor law pre-empts the
plaintiffs' cause of action. 62 Although these statements are seemingly
contradictory, they are easily resolved when considered in light of
the two distinct senses in which the Court is using pre-emption.
Complete pre-emption exists where state law causes of action
are totally displaced by a federal cause of action. 63 This is the case
with Section 301 of the Taft Hartley Act which makes any state law
cause of action either directly based or substantially dependent on
a collective bargaining agreement inherently federal. 64 Federal law
is therefore the basis of all rights asserted under a collective bar-
gaining agreement.° Thus, if the plaintiff tries to assert a state law
claim for violation of a collective bargaining agreement, the defen-
dant can remove the case to federal court. 66 Because, however, the
Caterpillar Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not base their
cause of action in the collective bargaining agreement, Section 301
pre-emption does not apply in this case. 67
Unlike complete pre-emption, ordinary pre-emption does not
supplant state law causes of action but rather exists as a defense to
rights claimed under state law. 68 In arguing ordinary pre-emption
the defendant is not claiming that the plaintiff is in reality asserting
a federal claim but rather that federal law cuts off the rights alleged
under state law.69 Because ordinary pre-emption is a defense, it
cannot be grounds for removal." Removal must be based on the
plaintiff's complaint without resort to the defendant's answer to the
complaint. 71 Thus, as the result of the federal court's lack of juris-
diction, the question of whether federal labor law pre-empts the
plaintiffs' claim in this case is for the state to decide.
The Court therefore decided this case on the basis of the rules
governing federal jurisdiction. Concluding that the policies behind
the well pleaded complaint rule are paramount, the Supreme Court
61 Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2430-32, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524-25.
62 Id. at 2432, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525.
63 See WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 216.
64 See Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct at 2430-31, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
65 See WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 216.
66 See Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2430, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523-24.
67 See id. at 2430-32, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524-25.
69 See WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 216.
69 See id.
7° Id.
7 ' Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 96, 98 (1936).
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refused to change the rules and allow removal based on a federal
defense. 72 As a result the state court in this case must apply federal
labor law." State courts are often called upon to apply federal law
because state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
federal question cases unless Congress has made federal jurisdiction
exclusive. 74 Thus, in denying removal to federal court, the Caterpil-
lar Court rejected the defendant's complete pre-emption argument,
but at the same time left open the possibility of a state court ruling
of ordinary pre-emption.
B. * Preemption and Removal of State Law Claims: Young v.
Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc.'
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides
federal jurisdiction for suits alleging contract violations between an
employer and a labor organization. 2 Federal substantive law, derived
from the policy of national labor laws, controls suits which arise
under section 301. 3 The Supreme Court has held that section 301
has extraordinary preemptive force which will displace any state
cause of action based on a collective bargaining agreement (the
contract between labor and employer} and any state tort claim which
is either dependent on a right established by a contract or is "inex-
tricably intertwined" with the terms of a contract. 4
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, the Supreme Court held that
federal law properly preempted a state contract claim arising under
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that such a contract
72 See Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2433, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2526.
" See id. at 2432, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525.
74 See WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 268.
* By Daniel J. Rose, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 830 F.2d 993, 126 L.R.R.M. 2798 (9th Cir. 1987).
2 '29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Section.301 of the L.M.R.A. states that "[sluits for violation
of contracts between employer and a labor organization representing employees in an in-
dustry affecting commerce may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties ... ." Id.
" See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57, 40
L.R.R.M. 2113, 2116 (1957) (Court upheld decision requiring arbitration of a labor grievance
applying federal law fashioned from national labor law policies).
See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3349-50
(1985) (state law tort claim preempted by section 301 of L.M.R.A.; Court set out guidelines
to determine when a state law tort claim was preempted); Franchise Tax Bd, v. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983) (Court held the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 did not preempt all state tax laws and thus removal to federal
court was unwarranted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (sets out basic guidelines for
removal jurisdiction).
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claim may be removed to federal court even though the superseding
federal claim offers no remedy to the plaintiff. 5 Nineteen years
later, in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, the Supreme Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's view that preemption of a contract claim required a
superseding federal cause of action to provide the plaintiff with a
remedy.6 In Caterpillar, the Supreme Court distinguished the issue
of remedy from issues concerning jurisdiction and preemption,
making clear that if a state claim is preempted by a federal claim,
no federal remedy is necessary.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has, however, continued
to look at the issue of remedies when confronted with section 301
preemption of state tort claims' In Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp.,
the court found the state tort of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing preempted because the superseding federal claim, aris-
ing from the CBA, did not offer "any less protection" than the state
wrongful termination law.° Recently, in Scott v. New United Motor
Manufacturing, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of
California held that the lack of an adequate remedy from a CBA
under federal law prohibited the court from finding the state tort
claim preempted.m Both the Harper and Scott courts noted that the
Ninth Circuit had never found a state tort claim preempted where
there was not a comparable federal remedy."
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc. ruled that
federal law preempted the state tort claim of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, although there was no federal remedy
5 390 U.S. 557, 561, 67 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2882 (1968).
107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2523 n.4 (1987).
Id,
8 Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1049, 125 L.R.R.M. 3075, 3078 (9th
Cir. 1987) (CBA established that employee had guarantee of discipline only for just cause);
Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 668, 119 L.R.R.M. 3161, 3164 (9th Cir.
1985) (implied covenant claim preempted because "good cause" provision provided no less
protection than state wrongful termination law); Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635,
642-43 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985) (court held that in order for federal
law to preempt state law, federal law must provide a remedy); Olguin v. Inspiration Consul.
Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1474, 117 L.R.R.M. 2073, 2078 (9th Cir. 1984) (court allowed
preemption noting that the CBA provided the same or greater protection of job security as
the state tort law provided for nonunionized workers); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,
726 F.2d 1357, 1367, 115 L.R.R.M, 3089, 3095 (9th Cir. 1984).
9 Harper, 764 F.2d at 668, 119 L.R.R.M. at 3164.
1 ° 632 F. Supp. 891, 894, 121 L.R.R.M. 2501, 2503.
11 Harper, 764 F.2d at 668, 119 L.R.R.M. at 3164; Scott, 632 F. Supp. at 894, 121 L.R.R.M.
at 2503.
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under the CBA comparable to the remedies which state law af-
forded. 12
 In Young, the court ruled that the CBA between the union
and the employer waived the state job security protections arising
from an implied covenant of good faith because the agreement
stipulated that probationary employees could be fired at will.'s The
court held that the implied covenant exception to the employment
at will doctrine regulated the employment relationship which Con-
gress had intended federal labor legislation to control." Extrapo-
lating from the policies inherent in the national labor laws, the court
concluded that the process of collective bargaining should preempt
an independent state law relating to the job security of union mem-
bers.'' Consequently, after Young, courts should only determine if
state law interferes with federal labor policy concerning collective
bargaining and need not be concerned if federal law provides a
comparable remedy.
In Young, Ruth Young worked as a waitress for Anthony's Fish
Grottos, Inc., (Anthony's) from 1974 until 1983 when she voluntar-
ily left her job.' 8 Young returned to work on May 15, 1985 and was
discharged the same day." During her employment a CBA was in
effect which established a 30 day probationary period for new em-
ployees.' 8 The agreement stated that a probationary employee may
be discharged at the employer's discretion, while all other employees
may only be discharged for just cause. 1 •
Young believed that her discharge was the result of activities
she instigated in 1980 when she organized an employee protest over
an Internal Revenue Service audit." Young argued that dismissing
her because of her protest activities violated state public policy. 2 '
She also argued that a manager had orally promised to hire her on
the same terms as her previous employment: 22
Young sued in state court under state law claims of breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 126 L.R.R.M. 2798 (9th Cir.
1987).
Id. at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2804.
1, Id. at 999, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2802.
15 /d. at 998, 126	 at 2801.
1 ° Id. at 996, 126 L.R.R.M. a( 2799-800.
17 Id. at 996, 126 L.R.R.M. al 2800.
Id.
15, Id,
211 Id
21 Id.
22 Id.
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dealing, fraud, wrongful discharge, negligent misrepresentation,
and negligent and intentional infliction of mental distress. 23
 An-
thony's removed the case to federal court claiming that Young's
state law claims were, in essence, claims for breach of the CBA and
therefore preempted by federal law and removable under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.24 Young moved to
remand the case back to state court. 25 The district court denied
Young's motion and permitted removal, holding that section 301
preempted her claims because they arose under and were inter-
twined with the CBA.29 The district court then granted summary
judgment in favor of Anthony's on the grounds that Young failed
to exhaust the CBA's grievance procedure or to timely file the
section 301 claim. 27
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding. 28
The court first addressed Young's claim for breach of an oral em-
ployment contract. 29 Although her complaint did not state that the
CBA governed her employment, the court looked beyond the face
of the pleadings to determine that her contract depended upon the
CBA." The court reasoned that any independent agreement of
employment, in a job position contained in a CBA, could only be
effective as part of the CBA." Therefore, the court read Young's
23 Id.
24 Id.
23 Id.
25 1d.
27 Id.
29 Id. at 1002, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2805.
" Id. at 997, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801.
"Id. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983). The
Court stated that the plaintiff's complaint establishes jurisdiction and that a federal law
defense does not establish original jurisdiction. Id. at 10-11. The Court recognized that an
independent corollary to this rule is that a plaintiff may not "defeat removal by omitting to
plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." Id. at 22; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547 (1987) (state contract and tort claims completely preempted
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). The Court had held that, for
the purposes of removing a state claim to federal court, section 301's preemptive strength is
powerful enough to convert a state common law complaint into a complaint which states a
federal claim. See also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2430, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521,
2523-24 (1987) (state law complaint not completely preempted and thus claims were not
removable).
." Young, 830 F.2d at 997, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801 (citing Olguin v. Inspiration Canso!.
Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1474, 117 L.R.R.M. 2073, 2078 (9th Cir. 1984); Stallcop v. Kaiser
Found. Hasps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048, 125 L.R.R.M. 3075, 3078 (9th Cir. 1987); Bale v.
General Tel. Co., 795 F.2d 775, 779-80, 123 L.R.R.M. 2835, 2837-38 (9th Cir. 1986)), But
see Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2(1 953, 957-59, 123 L.R.R.M. 2753, 57 (8th Cir.
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complaint for breach of contract as a complaint for breach of the
CBA." The Ninth Circuit concluded that section 301 preempts and
supplants the state law claim for breach of contract and therefore
found the district court correctly assumed jurisdiction."
Young argued that section 301 did not supplant her claim, for
federal law afforded her no redress." Specifically, Young noted that
under the CBA she could be discharged at will because she was a
probationary employee while her state law claim for breach of
promise protected her from dismissal. 35 Young argued that a fed-
eral law claim could supplant a state claim only if it provided a
superseding remedy. 36
The court noted that the Supreme Court had distinguished
between the issues of jurisdiction and relief and had rejected the
notion that a federal remedy must supersede a state remedy for
federal law to preempt a state claim. 37 The court held that the
grievance procedure set out in the CBA supplanted Young's claim
although Young did not participate in the procedure. 38 Further, the
court held that federal law recognized the right of the union to
waive contractual rights in the "give and take of bargaining."39 The
court stated that federal law may supplant and preempt state law
even if federal law fails to provide remedies which are available
under state law." Thus, the court found that section 301 preempted
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3242 (1987). The Eighth Circuit held that a claim for breach of
an individual contract did not arise from a CBA even where the individual position was
included in bargaining unit. Young, 830 F.2d ai 997 n.1, 126 L,R.R.M. at 2801 n.l. The issue
of whether individual contracts arise out of a CBA has yet to be settled by the Supreme
Court. Id,
57 Young, 830 F.2d at 998, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801.
33 Id. at 999, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2802.
34 Id. at 998, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801.
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 Id. (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560, 67 L.R.R.M. 2881,
2882 (1968) (Court affirmed removal and preemption of a state law claim for breach of a
CBA even though the relief the plaintiff sought could not be obtained in federal court);
Caterpillar, hie. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2523 n.4 (1987)
(Court distinguished between remedy and jurisdiction)); see also Franchise Tax lid. v. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1983).
3" Young, 830 F.2d at 998-99, 126 L.R.R,M. at 2802.
39 /d. at 998, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801 (citing NLRB v, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Lueck,
388 U.S. 175, 180, 65 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2451 (1967); Hollins v. Kaiser Found. Hasps., 727
F.2d 823, 8'25, 115 L.R.R.M. 3601, 3602 (9th Cir. 1984)).
4° Id. at 998, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801 (citing Avco, 390 U.S. at 560-61, 67 L.R.R.M. at
2881-82).
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and supplanted Young's claim of breach of contract even though
her probationary status would prevent her from being afforded a
remedy under the CBA. 4 '
The court then determined that section 301 preempted
Young's tort claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 42
 The, court observed that the tort claim for violation
of the implied covenant protects the job security of employees by
providing an exception to the common law rule that an employer
can terminate employees at wi11.43 The court utilized the Supreme
Court's analysis in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck to help determine
whether section 301 preempts a state tort claim." In Allis-Chalmers,
the Supreme Court stated that while federal law will not preempt
a state tort claim if the state "confers nonnegotiable state-law rights
on employers or employees independent of any right established
by contract," federal law will preempt such a tort claim if the tort
claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of
the labor contract."45 The court found that Young's implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing claim was intertwined with her
contract and the terms of the CBA. 4(t The court noted that the
implied covenant directly regulates the employment relationship
and would afford Young a different set of rights than those nego-
tiated under the CBA. 47 Consequently, because Young's tort claim
was intertwined with the CBA, section 301 preempted the claim. 48
As with her contract claim, however, Young argued that section
301 could only preempt a state tort claim when an employee had
comparable job security under a CBA. 49 Young noted that under
the CBA she could be terminated at will as a probationary employee
while the implied covenant might have provided her with more job
41 Id. at 999, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2802.
4'2
	 at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2804. The court noted that the district court had exercised
pendent jurisdiction over the tort claims based on their close relation with the section 301
claim. Id, at 999, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2802.
43 Id, at 999, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803 (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, 111  Cal. App. 3d
443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (court found that the duty arising from the covenant of good
faith is that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive
benefits from the agreement, that it is unconditional and independent, and that it applies to
all contracts)).
44 Young, 830 F.2d at 999, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2802.
45 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349-50.
46 Young, 830 F.2d at 1000, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803.
.41, Id.
" Id. at 1000-01, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803-04.
19 Id. at 1000, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803.
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security. 5" The court agreed that in all previous cases in which
section 301 preempted a claim of implied covenant the CBA af-
forded the employee comparable job security. 51 The court thus held
that a union could not bargain away an employee's state claim which
protected job security otherwise unprotected. 52 Further, the Young
court noted that in Scott v. New United Motor Manufacturer, Inc. a
district court held that section 301 could not preempt a probation-
ary employee's tort claims which gave that employee greater job
security." The Young court observed that the court in Scott reasoned
it would be against federal labor policy to penalize workers in a
union by not allowing them access to those minimum state standards
available to nonunion workers."
Despite the precedent and Young's arguments, the Young court
held that the union could waive the implied covenant protections."
The court stated that the state tort furthers no state policy inde-
pendent of Young's employment contract and primarily duplicates
the protection implicit. in the notion of collective bargaining. 56 The
Young court - acknowledged that in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.
the court had reasoned that federal law will not preempt a state
tort claim if the state claim furthers a state public policy and does
not threaten the collective bargaining process. 57 The Young court,
however, found no public policy which protected Young's claim,
and stated that allowing states to fashion corollary protections to
collective bargaining agreements would not be in keeping with fed-
eral labor policy."
50 Id.
• 1 Id. at 1000, 126 L,R.R.M. at 2803; see also Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co.,
740 F.2d 1468, 1474, 117 L.R.R.M. '2073, 2078 (9th Cir. 1984) (court allowed preemption
noting that the CBA provided the same or greater protection of job security as the state tort
law provided for nontinionized workers); Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044,
1049, 125 L.R.R.M. 3075, 3078 (9th Cir. 1987) (CEA established that employee had guarantee
of discipline only for just cause); Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 668, 119
L.R.R.M. 3161, 3164 (9th Cir. 1985) (implied covenant claim preempted because "good
cause" provision provided. no less protection than stale wrongful termination law).
"Young, 830 F.2d at 1000, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803.
" id. at 1000, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803 (citing Scott v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 632
F. Supp. 891, 121 L.R.R.M. 2501 (N.D. Cal. 1986)).
" Id. (citing Scott, 632'F. Stipp. at 894, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2503-04).
" Id. at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2804.
" Id. at 1000, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803-04. See generally infra note 58.
5 ' Young, 830 F.2d at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2803 (citing Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1373-75,
115 L.R.R.M. at 3093-99).
" Id. at 1002, 126 L.R.R,M. at 2803-04 (citing N.L.R.A. Preemption of Stale Wrongful
Discharge Claims, 34 liasTINGs L.j. 635, 660 (1983)). (state torts of implied covenant and
wrongful discharge "accommodate the very interest that the NLRA accommodates through
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Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers, the court
noted the importance of ensuring consistent federal interpretations
of CBA's. 59
 Allowing parties to recast section 301 contract claims as
state law torts, the Young court reasoned, would permit plaintiffs to
evade the requirements of 301. 6° Finally, the court stated that failure
to recognize the unions' ability to waive probationary employees'
job security would lead to incongruous results." The court observed
that probationary employees would have access to the wide range
of tort remedies and senior employees would be limited to the
CBA.62 Therefore, the court reasoned, probationary employees
might actually enjoy greater job security than their more senior
coworkers." Accordingly, the court upheld the unions' prerogative
to waive probationary employees' rights to the minimum protections
offered under state law."
Young's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy rested on her belief that her efforts to organize employees
in 1980 caused her firing. 65 Although the court had recognized
exceptions to preemption on public policy grounds, it found that
preemption violated no public policy here."' The court noted that
Young failed to identify a statute or any other source of public
policy supporting her claim. 67 Because it found no policy, the court
held this claim preempted."
Young's last claim was for intentib'fial and negligent infliction
of mental distress due to her disChdi*e. The court relied on its prior
analysis in holding that these Zlaiins arose out of Young's contract
claim and thus are inextricably intertwined with the interpretation
the collective bargaining process"; the federal labor system cause; individual contracts to be
superseded by the CBA).
" Id. at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2804.
6° Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471	 202, 11; 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3349
(1985)).
6 i Id.
62 Id.
03 Id,
64 Id, The court also cited Trumbauer v. Group Health Coop., 635 F. Supp. 543, 547,
122 L.R.R.M. 2384, 2387 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (court held that section 301 preempted pro-
bationary employee's implied covenant claim, because the claim arose out of the CBA and
was subject to waiver); Hollins v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 727 F.2d 823, 825, 115 L.R.R.M.
3601, 3602 (9th Cir. 1984) (court held that as exclusive bargaining representative, the union
could waive right of the employees).
65 Id. at 996, 126 L.R.R.M, at 2800.
66 Id. at 1002, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2805.
67 Id.
68 Id.
December 1988] ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 203
of the CBA.69 Thus the court found that federal law preempted
these claims and that removal was proper."
The Young decision is significant because it permits the union
to waive the state created job security of implied covenants for
probationary workers:n A court no longer must consider if a
preempted and supplanted state law claim has a comparable remedy
in federal court. Because of this decision, plaintiffs such as Young
may only look to the CBA from which their contract arose for
redress when pleading the state law claim of implied covenant.
Whether other courts will follow the Young court's holding, and the
degree to which courts may extend the holding, depends primarily
on the Young court's interpretation of the policy of the national
labor laws. 72 Although the court's interpretation is correct, it
avoided making the most compelling argument for its decision. 73
In essence, the court's holding put much faith on the collective
bargaining process as the primary means of protection for union
employees. 74 The Young decision manifests the belief that the parties
to a CBA must be left free to bargain without government intrusion.
This view of the collective bargaining process is in keeping with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the policy behind the national
labor laws. 75 The Supreme Court has held that the government's
role in collective bargaining is only to provide the format from
which the parties to a CBA can make their own law." The Court
has found that the intent of labor laws is generally to 'keep the
government and the courts from interfering with the process and
69 Id.
70 Id.
7 ' Id. rt 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2804.
72 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court held that federal sub-
stantive law applied to section 301 claims is derived from the policy of national labor laws.
Id,
73 The court focused on the fact that the state claim was intertwined with the CBA, that
labor policy benefits from applying consistent rules, and that not permitting the union to
waive such rights would lead to incongruous results. See supra text accompanying notes 51—
68.
74 13y allowing the union to waive rights protected by the state, the court adopted a stance
favoring private ordering through free colleciive bargaining.
" See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
76 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 45 L.R.R.M. 2704 (1960)
(Court held that union could apply economic weapons during negotiation process). The
Court noted that collective bargaining is a system where the government does not attempt
to control the results of negotiations. Id. at 490, 45 L.R.R.M, at 2709; see also NLRB v.
American Nat'l fns. Go., 343 U.S. 395, 30 L.R.R.M. 2147 (1952) (Court upheld a clause
which parties agreed to during collective bargaining, despite the fact that the clause was
favorable to management).
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substance of free collective bargaining. 77
 The Young decision is in
keeping with this policy.
As the Young court articulated, if employees could look both to
state law and the CBA, parties to a CBA would have to take into
account the state law in forming their agreements. 78 Unions which
may wish to bargain away rights for probationary employees in
order to ensure greater job security for senior employees could not
do so. The state would, in essence, become a party to the CBA.
This was clearly not the intention of the legislature in forming the
labor laws.
Thus, the Young decision was correct because it was in keeping
with national labor policy. Unions and employers ought to be free
to fashion their own collective bargaining agreements. The Young
holding can not, however, be extended indefinitely. Unions may
not, for example, waive all employee's protections afforded by state
law. 79
 Federal law ought not to preempt and supplant those state
laws advocating important public policy which do not threaten the
bargaining process. 8° Claims which arise outside of the CBA will
definitely not be preempted." As noted in Young, some courts dis-
agree as to what sort of activities or contracts lie within the realm
of the CBA and thus section 301. 82
Thus, the Young court properly established that if a claim arises
under a CBA, federal law may preempt and supplant the claim
whether or not the remedy provided under the CBA is comparable
with that offered under state law. The issue of what claims legiti-
mately arise under a CBA, however, remains for the Supreme Court
to clarify.
C. *The Preemption of State Tort Claims Based on State OSHA Statutes:
Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co.'
Courts have addressed the issue of when federal jurisdiction
preempts state jurisdiction in cases involving labor relations regu-
" See generally supra note 76.
" See generally Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at
2804 (9th Cir. 1987).
79 See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1374, 115 L.R.R.M.
3089, 3094 (9th Cir. 1987) (court held claim that arose under state policy inherent in "whistle
blower" statute not preempted where claimant was fired because he reported that he was
delivering spoiled milk).
80
 Young, 850 F.2d at 1001, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2804.
81 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
" Young, 830 F.2d at 997 11.1, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2801 n.l.
* By John J. Powers, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAw REVIEW.
826 F.2d 857, 126 L.R.R.M. 2145 (9th Cir. 1987).
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lated by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA). 2 Generally, federal preemp-
tion issues arise in three contexts. 3 First, if the activity of the em-
ployer or union is arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA,
state and federal courts must defer to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). 4 Second, if a state act interferes with the NLRA's
policy of keeping certain labor or management conduct unregu-
lated, federal law will preempt the state act.° Finally, section 301(a)
of the LMRA grants jurisdiction to federal courts in actions involv-
ing collective bargaining agreements without requiring the usual
diversity of citizenship or the minimal dollar amount in contro-
versy.°
Although section 301(a) does not explicitly clarify which law
courts should apply, federal substantive or state contractual, courts
have construed section 301(a) as a Congressional mandate to federal
courts to form a body of federal common law' in order to provide
uniformity in disputes over collective bargaining agreements. 8 A
2 See generally C. Moult's, THE DEvEt.optsic. LABOR LAW 1504-98 (2d ed. 1983). Congress
passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U,S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982), in 1935
in order to regulate more effectively the growth of organized labor. Moitais, supra, at 27-
35. In 1947, Congress amended the Wagner Act with the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982). MORRIS, supra, at 35-38.
3 MORRIS, supra note 2, at 1504-05.
'San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838 (1959)
(Court held that a California state court was precluded by the NLRA from awarding damages
resulting from peaceful picketing, because the activity was "arguably subject to" section 7 or
section 8 of the N1-RA and therefore exclusively under the NLRB jurisdiction); see also
MORRIS, supra note 2, at 1517-19.
5 Lodge 76, Intl Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v, Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm . '', 427 U.S. 132, 140, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883-84 (1976). The Court held
that a union's refusal to work overtime was "peaceful conduct which must be free of regu-
lation by the States if the congressional intent in enacting the comprehensive federal law of
labor relations is not to be frustrated." Id. at 155, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2889; see also MORRIS, supra
note 2, at 1522-24.
Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301(a) provides
in part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce , may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Id.
' Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456, 40 L.R.R.M.
2113, 2116 (1957) ("the substantive law to apply in suits under 301(a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws"); see also Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3348 (1985).
8
 Local 174, Teamsters v, Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2721
(1962) (Tillie subject matter of § 301(a) is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law'....The
possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and
federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both negotiation and admin-
istration of collective agreements.") (citation omitted); see also International Bhd. of Elec.
206	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:99
state claim is preempted when the claim is either directly founded
on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement or when
resolution of the claim is "substantially dependent" on interpreting
the collective bargaining agreement. 9 Thus, section 301(a) creates a
federal cause of action that completely preempts state law claims
which necessitate interpreting collective bargaining agreements,
even where the plaintiff has attempted to tailor his complaint to
avoid federal jurisdiction by omitting allegations of federal law.'°
In the 1985 decision of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck," the United
States Supreme Court broadened its reading of the preemptive
effect of section 301(a) to cover suits alleging liability under state
tort laws.' 2 The Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs may no longer
avoid federal jurisdiction by merely re-labeling their contract claims
as state claims for tortious breach of contract." The Allis-Chalmers
Court established a test to distinguish when state tort claims are
preempted. The test determines whether the state law proscribes
conduct or creates rights and duties independent of the collective
bargaining agreement, in which case state law will apply. In contrast,
where the state tort claim is substantially related or "inextricably
Workers v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2168, 125 L.R.R.M. 2353, 2357 (1987); Allis-Chalmers,
471 U.S. at 209-10, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3348.
9 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2430-31, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2524 (1987)
(citing Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2166-67 n.3, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2356 n.3); see also Allis-Chalmers,
471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352-53.
1 ° Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2429-30, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523-24. The Court explored the
mechanics of how a defendant may remove a case involving a federal question from state to
federal court. Id. The "well-pleaded complaint rule" makes the plaintiff the master of the
claim and provides federal jurisdiction "only when a federal question is presented on the
face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Id. at 2429, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523 (citing
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936)). Moreover, a case may not be removed
to federal court solely on the basis of a defense of preemption. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2430,
125 L.R.R.M. at 2524 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. I, 12 (1983)). The preemptive force of a federal statute, however, is so great that
it can "completely preempt" an area of state law and thus make any claim purportedly based
on that law a federal claim. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2430, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2523-24 (citing
Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 24). Therefore, a statute like section 301(a) prohibits a
plaintiff from "artfully pleading" his complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction. Caterpillar, 107
S. Ct. at 2432, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
"471 U.S. 202, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345 (1985).
12 Id. at 210-11, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349.
13 Id. at 211, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349. The Court posited:
[Q]uestions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what
the legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement,
must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions
arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability
in tort.
Id.
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intertwined" with interpretation of the labor contract, section 301(a)
applies and the state tort claim is preempted."
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have interpreted Allis-Chal-
mers narrowly. In two cases decided in 1987, Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams 15 and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hech-
ler,m the Supreme Court rejected the view that preempts any state
claim that is slightly related to the collective bargaining agreement.I 7
Rather, the cases recognize independent state claims "tangentially"
related to the labor agreement: 8
During the Survey year, in Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted narrowly the Allis-
Chalmers standard and ruled that section 301(a) did not preempt a
state tort claim for wrongful discharge based upon a state public
policy expressed in California's Organized Safety and Health Act
(Cal/OSHA).'° In Paige, the Ninth Circuit applied the preemption
standard presented in Allis-Chalmers, and determined that although
one cause of action based on a state tort claim of breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing was preempted as a product of the
collective bargaining agreement, a second state tort claim of wrong-
ful discharge based on Cal/OSHA was not "inextricably intertwined"
with interpreting the terms of the labor agreement and therefore
was not preempted.2° The court in Paige then applied a second
preemption doctrine and held that minimum state standards for
health and safety do not violate the LMRA's policies of promoting
the collective bargaining process. 21
 Thus, following the standards
set forth in Paige, courts could find that section 301(a) does not
preempt claims based on state health regulations. 22
In Paige, the plaintiffs were two employees who worked as
welding-machine tenders pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
" Id. at 212-13, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3349-50. The Court held that the plaintiff's claim
alleging bad faith in the company's handling of an insurance claim was rooted in the labor
agreement because it necessitated looking to the contract to determine if the contract created
any implied rights. Id. at 215-20, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3350-53.
" Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521 (1987).
16
 International Mid. of Elec. Workers v. Flechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 125 L.R.R.M. 2353
(1987).
" See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
19
 Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 820 Elk] 857, 863, 126 L.R.R.M. 2145, 2149-50 (9th
Cir. 1987).
20 Id. at 861-63, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2148-50.
41 Id. at 863-65, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2150-52.
" M. at 866, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2152.
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ment between defendant Kaiser Co. and Operating Engineers Local
3.23 The plaintiffs were required to fuel twelve gasoline generators
under conditions they believed were unnecessarily and illegally haz-
ardous." After they unsuccessfully complained to their supervisors,
Kaiser Co. fired the plaintiffs when they refused to re-fuel a gen-
erator.25 The employer's superintendent discussed the firings with
representatives from Local 3, who told the plaintiffs that nothing
could be done. 26
The plaintiffs then filed a state court action containing seven
tort claims under California law. 27 Two of the state claims included
actions in tort for wrongful discharge." The plaintiffs claimed that
their employer breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as well as violated Cal/OSHA which prohibits the discharge
of employees who complain of unsafe working conditions. 29
The defendant company successfully removed the action to the
federal district court, alleging that section 301 preempted the
wrongful discharge claims because the plaintiffs' claims were merely
artfully-pleaded federal claims based on the collective bargaining
agreement. 3° The federal district court agreed and dismissed the
wrongful discharge claims because the federal statute of limitations
had run. 3 ' The district court remanded the remaining five tort
claims to the state court. 32
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim based on breach
of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but reversed the district
25 Id, at 859, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2146.
24 Id. The court found that the fueling was performed before the engines had cooled,
that leakage and spillage occurred during the fueling due to cracked funnels and poorly-
conditioned containers, and that "much of the re-fueling was required to be done beneath
falling sparks given off by the welders." Id.
25 Id.
"Id. at 859-60, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2146-47.
"/d. The claims included: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 6310,
6311, 6400, 6401, 6403, 6404 providing for regulation of occupational health and safety; (2)
wrongful discharge in violation of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5)
assault, (6) wilful refusal to take precautions by Chevron who employed Kaiser Co.; and (7)
willful, malicious requirements to perform ultra-hazardous tasks. Id. at 860, 126 L.R.R.M. at
2147.
25 Id.
29 Id.
5" Id.
51 Id.
" Id.
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court's treatment of the claim based on violation of Cal/OSHA." In
so holding, the Ninth Circuit first noted that section 301 prevented
the plaintiffs from "artfully pleading" their complaint to avoid fed-
eral jurisdiction. 34 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that courts will re-
characterize artfully-pleaded complaints as federal claims subject to
federal jurisdiction."
In assessing whether the two wrongful discharge claims were
"artfully-pleaded" to avoid section 301 preemption, the court stated
that the inquiry must focus on the express or implied intent of
Congress in enacting section 301 . 36 The court cited the policy pre-
sented in Allis-Chalmers that courts should neither preempt state
laws that do not conflict with nor frustrate federal laws, policies, or
congressional intent." The court also cited the Supreme Court
standard that section 301 only preempts claims directly based on
rights of collective bargaining agreements and claims "substantially
dependent" on interpretation of the agreements. 38 The court rec-
ognized that this doctrine applies to tort claims that are "inextricably
intertwined" with analysis of the contractual terms."
Applying this standard to the claims at hand, the court first
focused on the plaintiffs' first cause of action. The plaintiffs alleged
that the employer breached an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 40 The court found that this claim would require ex-
amination of the rights and liabilities presented in the collective
bargaining agreement.'" The court, therefore, held that section 310
completely preempted this first cause of action and properly dis-
missed the action as time-barred. 42
The Paige court then focused on the claim for wrongful dis-
charge in violation of California's public policy as expressed in Call
33
 Id. at 866, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2152.
34 Id. at 860, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2147; see supra note 10.
" Id. at 860, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2147.
w Paige, 826 F.2d at 861, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2148 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738, 119 L.R.R.M. 2569, 2575 (1985)).
57 Paige, 826 F.2d at 861, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2148 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202, 208, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3348 (1985)).
" Id. (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. at 2431, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2524).
a hl. (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 216-18, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351-52).
40 Id.
4 ' Id.
42 Id. at 861-62, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2148. The Paige court cited Allis-Chalmers, where the
Supreme Court held that because an implied duty to act in good faith "ultimately depends
upon the terms of the agreement between the parties, both arc tightly bound with questions
of contract interpretation that must be left to federal law." Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S.
at 216, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351).
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OSHA.43
 Cal/OSHA, the court observed, requires employers to pro-
vide a safe work atmosphere and prohibits the firing of employees
who complain of unsafe working conditions." To determine
whether this claim was preempted, the court outlined three existing
theories of federal preemption. 45 First, the court noted that the
preemption doctrine reserving claims arising under sections 7 and
8 of the NLRA to the NLRB did not apply in this case because the
alleged violations were claims arising under a state statute. 46
Second, the court noted that preemption could also obviously
exist under the federal jurisdiction granted by section 301(a) of the
LMRA. 47
 The court reasoned, however, that an employee under a
collective bargaining agreement retains a private right of action
under Cal/OSHA because the state regulations protect all workers
"irrespective of any labor agreements."48 The court recognized the
rights of all employees as individuals to benefit from the state health
and safety regulations." Moreover, the court noted that allowing
plaintiffs to refuse to expose themselves and others to a possibly
serious explosion would further California's public policy to protect
its citizens. 5° Therefore, even though article 19 of the collective
bargaining agreement incorporated the state safety laws, the court
held that section 301 did not preempt the claim because it was not
43 Paige, 826 F.2d at 862, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2148. The court noted that California restricts
any termination that is disallowed by statute or violates public policy. Id. (citing Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)).
" Paige, 826 F.2d at 862, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2148.
45 Id.
4!i
	(citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 43 L.R.R.M.
2838 (1959)).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 863, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2149.
1" Id.
50 Id. The court analogized its finding to its 1984 decision in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food
Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1376, 115 L.R.R.M. 3089, 3095 (9th Cir. 1984), in which it
upheld a state tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where an
employer fired an employee for reporting a shipment of spoiled milk to local health officials.
Paige, 826 F.2d at 863, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2149. The Paige court, moreover, distinguished this
case from Olguin v. Inspiration Como!. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475, 1l7 L.R.R.M.
2073, 2078 (9th Cir. 1984), where the Ninth Circuit held that an employee's state claim of
wrongful termination was preempted because his employer fired him when the employee
complained of mine safety conditions under a federal safety regulation. Paige, at 863 n. 10,
126 L.R.R.M. at 2149 n. 10. The I'aige court also distinguished DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc. 811 F. 2d 1333, 125 L.R.R.M. 3107 (9th Cir. 1987), because there the employer
discharged an employee not for health and safety violations, but rather for refusing to drive
a truck he mistakenly believed was unregistered. Paige, 826 F.2d at 863 n. II, 126 L.R.R.M.
at 2149 n. 11.
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"inextricably intertwined" with an interpretation of contract terms,
but rather required interpretation of state law. 5 '
In addition to these two theories of preemption, the Paige court
explored the implications of a third theory. The court considered
the third preemption doctrine which precludes state claims that
interfere with the goals of the NLRA. 52 The court quoted the 1985
Supreme Court decision of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, which stated that the Congress' goal in enacting the NLRA
was to establish a framework for an equitable bargaining process
without disturbing existing state laws that set minimum labor stan-
dards unrelated to the collective bargaining process." The Paige
court posited that Congress intended California to retain this police
power because the federal OSHA statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
explicitly allows individual states to adopt regulations at least as
vigorous as those required by the federal act. 54 The court went on
to note that other Supreme Court decisions have upheld various
state statutes that provide unemployment compensation to stri-
kers," require certain minimum mental health care benefits even
for residents insured on an employee health plan," and require a
specific severance payment to all employees in event of plant clos-
ing.57
Finally, in regard to the remaining five tort claims — intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault, peculiar risk,
and ultra-hazardous activities — the court found the district court's
order to remand was not reviewable on appeal because it did not
involve a matter of substantive law." In addition, the Ninth Circuit
5 ' Id. at. 863, 126 1„R.R.M. at 2149 ("Article 19 of the collective bargaining agreement
states that the employer will comply with all state and federal health and safety laws including
OSHA").
52 Id.
53 Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755, 119 L.R.R.M.
2569, 2581-82 (1985)).
" Paige, 826 F.2d at 864, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2150.
as See New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dept, 440 U.S. 519, 544-46, 100 L.R.R.M.
2896, 2904-05 (1979) (Court upheld a state court finding no preemption on the ground that
the unemployment insurance statute in question was a law of general application).
56 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 755, 758, 119 L.R.R.M. at
2582-83 (Court held that the NLRA did not preempt state statute providing "minimum
standards independent of the collective bargaining process [that] devolve on [employees] as
individual workers, not as members of a collective organization").
57 See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2222-23, 125 L.R.R.M. 2455,
2463-69 (1987) (Court relied on Metropolitan Life and held that. such a regulation protected
individual union and non-union workers alike, and was a valid exercise of the state's police
power).
"" Paige, 826 F.2d at 865-66, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2151-52 (citing Clorox Co. v, United States
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denied the plaintiffs' request for mandamus because it found that
the district court was legally correct in finding that section 301 did
not preempt the claims. 5° Consequently, the Ninth Circuit re-
manded the five tort claims to the California state court, along with
the plaintiffs' claim 'for wrongful termination in violation of Call
OSHA in order to determine if the alleged violations existed."
By recognizing that an individual employee can bring a state
tort action of wrongful discharge in violation of a public policy
independent of any contractual right,- the court in Paige adhered to
and clarified the narrow focus of the Allis-Chalmers decision. While
other courts have broadly interpreted Allis-Chalmers as preempting
any wrongful discharge claim brought by an employee who is sub-
ject to a collective bargaining agreement and arbitration proce-
dure,6 ' Paige illustrates a more refined reading of the Supreme
Court's "narrow focus" in Allis-Chalmers. In Allis-Chalmers, the Su-
preme Court stated that its decision did not hold "that every state
law suit asserting a right that relates in some way to a provision in
a collective bargaining agreement, or more generally to the parties
to such an agreement, necessarily is preempted by § 301."62
The Paige decision comports with two recent Supreme Court
interpretations of Allis-Chalmers. In International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers v. Hechler, 63 the Court noted that courts should read
Allis-Chalmers in the context of its "precise limits," and find preemp-
tion of only those state claims "substantially dependent" on analyses
of collective bargaining agreements. 64 In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Wil-
Dist. Ct. for N.D. of Cal., 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v.
Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 276-78 (9th Cir. 1984)).
59 Paige, 826 F.2d at 865-66, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2151-52 (citing Survival Sys. v. United
States Dist. Ct., 825 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Paige, 826 F.2d. at 866, 126 L.R.R.M. at 2152.
61 See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031, 1046, 125 L.R.R.M. 2855,
2867 (7th Cir. 1987). The court in Lingle faced an employee's allegation that her employer
fired her in retaliation for exercising her rights under Illinois' worker's compensation law.
Id. at 1033-34, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2857. The court held that section 301 preempted the
employee's claim because "where a plaintiff makes a claim for wrongful discharge, this claim
necessarily implicates a just cause provision" (of the collective bargaining agreement]. Id. at
1049, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2870. The court cited other Seventh Circuit decisions which similarly
held that section 301 preempts the tort of retaliatory discharge. Id. at 1044-45, 125 L.R.R.M.
at 2866.
62 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352-53 (1985).
65 107 S. Ct. 2161, 125 L.R.R.M. 2353 (1987).
" Id. at 2166 11.3, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2356 n.3 ("the Court took care in Allis-Chalmers to
define the precise limits of its holding"). Nevertheless, the Heehler Court held that section
301 preempted an employee's suit against her union for breach of duty to furnish a safe
workplace, because the Court reasoned that it would have to look to the terms of the collective
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iiams,"5 the Court held that plaintiff's employed under a collective
bargaining agreement could still enforce state contract rights to
contracts independent of the collective bargaining agreement." The
Caterpillar Court also noted that Allis-Chalmers allows state claims
"tangentially" involving provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments."' Thus, in light of these precedents, the Paige court correctly
narrowly interpreted Allis-Chalmers.
The Paige decision impacts labor relations law on two levels:
the practical and the theoretical. In regard to practical, direct im-
plications, Paige is consistent with earlier Ninth Circuit opinions that
recognize a public policy exception to cases addressing state health
and safety regulations." However, Paige represents the first time a
court has included state OSHA claims in the he"' of state tort claims
that arc outside of section 301 preemption even when the collective
bargaining agreement generally incorporates the state regulations."
The practical impact of Paige, however, may extend to other
areas where courts have split over whether section 301 should
preempt a state regulation. For example, the circuits have conflict-
ing views regarding tort claims of wrongful discharge based on
bargaining agreement to determine if and when the union assumed this duty of care from
the employer. Id. at 2168-70, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2357-58.
6' 107 S. Ct.. 2425, 125 L.R.R.M. 2521 (1987).
"" Id. at 2431-32, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525-20,
"7 Id. at 2432 n,10, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2525 n.10.
6"See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 720 F,2d 1367, 1375-70, 115 L.R.R.M. 3089,
3095 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit held that an employee who was fired because he
reported to local health officials that his shipment of milk was spoiled could bring a valid
state action for wrongful discharge. Id. The court avoided an "inllexible application" of the
preemption doctrine when claims presented no danger to the collective bargaining nor to
the economic relationship between the employer and employees. Id. lint see DeSoto v. Yellow
Freight Sys., 820 F.2d 1434, 1438, 125 L.R.R.M. 3107, 3110 (9th Cir. 1987) (court held that
preemption occurred when the employee "was not acting in defense of a public policy of the
state of California, but [rather] incorrectly asserting his own interpretation of the law" when
he refused to drive a truck he mistakenly believed was not registered); Olguin v. Inspiration
Consul, Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475. 117 L.R.R.M. 2073, 2078 (9th Cir. 1984) (court
held employee did not have an independent state claim when the violation of public policy
occurred under federal mine safety act).
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
7"Compare Paige with Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 3117, 125 L.R.R.M. 2045
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (court held that an employee has a private right of action fur retaliatory
termination where an employer retaliates against the employee by firing the employee for
filing a complaint with Minnesota OSHA, and relied heavily on the fact that the collective
bargaining agreement in question contained absolutely no mention of Minnesota 051-IA
rights and no right to grievance for "just cause" claims) and Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d
272, 278, 118 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2206 (7th Cir. 1985) (court fbund no private right of action
under state law for wrongful dismissal when employee claimed employer violated federal
OSHA).
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firings in retaliation against employees who filed claims under state
workers' compensation statutes. 71 If courts analogize to the public
policy exception of Paige, they may determine that state workers'
compensation statutes, like state OSHA regulations, are sufficiently
independent of the collective bargaining process to avoid preemp-
tion. 72
The Paige decision also presents two important theoretical con-
cepts that courts have developed regarding the nature of collective
bargaining. Within the framework of the federal regulations, courts
have balanced the need for uniformity with the rights of individuals
and states. Paige is an example of a balancing of these concepts.
First, the Paige court illustrates the important concept that even if
an individual is employed under a collective bargaining agreement,
he or she may still assert rights independent of that agreement.
Consequently, an employee, by entering a union, is not penalized
for claiming rights guaranteed to all non-union employees. The
Supreme Court has recently recognized this concept in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts." In Metropolitan Life, the Court
upheld a state statute giving minimum mental health care benefits
to citizens insured under a general policy as well as to those citizens
insured under employee health care plans. 74 Similarly, in upholding
a Maine statute requiring employers who close their plants to pro-
vide severance pay to employees, the Court in Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne" noted that the statute provided rights to union as well
as non-union employees. 76 The court in Paige, therefore, recognized
See Prestress Eng'g Corp. v. Gonzalez, 107 S. Ct. 3248, 125 L.R.R.M. 2846 (1987). In
his dissent, Justice White disagreed with the Court's denial of certiorari and presented
conflicting circuit views on the subject of retaliatory discharge in response to filing of work-
men's compensation claims. Id. (White, J., dissenting)
72 See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031, 125 L.R.R.M. 2855 (7th Cir.
1987) (court held that two employees' claims of retaliatory discharge were preempted by
section 301). Bul see Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 814 F.2d 102, 125 L.R.R.M.
3363 (2d Cir. 1987) (court field that employees' retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted
because state workmen's compensation statute provided rights independent of the collective
bargaining agreement).
75 471 U.S. 724, 119 L.R.R.M. 2569 (1985).
74 /d. at 756, 119 L.R.R.M. 2582 ("It would turn the policy that animated the Wagner
Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to join a union
by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards
on non union employers.").
73
 107 S. Ct. 2211, 125 L.R.R.M. 2455 (1987).
76 Id. at 2222, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2463. ("such regulations provide protection to individual
union and non-union workers alike and thus 'neither encourage[s] nor discouragehl the
collective bargaining processes that are the subject of the NLRA'").
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this view of employee individuality when it noted that Cal/OSHA
benefits all employees as "individual workers.""
Second, the holding in Paige demonstrates that state interests
in health and safety are still viable in labor relations." While rec-
ognizing the need for uniformity in rulings on collective bargaining
agreements, the court stated that the goal of the NLRA was "the
establishment of an equitable bargaining process." 79 Therefore, as
long as a state's police power over health and safety does not inter-
fere with the NLRA's concern for equitable bargaining, its statutes
survive preemption."
This theory of the interstitiality of federal and state law in labor
relations is consistent with several Supreme Court decisions." In
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the Court proposed that courts should
sustain local regulations unless they conflict, frustrate, or interfere
with federal law or congressional intent. 82 In Metropolitan Life the
Court noted that the legislative history of the NLRA demonstrates
that Congress did not intend to destroy the "myriad of state laws"
that regulated minimum labor standards and remained relatively
unrelated to the collective bargaining process. 85 In fact, the Court
proposed that the NLRA merely creates a framework within exist-
ing state laws." Similarly, in Fort Halifax, the Court continued to
recognize the role of state standards as a "backdrop" to the frame-
work of the equitable bargaining process. 85 The Ninth Circuit in
Paige, re-affirmed this view of the role of state police power in
regard to health and safety provisions.
" Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 863, 126 L.R.R.M. 2145, 2149 (9th Cir.
1987).
78 Id. at 865, 1'26 L.R.R.M. at 2151 ("it is uniquely within the state's police power to
legislate for the health and safety of their citizens").
29 Id.
80 1d.
Bi Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756, 119 L.R.R.M. 2569,
2582 (1985) ("federal labor law in this sense is interstitial, supplementing state law where
compatible, and supplanting it only when it prevents the accomplishment of the purposes of
the federal Act").
82 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208-09, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3348 (1985).
83 Melropolililan Life, 471 U.S. at 756, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2582.
84 Id. ("we believe that Congress developed the framework of self-organization and
collective bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law promoting public health
and safety").
85 Fort Halifax Packing Co., v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2222-23, 125 L.R.R.M. 2455,
2463 (1987) ("preemption should not lightly be inferred in this area, since the establishment
of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State"); see also Dc Canas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356, 91 L.R.R.M. 2433, 2434 (1976) ("States possess broad authority
under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within
the State ... [including] laws affecting occupational health and safety").
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In sum, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Paige v.
Healy J. Kaiser Co., recognized an independent state tort claim for
wrongful discharge based on a state's public policy as expressed in
its OSHA health and safety regulations. The court's decision corn-
ports with the Supreme Court's decisions addressing federal
preemption of state claims under section 301. As well as creating a
new area of tort liability sheltered from the preemptive effects of
section 301(a), the court in Paige reaffirmed the coexistence of
individual workers' rights and state police powers within the federal
labor law framework.
V. UNION LIABILITY
A. *Union Liability Under Title VII and Section 1981 for the Non-
Assertion of Racial Discrimination Claims: Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) explicitly
prohibits a union from discriminating, or causing an employer to
discriminate, against any person on the basis of race. 2
 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the more general antidiscriminatory provi-
sions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (section 1981) to similarly prohibit dis-
crimination by a unions Although the courts have consistently held
* By Eric Jaeger, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW RE:V1EW,
107 S. Ct. 2617, 44 FEP Cases 1 (1987).
2 § 703(c)(1)—(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1)—(3) (1982). The relevant portion of Title VII
reads in full:
703(c) Labor Organization Practices
It shall be unlawful employment practice for a labor organization —
(I) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or to otherwise discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership,
or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual
in violation of this section.
Id.
3 See SCIILEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 669 (1982); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 10 FEP Cases 817, 819 (1975) (Section
1981 provides a remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race).
Section 1981 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
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unions liable for active discrimination against their members," until
recently the courts have failed to definitively hold whether a union
is liable for its passive failure or refusal to challenge an employer's
racially discriminatory practices.• Subsidiary issues include whether
a plaintiff must prove that a union or it's officials exhibited racial
animus towards the plaintiff, 6 and whether a union can avoid lia-
bility by asserting a nondiscriminatory motive for its discriminatory
conduct.?
Courts have also failed to agree on the appropriate statute of
limitations to be applied to section 1981 claims, 8 because section
1981, like sections 1982 and 1983, does not contain its own statute
of lirnitations. 8 Courts must thus "borrow" the most appropriate
state statute of limitations from the law of the state in which the
claim arises.w Previously, courts selected the appropriate statute of
limitations to apply on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the nature
of the plaintiff's injury and the relief sought." In most cases, courts
have applied either the statute of limitations applicable to personal
injuries or the one applicable to contractual relations.' 2 In 1985, in
Wilson v. Garcia, the United States Supreme Court rejected the use
of a case-by-case analysis for section 1983 claims, holding that courts
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no others,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
The coverage of section 1981 is not, however, exactly coextensive with that of Title VII.
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460, 10 FEP Cases at 819 (11 1981 not applicable to certain employers
covered by Title VII; Title VII offers various proced u ral advantages). The differences arc
not, however, relevant to the present discussion.
The text of § 703(c) of Title VII explicitly prohibits active discrimination, including,
for example, the exclusion of a person front union membership because of his or her race.
§ 703(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1) (1982).
See SMILE! & GROSSMAN, coma nOle 3, at 635-37.
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, '1625, 44 FEP Cases 1, 6 (1987).
7 Id. at 2624-25, 44 FEP Cases at 4.
See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1982). See Wilson V. Garda, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985); Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 10 HP Cases 817, 820.
1 " See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67; Johnson 421 U.S. at 462, 10 HI' Cases at 820.
'' See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 17.2d 113, 118, 39 FEP Cases 658, 661 (3d Cir.
1985); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2(1 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1978); Meyers v.
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass .n, 559 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1977).
L2 See Goodman, 777 EU 118, 39 HP Cases 661; Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 122, (3d
Cir. 1984); Davis, 581 F.2d at 337, 339 (applying a "contractual rights" statute of limitations
to an employment discrimination claim); Meyers, 559 F.2d at 900 (applying it "contractual
rights" statute of limitations in a housing discrimination case).
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must apply the same statute of limitations to all actions arising under
section 1983." Using an historical analysis, the Garcia Court con-
cluded that the applicable state's "personal injury" statute of limi-
tations should be applied in section 1983 actions." The Garcia Court
did not address, however, whether courts must apply the same
statute of limitations to all section 1981 claims, and, if so, whether
the "contractual rights" or "personal injury" state statute of limita-
tions is appropriate. 15
During the Survey year, in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. the Su-
preme Court held that when a union deliberately decides not to
prosecute grievances alleging racial discrimination against an em-
ployer, it has violated both Title VII and section 1981.' 6 Further,
the Goodman Court held that when a union is aware of an employer's
discriminatory practices, but refuses to take corrective action, the
discriminatory intent necessary to maintain an action under both
section 1981 and Title VIPs disparate treatment theory has been
established," regardless of whether the plaintiff union members
have demonstrated that union officials exhibited racial animus to-
wards them." Moreover, the Court held that unions may not escape
liability merely by asserting a racially neutral purpose for otherwise
discriminatory conduct, particularly where contrary evidence sug-
gests that the purpose is pretextual.'° Although the Goodman deci-
sion does not impose an affirmative duty on unions to actively seek
out and combat employer discrimination, the decision does indicate
that unions risk liability when they fail to take remedial action in
the face of discriminatory employer practices.
Regarding the relevant statute of limitations applicable to sec-
tion,1981 actions, the Goodman Court held that the personal injury
limitations period applicable to all section 1983 claims is also appli-
cable to all section 1981 claims. 2° Although recognizing that section
1981 has particular significance with respect to the protection of
economic rights, the Goodman Court stated that section 1981's ulti-
mate role as part of a larger statutory scheme prohibiting racial
discrimination, a personal injury, indicates that the tort limitations
471 U.S. at 275.
" Id. at 276-79.
15 See id. at 266-79.
18
 107 S. Ct. at 2625,44 FEP Cases at 6.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 2625,44 FEP Cases at 6.
2° Id. at 2621. 44 FEP Cases at 3.
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period is more appropriate:2 ' The application of a single statute of
limitations to all section 1981 claims will promote predictabiltiy and
reduce the litigation costs associated with collateral matters for both
plaintiffs and defendants. 22 The Goodman Court's choice of the per-
sonal injury statute of limitations is unlikely, however, to have a
neutral effect, as the limitations period applicable to personal injury
claims is usually shorter than the one applicable to contract claims.
In Goodman, individual employees of Lukens Steel Company
(Lukens) filed a class action suit against Lukens and the employee's
collective-bargaining agents, the United Steel Workers of America
and two of its local affiliates (collectively, the Unions), alleging racial
discrimination under Title VII and section 1981." With regard to
the Unions, the employees made several distinct allegations. 24 First, ,
they charged that the Unions had pursued the grievances of black
employees less vigorously than those of white employees. 25 Second,
the employees charged that the Unions had repeatedly failed to
include charges of racial discrimination in grievances filed against
Lukens and failed entirely to file grievances and other complaints
that were based solely on racial discrimination. 26 In addition to a
generalized claim that the Unions had tolerated and tacitly encour-
aged racial harassment, the employees specifically asserted that the
Unions had failed to take any action despite their awareness that.
Lukens had discharged black probationary employees at a signifi-
cantly higher rate than white probationary employees, and that tests
Lukens used in hiring and promotion had a racially disparate im-
pact. 27
Although rejecting some of the employee's allegations regard-
ing the Unions, the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania found sufficient grounds for holding that the Unions had
discriminated on the basis of race in violation of both Title VII and
section 1981. 28 Rejecting the Unions' assertion of a nondiscrimina-
21 Id.
22 See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
" 107 S. Ct. at 2619, 44 FEY Cases at 2. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held Lukens liable under a number of theories. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
580 F. Supp. 1114, 1163-64, 39 FE? Cases 617, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The judgment against
Lukens was nut before the Supreme Court. 107 S. Ct. at 2620 n.6, 44 FE? Cases at 2 n.6.
"Goodman, 580 F. Supp. at 1157-60, 39 FEY Cases at 651-55,
25 1d. at 1158-59, 39 HP Cases at 652-53.
25 Id. at 1159-60, 39 HP Cases at 653-54.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1164, 39 FE? Cases at 657. The district court found the evidence regarding the
employees' first allegation that grievances initiated by blacks were less vigorously prosecuted
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tory purpose for their conduct as pretextual, 29 the district court
concluded that the Unions' failure to act constituted tacit approval
of Lukens' discriminatory practices." The district court thus held
that the Unions' conduct violated both Title VII and section 1981. 31
The district court also held that the statute of limitations applicable
to section 1981 claims was Pennsylvania's six year "contractual
rights" limitations period rather than the two year "personal injury"
limitations period.32 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the
Unions' liability, 33 but reversed the district court's application of the
longer, contractual rights limitations period to section 1981. 34
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's
decision regarding both the Unions' liability and the statute of
limitations period applicable to section 1981 claims." Although re-
fusing to reach the question of whether Title VII and section 1981
impose a positive duty on Unions to combat racial discrimination
in the workplace,36 the Court held that the Unions' intentional non-
assertion of claims of racial discrimination in grievances and other
complaints rendered the Unions liable under both Title VII and
section 1981. 37 With regard to the statute of limitations, the Court
reasoned that the civil rights violations to which section 1981 applies
represent injuries to individual rights more akin, on the whole, to
than those by whites inconclusive, and thus insufficient to support liability. Id. at 1158-59,
39 FEP Cases at 652-53. With regard to the employees' second allegation that the unions
had failed to assert grievances and other complaints that included claims of racial discrimi-
nation, however, the district court found the evidence presented more compelling. Id. at
1159, 39 FEP Cases at 653-54. The district court also found that Lukens had discharged a
statistically disproportionate number of black probationary employees, and that the Unions
were aware of the disproportionality, but intentionally chose not to take any corrective action.
Id. Similarly, the district court found that the Unions were aware that tests that the steel
company used in making decisions with regard to hiring and promotions had a racially
disparate impact, but that the Unions took no action. Id. Finally, the district court found that
the Unions' reluctance to assert racial discrimination as a basis for grievances could not be
justified as a practice necessary to the effective and equitable resolution of grievances gen-
erally. Id. at 1159-60, 39 FEP Cases 654.
29 Id, at 1159-60, 39 FEP Cases at 654.
" Id, at 1164, 39 FEP Cases at 657.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1121-22, 39 FEP Cases at 622-23.
33 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 127, 39 FEP Cases 658, 668-69 (3d Cir.
1985).
94 Id. at 120, 39 FE!' Cases at 663.
" Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2622, 2625, 44 FEP Cases 1, 4, 6
(1987).
30 Id. at 2623, 44 FEP Cases at 5.
37 Id. at 2625, 44 FEP Cases at 6.
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claims of personal, rather than economic, injury." Thus, the Court
held that the state's two year "personal injury" limitations period,
rather than the six year "contractual rights" limitations period, was
the appropriate state limitations period to be borrowed for section
1981 claims."
In its analysis, the Goodman Court first set forth the relevant
standards for finding liability under Title VII and section 1981."
In both cases arising under Title VII, the Court noted, two distinct
theories of liability exist. 4 ' Under a disparate impact theory, the
Court stated, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a racially neutral
policy in fact operates in a manner which discriminates on the basis
of race. 42
 Under a disparate treatment theory, the Court held, a
plaintiff must prove not only that he or she was treated in a dis-
criminatory way, but also that the discrimination was intentional."
Similarly, according to the Court, a plaintiff seeking relief under
section 1981 must demonstrate that the alleged discrimination was
intentional: a showing that a facially neutral policy burdens one
race more than another is insufficient."
The Goodman Court turned next to the Unions' contention that
the district court's judgment rested on the erroneous legal ground
that mere passivity in the face of discrimination by an employer can
trigger liability under Title VII and section 1981.45 The Court noted
that both the district court and the Third Circuit had apparently
held that such passivity was actionable." Because both lower courts
ultimately found that the Unions had in fact done "far more" than
passively ignore discriminatory employer practices, 47 however, the
Supreme Court treated the lower courts' statements that mere pas-
sivity triggers liability as dicta, and declined to rule on the matter."
In deciding what activity by the Unions extended beyond mere
passivity, the Goodman Court adopted the district court's findings
virtually verbatim." The Court found that although the Unions
" Id. at 2621, 44 FEP Cases at 3.
56 Id.
4" Id. at 2622, 44 FEP Cases at 4.
41 Id.
42 Id.
45 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2623-24, 44 FEP Cases at 5.
46 Id.
47 Id,
46 Id.
49 Id. at 2622-24, 44 FEP Cases at 4-5.
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were aware that Lukens had discharged black probationary em-
ployees at a disproportionately greater rate, the Unions had failed
to take any corrective action; that the Unions failed to file grievances
that were solely based on claims of racial harassment; and that the
Unions refused to include claims of racial discrimination in griev-
ances that also contained other claims. 5°
The Goodman Court next examined the language of Title VII
to determine whether the district court's findings supported Title
VII liability.5 ' The Unions contended that where an employer's
discriminatory practices, rather than a union's, are at issue, the only
provision of Title VII under which a court may hold a union liable
is section 703(c)(3), which prohibits Unions from "caus[ing] or at-
tempt[ing] to cause an employer to discriminate."52 The Goodman
Court rejected this contention, holding that section 703(c)(1), which
prohibits Unions from "otherwise discriminating against" any in-
dividual on the basis of race, provides a sufficient basis for holding
a union liable where it is aware of discriminatory employer practices
but fails to take corrective action. 53 Specifically, the Court held that
an intentional decision by the Unions not to file grievances based
on claims of racial discrimination violates the plain meaning of the
language of section 703(c)(3). 54
Moreover, the Goodman Court refused to accept the reason
offered by the Unions for their failure to assert claims of racial
discrimination in the grievances they had filed. 55 The Unions con-
tended that Lukens was highly sensitive to claims of racial discrim-
ination and that the assertion of such claims would cause Lukens
to "get its back up," ultimately making the settlement of grievances
more difficult. 56 The Unions further contended that excluding
claims of racial discrimination had not harmed black employees
because other, non-racial, allegations usually supported the griev-
ances: 57 The Supreme Court, as well as the district court and the
court of appeals, held that, regardless of the truth of the Unions'
contention it failed to explain why the Unions had refused to assert
claims of racial discrimination even where no other independent
so Id
" Id. at 2624, 44 FEP Cases at 5.
52 Id.
5s Id.
3-1 Id.
" Id. at 2624-25, 44 FEP Cases at 6.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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grounds for complaint existed, and thus failed to negate the Unions'
liability." Moreover, the Court noted, the Unions' contention was
irrelevant to their failure to protest the discharge of a dispropor-
tionate number of black probationary employees. 5°
Finally, the Goodman Court held that union liability under Title
VII and section 1981 did not require a finding that union officials
had exhibited racial animus. 6° Rather, the Goodman Court stressed,
a union is liable whenever it intentionally avoids asserting claims of
racial discrimination, regardless of whether the reason for doing so
is to avoid antagonizing the employer or to satisfy the demands of
its white membership."
Turning to the issue of the appropriate statute of limitations,
the Court noted that section 1981, like sections 1982 and 1983, does
not contain its own statute of limitations, and thus courts must
borrow the most appropriate or analogous state statute. 62 The Good-
man Court stated that in Wilson v. Garcia it had held, first, that the
same state statute of limitations should apply to all section 1983
claims, and, second, that because the civil rights that section 1983
was intended to protect are in essence personal rights, the state
"personal injury" statute of limitations was the appropriate one to
apply."
The plaintiff employees in Goodman contended that section
1981, unlike section 1983, focused primarily on the deprivation of
economic rights and that the applicable state "contractual rights"
statute of limitations should thus apply." The Goodman Court re-
jected this contention, stating that section 1981 has a much broader
focus than economic rights.°5 The Court noted that in addition to
the right to make and enforce contracts, section 1981 protects the
personal right to equal rights under the law for the security of
persons and property, and to sue and to testify.° 6 The Goodman
Court concluded that, viewed more abstractly, section 1981 was part
56 Id.
59 id .
n° Id. at 2625, 44 FF.13 Cases at 6.
63 Id.
62 Id. at 2620, 44 FEP Cases at 3. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-68 (1985).
63 Goodman, 107 &Ct. at 2620-21, 44 FEP Cases at 3. Section 1983 provides a cause of
action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another individual
of any of the rights or privileges guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982).
6' Goodman, 107 S.Ct. at 2621, 44 FEE' Cases at 3.
" Id.
" Id.
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of a larger federal law intended to prohibit racial. discrimination, 67
an injury that the Garcia Court found to be distinctly personal in
nature."
The Goodman Court went on to hold that the two year period
should apply retroactively to the employees in Goodman. 69 The Good-
man Court found that although the applicable rule of law in exis-
tence at the time of the district court's decision had required appli-
cation of the six year period, the precedent establishing this rule of
law had not existed at the time the present suit was filed. 70 The
Goodman Court found that no definitive statement of the law con-
cerning the applicable state statute of limitations existed at the time
the suit was filed, and thus rejected the employees' claims of detri-
mental reliance."
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
agreed with the majority's ruling that the Unions' conduct violated
Title VII and section 1981, but dissented from the Court's holding
that the relevant statute of limitations for actions arising under
section 1981 is the applicable state's personal injury statute of lim-
itations. 72 Justice Brennan asserted that section 1981 protects pri-
marily economic rights, and that the appropriate limitations period
is thus the one applicable to contractual relations." Justice Brennan
reached his conclusion through an analysis of section 1981's legis-
lative and case law history."
Looking first to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, Justice Brennan argued that Congress' purposes in passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to prevent the continued economic
subjugation of blacks. 75 To buttress his historical analysis, Justice
Brennan pointed out that section 1982 also has a singularly eco-
nomic purpose." Section 1982's economic focus, Justice Brennan
asserted, weakened the majority's view that, together, sections 1981,
1982, and 1983 demonstrate a concern with racial discrimination
67 Id.
8 Id.
66 Id,
70 Id. at 2621-22, 44 FEP Cases at 3-4.
71 Id.
"Id. at 2625, 44 FEP Cases at 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2625-26, 44 FEP Cases at 6-7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2626-31, 44 FEP Cases at 7-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2628, 44 FEP Cases at 8 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan sets forth
evidence in the form of, for example, congressional debates which he asserts supports his
thesis. Id.
70 Id. at 2628-29, 44 FEP Cases at 9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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generally, rather than with the individual manifestations of such
discrimination."
Justice Brennan stated that as a practical matter, actions arising
under section 1981 are better characterized as contract, rather than
tort, actions." An overwhelming number of section 1981 claims
actually concern the enforcement of economic rights, Justice Bren-
nan noted. 7° Further, while the evidence surrounding personal in-
juries is likely to become ephermeral quickly, so that a short limi-
tations period is appropriate,80 actions concerning economic
relations tend to involve evidence of a more permanent nature,
permitting a more extended limitations period.'"
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor, 82 con-
curred in the Court's holding that the applicable state personal
injury statute of limitations should apply to all section 1981 claims,
but dissented from the Court's holding that the Unions' conduct,
as set forth in the district court's findings of fact, established a
violation of either section 1981 or Title VII." justice Powell asserted
that the district court's findings are ambiguous and insufficient to
support the conclusion that the Unions had intentionally discrimi-
nated.'" A finding that the Unions were motivated by racial animus
is necessary, Justice Powell stated, to establish a violation of section
1981 and Title VII's disparate treatment theory."
Discriminatory intent, Justice Powell asserted, cannot be estab-
lished absent a showing that the Unions were motivated by racial
animus. 86 Justice Powell reasoned that "intent" requires more than
" Id. Section 1982 provides that all citizens shall enjoy the same right to inherit, purchase,
lease, and sell real and personal property. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2630, 44 PEP Cases I, 9-10 (1987)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
'19 Id.
"°
" Id.
132
 Justice O'Connor wrote separately to concur in the application or the applicable state
personal injury statute of limitations to section 1981, but expressed doubt whether the Court
should give its holding general retroactive effect. Goodman, 107 S.Ct. at 2636, 44 FEY Cases
at. 14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
M3 Id, at 2631, 44 PEP Cases at 10-11 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Rather than reversing the Third Circuit, however, Justice Powell, would have remanded
to allow the district court to clarify or supplement its findings. Id. at 2630, 44 FEP Cases at
10—I l (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"+
	 at 2631, 44 FEP Cases at 10-11 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
" Id, at 2633, 44 FEP Cases at 12 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 2633-34, 44 FEP Cases at 12-13 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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mere violation or awareness by the defendant of the consequences
of his or her actions." Intent, Justice Powell observed, implies that
the defendant engaged in the discriminatory conduct, at least in
part, "because of" its discriminatory effect." Noting that the district
court had found that racial animus had not motivated the Unions,
and that the Unions had advanced nondiscriminatory purposes both
for failing to challenge Lukens' firing of disproportionately more
black probationary employees and for refusing to include claims of
racial discrimination in grievances, Justice Powell concluded that
the district court's finding failed to establish the necessary intent. 89
Justice Powell also disagreed with the Court's conclusion that
the Unions' conduct consisted of more than mere passivity. 90 He
concluded that Title VII does not impose an affirmative duty on
unions, and that the Unions' conduct had. violated the statutes. 9 '
Based on an analysis of the statutory language of Title VII, Justice
Powell argued that section 703(c) prohibits only direct discrimina-
tion by a union. 92 Turning to policy considerations, Justice Powell
contended that the imposition of an affirmative duty on Unions to
combat employer discrimination would interfere with the discretion
unions must exercise to provide the most effective representation.°
In Goodman, the Supreme Court held that a union's deliberate
refusal to assert claims of racial discrimination against an employer
violates both Title VII and section 1981. 94 Although falling short
of imposing an affirmative duty on Unions to seek out and combat
discrimination, the Court's opinion indicates that a union's aware-
ness of an employer's discriminatory practices creates a duty to take
remedial action. 95 Significantly, plaintiff union members need not
show that union officals exhibited racial animus in establishing
" Id. at 2633, 44 PEP Cases at 12 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Massachusetts v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 279, 19 FEP Cases 1377, 1386 (1979)).
88 Id.
89 1d. at 2633-34, 44 FEP Cases at 12-13 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Powell also stated that the district court did not hold, and its findings were
inadequate to support, a Title VII disparate impact claim. Id. at 2634, 44 FEP Cases at 13
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
9° Id. at 2634-35, 44 FEP Cases at 13-14 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
91 1d. at 2635, 44 FEP Cases at 13-14 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
42 Id. at 2635, 44 FEP Cases at 14 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94 Id. at 2625, 44 FEP Cases at 6.
95 See id, at 2623-25, 44 FEP Cases at 5-6.
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union liability under section 1981 or under the Title VII disparate
treatment theory."
Although the Goodman Court expressly declined to decide
whether mere union passivity in the face of employer discrimination
renders a union liable, the Court's holding indicates that a union
that does nothing to challenge such discriminatory practices risks
liability under Title VII and section 1981. The different ways in
which the Goodman Court found the Unions to have discriminated
represent varying degrees of "active" or "passive" discriminatory
conduct. The first aspect of the Union's conduct that the Goodman
Court held violated Title VII and section 1981, the Union's delib-
erate refusal to file grievances based wholly or in part on charges
of racial discrimination, includes an identifiable element of active
discrimination." The Union's positive act of refusing to file such
grievances constitutes active, rather than mere passive, discrimina-
tory conduct." On the other hand, the Court's imposition of liability
for the Unions' failure to take positive action despite their knowl-
edge that Lukens was discharging black probationary employees at
a disproportionate rate is more problematic, because the Unions'
conduct lacks an identifiable element of active discrimination."
Nothing in the district court's opinion indicates, for example, that
the Unions received a request from union members to challenge
the practice, or that the Unions affirmatively refused to do so. 1 °"
The lack of any affirmative act by the Unions in Goodman indicates
that courts may hold a union liable for its passive failure to challenge
a discriminatory employer practice."
The Goodman opinion also indicates that a union's assertion of
a nondiscriminatory motive for otherwise discriminatory conduct
will not negate its liability under the statutes. 102 Attempting to justify
its failure to include racial discrimination as a basis for grievances
filed on behalf of black union members, the Unions claimed that
96 Id. at 2625, 44 FEP Cases at 6,
in See id. at 2623-24, 44 FEP Cases at 5.
"" See id.
99 See id. at 2634, 44 FEP Cases at 13 (Powell, J., concurring in part arid dissenting in
part)(Unions' conduct merely passive). But see id. at 2623-24, 44 FEP Cases at 5 (Union's
conduct included more than mere passivity).
10" See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 580 F. Supp. at 1159, 39 FEP Cases at 653-54
(1984). The district court's opinion contains no indication that the unions acted affirmatively
in failing to challenge the discharge of black probationary employees. Id,
01 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 126-27, 39 FEP Cases at 668; Goodman,
580 F. Supp. at 1160, 39 HP Cases at 653.
112 See Goodman, 107 S.Ct. at 2629-25, 44 FEP Cases at 6.
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Lukens' sensitivity to charges of racial discrimination and the avail-
ability of other, nonracial grounds for obtaining relief rendered the
inclusion of allegations of racial discrimination unnecessary and
counterproductive.'" The Goodman Court rejected the Union's ar-
gument, holding that where a union has intentionally engaged in
discriminatory conduct, the assertion of a nondiscriminatory motive
will not shield the union from liability, even where the motive was
not pretextual.'" The Goodman Court held further that a plaintiff
union member need not establish that union officials were moti-
vated by racial animus to demonstrate the intent required under
section 1981 and Title Vii disparate treatment actions.'° 5 Instead,
the Court held that the requisite intent exists if a union that pos-
sesses knowledge of an employer's discriminatory conduct inten-
tionally refrains from challenging the conduct.'"
The Goodman Court, in determining the appropriate statute of
limitations for courts to apply to section 1981 claims, held, first, that
the same statute of limitations applies to all section 1981 claims, and
second, that the applicable limitations statute is the applicable state's
"personal injury" statute of limitations.' 07 Application by the courts
of a single statute of limitations to all section 1981 actions promotes
uniformity and predictability, and eliminates unnecessary litigation
on collateral matters.'" The unpredictability faced by potential
plaintiffs and the waste of resources involved in relitigating the
issue on a case-by-case basis would frustrate the purpose of section
1981: providing an effective remedy for the enforcement of federal
civil rights.'"
In contrast to the desirability of applying a single statute of
limitations to all section 1981 claims, a compelling justification for
adopting one or the other of the statutes of limitations is difficult
to identify. In attempting to select the most appropriate statute of
limitations, both the Goodman Court and Justice Brennan focused
on identifying the "true nature" of section 1981. The Goodman
Court reasoned that, taken together, sections 1981, 1982 and 1983
are primarily concerned with racial discrimination: "a fundamental
1 " id. at 2624-25, 44 FEP Cases at 5.
1 " See id.
to Id, at 2625, 44 FEP Cases at 6.
106 See id.
1 ° 7 Id. at 2621, 44 FEP Cases at 3.
108 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
1 °9 See id.; Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 119, 39 FEP Cases 658, 662 (3d
'Cir. 1985).
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injury to fa person's] individual rights.""u Justice Brennan, in con-
trast, argued that the primary purpose for which section 1981 had
been enacted, as well as the function it had performed, was the
protection of economic rights."' Identification of the "nature" of
section 1981 misconceives, however, the appropriate inquiry. In-
stead, one must ask whether choosing one or the other of the
statutes would advance section 1981's purpose, combating racial
discrimination in an employment context.
Practical benefits, including judicial economy and predictability,
would be served if courts applied the same statute of limitations to
both section 1981 and section 1983 claims." 2 A plaintiff's claim may
be cognizable under both section 1981 and section 1983." 3 In such
a situation, application of different limitations periods under the
two statutes might result in the claim being time barred under one,
but not the other, of the statutes.'" The Court's decision to apply
the personal injury statute of limitations to all section 1981 claims
is thus correct.
111' Goodman, 107 S.Ct. at 2621, 44 FEY Cases at 3.
' 11 Id at 2(125, 44 FEE' Cases at (1-7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 ' 1 Goodman, 777 F.2d at 120, 39 RP Cases at 663.
115 Id.
" 4
 Id. (substantial overlap exists in the types of claims brought under sections 1981 and
1983; application of different statutes of limitations where the same claim is brought under
both sections 1981 and 1983 would lead to a bizarre result).
230	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:99
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Victims of Ethnic or Ancestral Discrimination May Sue Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981: Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji' and Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb'
Section I of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, 3 forbids all racial discrimination 4 in the making of private
and public contracts,`' including employment contracts. 6 The United
States Supreme Court had not clearly delineated the parameters of
the statute, as the Court had never defined the term "race."' Blacks
may clearly bring suit under the statute. 8 The Supreme Court also
has held that whites who are the victims of reverse discrimination
may sue under the statute." The Supreme Court, however, had
reserved judgment as to whether victims of discrimination based on
ethnicity, ancestry, or place of origin possess a cause of action under
*Charles 0. Gill, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 107 S. Ct. 2022, 43 1 7 E11 Cases 1305 (1987).
2 107 S. Ct. 2019, 43 FEP Cases 1309 (1987).
5 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1982) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
Id.
Although the term "race" does not appear in the language of the statute, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute as applying to racial discrimination. See McDonald v. Sante
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285, 12 EH' Cases 1577, 1582 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 10
FEP Cases 817, 819 (1975); Jones v. Alfred II. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
5 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2026, 43 FEP Cases 1305, 1307
(1987). See also Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60, 10 FEP Cases at 819; Jones, 392 U.S. at 436-37.
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60, 10 FEP Cases at 819.
7 See, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287, 12 FE1' Cases at 1582; Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.
780, 791 (1966); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 556, 29 FEP Cases 1494, 1498
(E.D. Cal. 1982). See also Kaufman, A Race By Any Other Name: The Interplay Between Ethnicity,
National Origin and Race for Purposes of Section 1981, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 259, 259 (1986)
[hereinafter Kaufman].
" See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 285, 12 FEP Cases at 1582.
" Id. at 286-87, 12 FEP Cases at 1582.
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section 1981. 10 In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower
courts have adopted two disparate approaches to this question."
One line of cases holds that section 1981 recognizes only claims
of racial discrimination against non-whites or reverse discrimination
against whites.' 2 This line of cases holds that claims based on eth-
nicity or place of origin discrimination are not cognizable under
section 1981." Other courts view section 1981 expansively, and
interpret the statute as providing protection for persons who suffer
discrimination because they are perceived to be distinct from
whites."
During the Survey Year, the United States Supreme Court de-
fined the parameters of section :1981 in the companion cases of
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji' 5 and Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb.,' 6 unanimously holding that the statute protects persons who
1 " See Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 550, 29 FEY Cases at 1498-99; Kaufman, supra note 6, at
277.
" See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 277-80.
12 Compare McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286-87, 12 FEP Cases at 1582 (Section 1981 protected
two white employees who were discharged following a theft, when a black employee who
was also charged with the theft was nut discharged) with, e.g., Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
733 F.2d 48, 49-50, 34 FEP Cases 1529, 1530-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (Section 1981 did not
protect an Iraqi whose claim of place of origin discrimination did not allege racial animus);
Patel v. Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374, 382-84 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (Section 1981 did
not protect a dark-skinned Indian because discrimination was motivated by plaintiff's na-
tionality rather than his color); Kurylas v. United States Dept of' Agric., 373 F. Supp. 1072,
1075-76, 7 FF.1) Cases 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Section 1981 did not protect a Ukranian-
born, naturalized, American citizen because Ukranians were not considered a separate race).
See also Kaufman, supra note 7, at 277-78.
" Kaufman, supra note 7, at 277.
14 See, e.g., Manzanares v. Safeway Stores Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 19 FEP Cases 191 (10th
Cir. 1979) (Section 1981 protected a Mexican-American employee who alleged discriminatory
employment practices when his employer fired him following a theft while white employees
were merely suspended); Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. 550, 29 FEP Cases 1494 (Section 1981 held to
protect an employee who was denied promotions and eventually fired because of her Puerto
Rican descent and accent). See also Kaufman, supra note 7, at 278-80.
Is 107 S. CI, 2022, 43 FEP Cases 1305 (1987).
16 107 S. Ct. 2019, 43 FEP Cases 1309 (1987). Although Shaare Tefila Congregation is a
section 1982 action which pertains to racial discrimination in regard to property rights, 107
S. Ct. at 2021, 43 FE? Cases at 1310, the case affects section 1981, and thereby affects
employment discrimination law. In short, the Supreme Court views sections 1981 and 1982
as companions and has interpreted them as protecting the same classes of persons. See Jones,
392 U.S. at 436-37. See also Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 550 n.8, 29 FE!' Cases at 1498 n.8. In
Goodman v.Lukens Steel Co., Justice Brennan, in dissent, wrote: "Both §§ 1981 and 1982
were derived from § 1 of' the Civil Rights Act of 1866; their wording and their identical
legislative history have led the Court to construe them similarly." 55 U.S.L.W, 4881, 4886,
46 FE? Cases 1, 9 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations
omitted). Thus a finding by the Court that Jews may bring suit under section 1982 is
equivalent to the Court's finding that Jews may bring suit under section 1981.
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are subjected to intentional discrimination based on their ancestry
or ethnicity." Curiously, however, the Court refused to hold that
section 1981 proscribes national origin discrimination. Thus, while
the Court clearly expanded the scope of section 1981 protection,
the Court also created a nebulous distinction between ethnic/ances-
tral discrimination and national origin discrimination. 18
In Saint Francis College, Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, an assistant
professor at Saint Francis College, claimed the college denied him
tenure because of his Arabian ancestry.i° On October 30, 1980, Al-
Khazraji filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and discrimination based upon
national origin, religion, and/or race. 2° After obtaining counsel, Al-
Khazraji added amended complaints which included claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, as well as state law." After
the District Court dismissed Al-Khazraji's section 1986, section
1985(3), and Title VII claims as untimely,22 the Court granted the
defendant college's motion for summary judgment on the remain-
ing section 1981 and 1983 claims as well as the state law claims."
The Court reasoned that section 1981 does not reach discrimination
claims based upon Arabian ancestry. 24
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Al-Khazraji's
section 1981 claim was not time-barred" and concluded that Con-
gress intended section 1981 to "at a minimum" reach "discrimina-
tion directed against an individual because he or she is genetically
a part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-group-
ing of homo sapiens." 26 The Third Circuit thereby held that discrim-
ination against ethnic Arabs was cognizable under section 1981, 27
and Saint Francis College petitioned for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. 28
17 Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
18 Id.
19 Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 506, 40 FEP Cases 397, 397 (3d Cir.
1986).
25 1d. at 508, 40 FEP Cases at 398-99.
2L Id. at 508, 40 FEP Cases at 399.
22 Id,
28 Id. at 508-09, 40 FEP Cases at 399.
24 Id, at 509, 40 FEP Cases at 399.
28 Id. at 514, 40 FE? Cases at 403-04.
28 Id. at 517, 40 FEP Cases at 406.
27
 Id. See Race Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Includes Members of Ethnically and Physiognomically
Distinct Groups: AI-Khazaraji v. Saint Francis College, 29 B.C.L. REV. 276 (1987).
28 Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2025, 43 FEP Cases at 1306.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in part, 2°
to consider the question of whether a person of Arabian ancestry
was protected from racial discrimination under section 1981. 30 The
college contended that because section 1981 does not encompass
claims of discrimination by one caucasian against another, Al-
Khazraji had no cause of action under section 1981 because he is a
caucasian. 31 Justice White, however, writing for a unanimous Court,
rejected petitioner's argument by ruling that for the purpose of
interpreting section 1981, contemporary conceptions and defini-
tions of race are not dispositive. 32 Rather, the Court concluded that
the definition of race under section 1981 must be determined by
examining what the prevalent conceptions and definitions of race
were circa 1866, when Congress contemplated and passed the stat-
ute."
The Court undertook an exhaustive examination of nineteenth
century dictionaries and encyclopedias and discovered that these
sources described "race" in terms of "stock," "ancestor," and "ethnic
groups."34 The Court noted that not until the twentieth century did
dictionaries begin referring to the taxonomical definitions of race
— the division of mankind based on physical differences." The
Court also found that the legislative history of the statute was replete
with references to groups which Congress intended to be protected
by the statute. These groups included Scandinavians, Chinese,
Spanish, Jews, Mexicans, Blacks, Germans, and Gypsies. 36
The Court concluded from this evidence that Congress in-
tended section 1981 to protect classes of persons who were subjected
to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics." The Court held that such discrimination is
racial discrimination for the purpose of section 1981 regardless of
whether such discrimination would be classified as racial in modern
terminology. 38 Thus, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding
29 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to consider the statute
of limitations question presented by the case. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct at 2025, 43 FEP
Cases at 1306.
'° Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2025, 43 FE? Cases at 1306.
31 Id. at 2026, 43 FE? Cases at 1307.
32 Id. Currently three main races are recognized: Causasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid.
See id. at 2026 n.4, 43 FE? Cases at 1307 n.4.
" Id. at 2026-27, 43 FEP Cases at 1307-08.
34 Id.
" Id. at 2027, 43 FE? Cases at 1307.
36 Id. at 2027, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
" Id. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
36 Id.
234	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:99
that section 1981 prohibits discrimination against a person because
he or she is ethnically or physiognomically distinctive." The Court,
however, further expanded the Third Circuit's holding by ruling
that a person need not have a distinctive physiognomy to qualify
for section 1981 protection." The Court refused, however, to in-
terpret section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination based upon one's
place or nation of origin. 4 ' The Court, therefore, concluded that if
Al-Khazraji could prove, on remand, that he was subjected to in-
tentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an Arab,
rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, then he will
have stated a section 1981 cause of action. 42
The Court's final distinction between discrimination based
upon ethnicity or ancestry and discrimination based upon place or
nation of origin prompted Justice Brennan to file a separate con-
currence." Justice Brennan emphasized that the line between dis-
crimination based on ethnicity or ancestry and discrimination based
on place or nation of origin is not clearly delineated." Justice Bren-
nan, therefore, interpreted the Court's opinion as reading that only
discrimination based on birthplace alone is insufficient to state a
claim under section 1981."
In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, a Jewish congregation and
some individual members brought suit in the Federal District Court
for Maryland, claiming that defendant's desecration of their syn-
agogue constituted a violation of sections 1981, 1982," 1985(3), and
the Maryland common law of trespass, nuisance, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 47 The District Court dismissed all
'" Id.
'° Id.
"I Id.
42 /d. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308-09.
"Id. at 2028-29, 43 FEP Cases at 1309 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2028, 43 FEY Cases at 1309 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote:
It is true that one's ancestry — the ethnic group from which an individual and
his or her ancestors are descended — is not necessarily the same as one's national
origin — the country 'where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country
from which his or her ancestors came.' Often, however, the two are identical as
a factual matter: one was born in the nation whose primary stock is one's own
ethnic group.
ld. (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring).
"Id. at 2029, 43 FEP Cases at 1309 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) states: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by White citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." See supra footnote 14.
" 107 S. Ct. 2019, 2021, 43 FEP Cases 1309, 1310 (1987).
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the claims, stating that Jews were not a racially distinct group and
thus did not warrant section 1982 protection.° On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 49 Both
courts . rejected the argument that although Jews were not a racially
distinct group, the defendant's actions violated section 1982 because
the defendants perceived Jews as being racially distinct.'" The
Fourth Circuit held that because discrimination against Jews was
not racial discrimination, section 1982 was not applicable. 51 The
congregation petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court,52 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice White agreed with the
Fourth Circuit that a plaintiff cannot successfully state a charge of
racial discrimination under section 1982 solely by proving that racial
animus motivated the defendants." Rather, the plaintiff must also
assert that defendants' actions were directed towards a group of
people that Congress intended the statute to protect." The Court,
however, reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that Jews may bring
suit under section 1982. 5" Relying upon its holding in Saint Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court concluded that although Jews are
not currently thought of as members of a separate race, when
Congress passed the Act, Jews were considered to constitute a dis-
tinct race and thus are within the protection of the Act.'"
The Supreme Court has thus held that Section 1981 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based upon a person's
ethnicity or ancestry." The Court arrived at its decision by reason-
ing that although section 1981 only prohibits racial discrimination,
when Congress passed the statute, the term "race" was defined and
conceived of more expansively than it is currently." The Court
concluded that in 1866, the phrase and concept of "racial discrim-
ination" included discrimination based upon ethnicity and ancestry,
49 Id.
1d.
59 Id.
51 Id.
59 Id.
55 107 S. Ct. 62 (1986).
54 Shatir Tefila Congregation, 107 S. Ct. at 2021, 43 FEY Cases at 1310.
55 Id.
59 Id. at 2022, 43 FEP Cases at 1310.
57 Id. at 2021-22, 43 FE? Cases at 1310.
59 Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308; Shaare Tefila Congregation,
107 S. Ct. at 2021, 43 FE? Cases at 1310.
59 Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2026-28, 43 FE? Cases at 1307-08.
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and thus the eradication of such discrimination was within Congress'
intent, and is therefore within the scope of section 1981. 60
The impact of the Court's decision is more than symbolic. The
Court effectively has opened section 1981 protection to all victims
of intentional ethnic or ancestral discrimination. This is significant,
for although Title VII already proscribes ethnic or ancestral dis-
crimination, section 1981 affords coverage and remedies beyond
those of Title VII. 6 ' Unlike Title VII, section 1981 provides for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as direct
access to federal courts. 62
 In addition, section 1981's statute of lim-
itations periods are longer than Title VII's. 63
The Court's distinction between discrimination based upon a
person's ethnicity or ancestry, and discrimination based upon a
person's place or nation of origin, however, appears potentially
troubling. This distinction makes little sense in terms of judicial
efficiency and congressional intent. In effect, the Court has created
a nebulous distinction that could spawn multitudinous litigation.
The Court's distinction also appears to contravene congressional
intent, as the legislative history of section 1981, which the Court
quoted in Saint Francis College, specifically referred to discrimination
Bo Id. at 2028, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
61 Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer: "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...."
42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). Although Title VII prohibits employment discrimination
based on national origin, in several respects it is more limited than section 1981.
A Title VII claimant is generally limited to equitable relief and back pay for a period
not in excess of two years, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); a section 1981 claimant may seek
equitable or legal remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages. See Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460, 10 FEP Cases 817, 819 (1975). Furthermore,
unlike a Title VII claimant, a section 1981 claimant is entitled to a jury trial. See Lincoln v.
Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 697 F.2d 928, 934, 31 FEP Cases 23, 26 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 31 FEY Cases 22 (1983). In addition, section 1981 provides
direct access to federal district courts, whereas a Title VII claimant must first exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit in the District Court. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460,
10 FEP Cases at 819. Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982); section 1981 applies to all contractual transactions, Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1976); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60, 10 FEP Cases at 819.
Also, the statute of limitations period for filing a Title VII lawsuit is shorter than the period
for a section 1981 action. A Title VII action must he filed within ninety days after the receipt
of a right to sue letter from the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1), whereas state personal
injury limitations periods apply to section 1981 claims. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. 55
U.S.L.W. 4881, 4882, 46 FE? Cases 1, 2-3 (1987).
" See supra note 57.
oa
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based upon "nationality."" Furthermore, in terms of equal protec-
tion analysis, the Court has deemed both racial and national origin
discrimination as suspect classifications. 65 This is significant because
the same Congress which enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also
proposed and enacted the fourteenth amendment. 66
The question of why the Court made this seemingly unfortun-
ate distinction appears to have a simple answer — stare decisis. Until
1968, prior restrictive judicial interpretations had relegated section
1981 to "a century of desuetude.”67 In 1968, however, the Court
effectively resurrected the Act in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, in which
the Court held that the Act prohibited private racial discrimination,
and thus no state action was necessary." Within this seminal case,
the Court stated: "the statute in this case deals only with racial
discrimination and does not address itself to discrimination on
grounds of religion or national origin,"69 Thus, the Court's failure
to include national origin discrimination within the parameters of
section 1981 most likely stems from the Court's unwillingness to
deviate from its interpretation of the statute in Jones."
In theory, by holding that national origin discrimination is not
violative of section 1981, the Court has not only created an impre-
cise distinction which seems instigative' of litigation, but also has
Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2027, 43 FEP Cases at 1308.
65 See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985);
Korethatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369, 374 (1886).
" See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 287.
' See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). See also Comment, Devel-
opments in the Law — Section 1981, 15 HARV, C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29, 33 (1980) {hereinafter
Commentl. See also Kaufman, supra note 7, at 259.
"Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). See Comment, supra note 67, at 67.
6" Jones, 392 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).
70
 In regard to the role of stare decisis in statutory interpretation, Justice Black, in his
dissent in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, wrote:
When this Court is interpreting a statute, however, an additional factor must
be weighed in the balance, It is the deference that this court owes to the primary
responsibility of the legislature in the making of laws .... When the law has
been settled by an earlier case then any subsequent 'reinterpretation' of the
statute is gratuitous and neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no
different in effect from a judicial alteration or language that Congress itself
placed in the statute.
398 U.S. 235, 257-58 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See E, LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 33 (1949). Conversely, it has been argued that Jones' language which excludes
national origin discrimination from section 1981 protection is not the Court's holding, and
thus is merely dictum and should not be deemed worthy of stare decisis. See Kaufman, supra
note 7, at 287-88; Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662, 667 n.20. (1975).
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created a loophole which could conceivably threaten to swallow the
Court's intention to eradicate ethnic and ancestral discrimination.
The loophole allows those charged with discriminatory practices to
argue that their actions were based on national origin discrimination
and not on ethnic or ancestral discrimination. In practice, however,
the Court's distinction will not likely instigate a flood of litigation
and uncertainty, for it does not seem probable that the Court's
distinction will clearly absolve a great deal of discriminatory prac-
tices. In short, it does not seem probable that a jury which finds
national origin discrimination will not also find ethnic or ancestral
discrimination. Accordingly, the Court's adherence to stare decisis
will not significantly undermine section 198 l's effectiveness in com-
batting ethnic and ancestral discrimination.
In summary, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, the Supreme Court has held that section
1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based
upon a person's ethnicity or ancestry. The Court arrived at its
decision by reasoning that although section 1981 only prohibits
racial discrimination, when Congress passed the statute, the term
"race" was defined and conceived of more expansively than it is
currently. The Court concluded that in 1866, the phrase and con-
cept of "racial discrimination" included discrimination based upon
ethnicity and ancestry, and thus the eradication of such discrimi-
nation was within Congress' intent, and is therefore within the scope
of section 1981. Furthermore, although the Court drew a nebulous
distinction between ethnidancestral discrimination and national or-
igin discrimination, it is unlikely that this distinction will create a
loophole which will undermine section 198 l's effectiveness in erad-
icating ethnic and ancestral discrimination.
B. *Plaintiff's Ultimate Burden in Title VII Actions: Benzies v.
Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 prohibits disparate
treatment in employment practices where an employer intentionally
and unlawfully discriminates against an employee and where the
* By Paul F. Carroll, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 810 F.2d 146, 42 FE? Cases 1537 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3231, 43 FEP
Cases 1999 (1987).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-17, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
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adverse decision would not have occurred absent the unlawful dis-
crimination." Unlawful discrimination under Title VII includes dis-
crimination on account of gender, race, national origin, or age.4 To
determine whether specific employment decisions violate the pro-
visions of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court established
an elaborate process of shifting burdens and presumptions between
plaintiff and defendant. 5
Title VII actions alleging unlawful discrimination in an em-
ployment setting are subject to a three-step analysis enumerated by
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green. 6 In
McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court noted that a plaintiff first
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful
employment discrimination.? Once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, a rebuttable presumption that the defendant unlawfully
discriminated against the plaintiff arises. 8 The defendant then bears
the burden of presenting lawful, non-discriminatory reasons for its
employment decision.`' Where the defendant successfully rebuts the
presumption that it acted in violation of Title VII, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's recited
reasons for the employment decision were pretextual or "unworthy
of credence" or that a discriminatory reason more likely accounted
for the employer's actions.'°
In 1981, the Supreme Court elaborated further on the third
stage of this analysis in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine." The Burdine Court explained first that the defendant's
second-stage burden serves to clarify the issue at hand, thereby
enabling the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reasons
for the employment decision were in fact pretext.t 2 Thereafter, the
Court explained, the plaintiff can satisfy his or her final burden of
proof in either of two ways.'" First, a plaintiff may demonstrate
See Germane v. Heckler, 804 F.2d 366, 368, 42 FEP Cases 1053, 1055 (7th Cir. 1986).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (b), (c), § 1982.
5 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 5 FEP Cases 965, 969-
70 (1972).
'5 Id.
7 Id. at 802, 5 FEY Cases at 969.
8 Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 25 FEP Cases 113, 116.
9 McDonnell Douglas, 4 11  U.S. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 FEP Cases at 116.
450 U.S. 248, 25 FEP Cases 113 (1981).
12 Id, at 255-56, 25 FEP Cases at 116.
'3 Id. at 256, 25 FEP Cases at 116.
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sufficiently the probability that the decision was discriminatorily
motivated." Second, a plaintiff may meet the final burden by ex-
posing defendant's recited reasons as "unworthy of credence." 5
In 1983, the Supreme Court again addressed the shifting bur-
den concept in Title VII cases in United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens which involved a black postal worker's allegation
of racial discrimination on the part of his employer.' 6 Justice Black-
mun, in his concurrence, emphasized once again that the plaintiff
satisfies his or her ultimate burden by demonstrating either suffi-
cient probability of discriminatory intent or that the defendant's
recited reasons were "not the true reasons for the employment
decision." 17
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held, in Benzies v. Illinois Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities,l 8 that a plaintiff's showing that
the defendant's recited reasons for failure to promote a female
psychologist were pretextual would not, in and of itself, suffice to
establish definitively the defendant's discriminatory intent.i° The
court of appeals pointed out that such a showing would not be
equivalent to the second-step presumption's remaining unrebutted
by the defendant. 2° By emphasizing that a mere showing of pretext
by the plaintiff is not dispositive of a Title VII violation, the court
established that the ultimate "question ... is whether the plaintiff
established that the employer's use of a criterion forbidden by stat-
ute caused an adverse decision.""
In Benzies, the plaintiff, Bonnie Benzies, brought a Title VII
action alleging that the Illinois Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities failed to promote her to the position of
Supervising Psychologist 1 on account of her sex. 22 A promotion to
such a position could occur by either of two processes: competitive
and non-competitive promotions. 25 Although the court of appeals
did not specify the requirements of competitive promotions, it did
' 4 Id.
n Id.
16 460 U.S. 711, 31 FEP Cases 609 (1983).
12 Id. at 717-18,31 FEP Cases at 612 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
18 810 F.2d 146, 42 FEP Cases 1537 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3231, 43 FEP
Cases 1999 (1987).
19 1d. at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
99 1d.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 147, 42 FEP Cases at 1537.
23 Id.
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note that the department twice denied plaintiff such a promotion
telling her that she needed a doctorate degree to qualify for the
job."
The plaintiff acquired her Ph.D. and sought a non-competitive
promotion. 25 The non-competitive promotion process involved a
"job audit" to determine whether a psychologist's duties included
the supervision of other psychologists." Because the plaintiff's job
'did not include supervisory responsibilities, civil service personnel
deemed her ineligible for a non-competitive promotion. 27 During
this time the department continued to promote other psychologists
with supervisory duties approving for non-competitive promotions
four psychologists, only two of whom had doctorate degrees. 28 All
four were male."
The district court in Benzies rejected plaintiff's contentions that
defendant had intentionally discriminated against her." Although
the district court was skeptical of the department's stated promotion
policy, the court of appeals continued, the plaintiff failed to meet
her burden of proving to the district court the likelihood that the
department's recited reasons behind denying the promotion were
a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 3 ' Plaintiff appealed the dis-
trict court's decision arguing that the court had applied an incorrect
standard of law as to the plaintiff's burden of proof in the final
stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis."
The plaintiff contended that the district court required the
plaintiff to show that the defendant's recited reasons were pretex-
tual, that the defendant's actions were discriminatory and that ab-
sent such discrimination the plaintiff would have been promoted."
The plaintiff argued to the contrary, however, that a showing of
either pretext or actual discrimination would establish a Title V11
violation."
Prior to analyzing the proper standard of law applicable in the
case, the court of appeals first dismissed the plaintiff's contention
24 Id.
25 a
26 Id.
27 /4.
28 Id.
28 Id.
38 Id.
Id.
32 Id. at 148, 42 HP Cases at 1537.
34 I&
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on practical grounds." The court noted that even a standard re-
quiring only pretext or actual discrimination would not have aided
the plaintiff because the district court found neither pretext nor
discriminatory intent in the defendant's explanation of why it failed
to promote the plaintiff. 36 Accordingly, the court pointed out, to
have applied either standard would have resulted in the same out-
come — that there was no Title VII violation. 37
Notwithstanding that no Title VII violation had occurred, the
court of appeals next addressed the proper burden of proof im-
posed on a plaintiff in a Title VII case once the defendant has
proposed nondiscriminatory explanations for the employment de-
cision." The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that a mere
showing that the defendant's explanations for failure to promote
were pretextual would be sufficient to establish a Title VII viola-
tion. 39
 Although the court suggested that such a showing of pretext
would weigh strongly in a court's assessment of the defendant's
discriminatory intent, the court also stressed that pretext alone
would not be dispositive of a Title VII violation. 49 Accordingly, the
court of appeals emphasized that a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's adverse decision was motivated by intentional discrim-
ination. 41
The court then explained why a mere showing of pretext on
the part of the defendant would not establish a Title VII violation
as a matter of law. 42 Title VII, the court asserted, does not prohibit
all objectionable employment decisions. 43 For example, a finding
that an employer discriminated against an employee because of a
personal grudge, and nothing more, would not establish a Title VII
" Id.
14; Id.
"See id. Regarding the standard of law, the court stated that "Benzies insists that and
should have been nr." Id. The court then added that "[Otis does not make any difference.
The district court concluded both that the reasons the Department gave were not pretexts
and that the Department did not act with discriminatory intent. Conjunctive versus disjunctive
became immaterial." Id.
" Id. at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
59 Id. The court of appeals pointed out that "Benzies argued that if the plaintiff ...
shows that the. ]employer's] explanation is a 'pretext' — then the district court must infer
that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. Not so." Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
"See id.
43 Id. The court noted that "Title VII does not compel every employer to have a good
reason for its deeds; it is not a civil service statute." Id.
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violation." The court explained that an employer may offer legiti-
mate reasons to disguise his or her true intentions behind an em-
ployment decision; but unless those actual motivations represent
forbidden actions under Title VII, a showing of pretext could not
establish a Title VII violation." Although not dispositive, where a
defendant's explanation of an employment decision fails to establish
nondiscriminatory intent, the court noted, it "supports an inference
that a bad reason accounts for the decision."46
The plaintiff further argued, the court of appeals pointed out,
that subsequent to her establishing a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination under Title VII, should the defendant's explanations
for the employment decision fail, the presumption of a violation
stemming from the prima facie case would not have been rebutted.'"
Accordingly, the plaintiff believed that the mere showing of pretext
would suffice to establish a Title VII violation." Here, however, the
court cited United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 49
noting that "after the case has been tried the apparatus of the prima
facie case and response is no longer determinative."" Therefore,
in this case, the court concluded, the ultimate burden to establish
unlawful discrimination on the part of the defendant resulting in
the plaintiff's being denied a promotion rests with the plaintiff. 5 '
As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's hold-
in gs. 52
Finally, the court of appeals expressed some concern as to the
criteria for promoting psychologists to the Supervisory Psychologist
1 level. 53
 Specifically, the court was concerned that the department
was assigning duties only to men that later qualified them for non-
competitive promotions." The court stressed that a neutral stan-
dard which required previous supervisory duties for promotion is
unacceptable where gender discrimination accounts for only males
receiving such duties." The court of appeals pointed out, however,
" See id.
45 Id.
4 's Id.
17 Id.
"Id. .
49 460 U.S. 711, 31 FEP Cases 609 (1983).
Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 149, 42 FEP Cases at 1539.
55 Id. at 149, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
54 See id.
55 Id.
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that the plaintiff didnot present the issue to the district court. 56
The court concluded that it is not the judge's responsibility to decide
issues that have not been clearly presented to the court. 57
Benzies' primary significance rests in the court's determination
that after a defendant recites a lawful, nondiscriminatory reason
for an employment decision, a plaintiff must show both that such
reasons were a pretext and also that the employer's intentional
discrimination accounted for the adverse action. 56
 This standard,
however, is not readily apparent from earlier cases in this field of
law. In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, for example, the
United States Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff must be allowed
to establish that "the presumptively valid reasons for [the plaintiff's]
rejection were in fact a coverup for a . . . racially discriminatory
decision." 5° In another portion of the McDonnell Douglas decision,
however, the Court asserted that the plaintiff be permitted to dem-
onstrate "that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection
was in fact pretext." 6° The crucial question, then, becomes whether
the Court intended to place a burden on the plaintiff of showing
merely pretext or pretext for specifically unlawful discrimination.
Seven years after the decision in McDonnell Douglas, the Su-
preme Court, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
cited McDonnell Douglas as establishing the third stage of Title VII
cases as the plaintiff's burden of proving that the defendant's re-
cited reasons for the employment decision were pretextual of un-
lawful discrimination. 6 ' The Court found that the final burden of
proving unlawful discrimination may be met either by showing that
discrimination was a more probable explanation of the employer's
decision than the recited reasons or by exposing the employer's
explanation as "unworthy of credence." 62
The Benzies court also relied in its analysis on United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aiken to establish that subsequent to
the plaintiff's prima facie case and the defendant's "legitimate"
explanation for the employment decision, the presumption of un-
" Id. at 199, 42 FEP Cases at 1538-39.
57 Id.
59 See id. at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
59
 711 U.S. 792, 805, 5 FEP Cases 965, 970 (1973).
69 Id. at 804, 5 FEP Cases at 970.
61
 450 U.S. 248, 256, 25 FEP Cases 113, 116 (1981).
62 Id. at 256, 25 FEP Cases at 116. The court explained that the burden of showing
pretext "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has
been the victim of intentional discrimination." Id. The court proceeded then to offer two
ways by which this burden could be met. Id.
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lawful discrimination present after the First stage of analysis is no
longer operative.° The court's decision, however, does not neces-
sarily follow. The court concluded that the burden ultimately rests
with the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's adverse em-
ployment decision resulted from unlawful discrimination." As men-
tioned above, the Supreme Court has stated that such is not the
only way to establish a Title VII violation.° The Benzies court re-
jected the plaintiff's contention that a showing of pretext would
suffice. 66 In Aikens, Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, noted that
the plaintiff's third-stage burden may be met by a showing of pre-
text.° Although the majority opinion in Aikens does not explicitly
set forth the plaintiff's third-stage burden, Justice Blackmun as-
serted that the majority implied what this ultimate burden entails. 68
Overall, then, the Benzies decision appears ill-premised. Su-
preme Court rulings regarding Title VII violations could have been
more explicit in some instances regarding the plaintiff's final bur-
den of proof, but such rulings were sufficiently clear to have estab-
lished that a plaintiff may prevail in a Title Vii action by demon-
strating that an employer's stated reasons for the adverse action
were pretextual or "unworthy of credence." It appears, therefore,
that the Seventh Circuit courts are operating under a mistaken
theory of current law until Benzies is overruled or at least clarified.
The court of appeals in Benzies cited an example to support its
interpretation; but the usefulness of the example may have been
misperceived by the court. The court noted that an employer may
have taken adverse action against an employee for an illegitimate
reason but one which is not specifically forbidden by any Title VII
provisions." As an example, the court cited a personal grudge as a
motivating factor which an employer might try to cover up by
proposing more legitimate reasons for an employment decision."
The court explained that proving this recited explanation to be
pretextual would not logically establish a Title VII violation.
This concern, however, fails to consider one significant factor
of Title : VII cases. It ignores the purpose of the second stage of
63 810 F.2d at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538 (citing Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715, 31 HP Cases
at 611).
64 Id.
66 450 U.S. at 256, 25 FEP Cases at 116.
66 See Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
" 460 U.S. at 718, 31 FEP Cases at 612 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 717, 31 FEP Cases at 611 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69 See Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148, 42 FE!' Cases at 1538.
70 Id.
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analysis as enumerated in Burdine. 7 ' There the court stated that the
purpose of the defendant's burden to recite legitimate reasons for
the employment decision in order to rebut the prima facie pre-
sumption of a Title VII violation is two-fold. 72 In addition to re-
butting the presumption, the Court noted, these proposed legiti-
mate reasons "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that
the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext." 73
 Where this purpose is undermined or ignored alto-
gether, an employer conceivably could recite one "legitimate" reason
after another. Although the plaintiff could prove each to be pre-
textual he or she would not necessarily prevail because the recited
reasons would fail to serve their practical purpose. Thus, the Benzies
decision undermines at least one purpose of placing a burden on
the defendant to present legitimate reasons for the employment
decision.
There is no cause to condone an employer's misrepresenting
his or her true reasons for an employment decision. Nor should an
employer be surprised by this standard. Any attorney representing
an employer in a Title VII action should be certain to alert his or
her client to an employer's responsibility to propose a truthful
explanation for any employment decision. In this way, an employer
who chooses to propose pretextual explanations in order to disguise
motives that may or may not be prohibited under Title VII would
do so with full knowledge of this tactic's inherent risks.
The Benzies court's misinterpretation of the standard of law to
be applied in Title VII cases, therefore, will have two serious con-
sequences in the Seventh Circuit. First, district courts in the circuit
will follow this erroneous standard until Benzies is overturned or at
least clarified. Second, as a result of this misperception, employers
will be allowed to evade their burden of factually clarifying the issue
at hand to allow the plaintiff a legitimate probability of meeting his
or her ultimate burden.
In 1987, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Benzies v.
Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities held
that an employee in a Title VII action does not prevail, as a matter
of law, by a mere showing that an employer's recited reasons for an
employment decision adverse to the employee were pretextual."
71 See Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56, 25 FEP
Cases 113, 116 (1981).
72
 See id.
73 Id.
74
 810 F.2d at 148, 42 FEP Cases at 1538.
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This holding, however, conflicts with earlier Supreme Court rulings
which stated that a plaintiff may meet his or her ultimate burden
by showing either that the employer was more likely acting discri-
minatorily or that the defendant's recited reasons for the decision
were pretextual or "unworthy of credence."Th Accordingly, Seventh
Circuit courts will be applying a mistaken interpretation of law until
Benzies is overturned or at least clarified. In addition, not only is
the standard proposed by the Benzies court ill-premised, it condones
improper conduct among employers on the stand and resultingly
places an unduly strict burden on plaintiffs in Title VII cases.
C. *Adverse Effects of the Single -filing Rule on Class Actions: Griffin v.
Duggerl
Under section 2000e-(5)(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the employer's
alleged discriminatory actions. 2
 Because discrimination in the work-
place often affects a substantial number of workers, courts in class
action suits have liberalized the 180-day filing requirement. 5
 In Oatis
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that if an individual
is a party to a class action suit against an employer, he or she need
not file a complaint with the EEOC so long as at least one class
member has filed a timely complaint with the Commission alleging
the charges that the non-filing plaintiff seeks to assert.'' This rule,
known as the "single-filing rule," bypasses Title VII's procedural
requirements for individuals joining as co-plaintiffs in a class action
suit. 5
 The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits
have all adopted the single-filing rule allowing non-filing plaintiffs
the opportunity to join a class action suit despite their failure to
accommodate the EEOC's I80-day requirement. 6
75 See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 25 HP Cases at 116.
* Paul Nappi, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
823 F.2d 1476, 44 FEP Cases 938 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1729 (1988).
2 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(5)(e) (1982).
3 See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp„ 398 F.2d 496, 498-99, 1 FE? Cases 328, 329-30
(5th Cir. 1968) (single-filing rule bypasses Title VIPs 180-day requirement).
4 Id. at 499, I FEP Cases at 330.
See id. at 498, 1 FEP Cases at 329.
6 See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 39 FEP Cases 1590 (2d Cir. 1986);
Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 33 FEP Cases 195 (4th Cir. 1983), cell.
denied, 466 U.S. 951, 34 FEP Cases 1096 (1984), on remand, 645 F. Supp. 1381, 42 FEP Cases
17, aff'd in part, rend in part, 842 F,2d 1496, 46 FEP Cases 610 (4th Cir. 1988); Foster v.
Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 26 FEP Cases 7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit
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In recognizing the applicability of class action suits to Title VII
actions, courts have applied a two-tier analysis.? First, the parties
seeking to represent the class must meet the requirements of stand-
ing and the procedural requirements of Title VII. 8 Constitutional
standing encompasses the plaintiff's ability to assert charges that
are common to the class. 9 If the plaintiff did not suffer the injury
that the class seeks to litigate, then the plaintiff lacks standing to
represent the class.'° Courts then turn to Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to determine the complaining plaintiff's
ability to represent the classes' interests." Under Rule 23(a), plain-
tiffs seeking to represent the interests of the class must satisfy four
factors before the class can be certified.' 2
 First, the class must be so
numerous that joinder of all the parties would be impracticable."
Secondly, there must be common questions of law and fact between
the parties." Thirdly, the representative parties' claims and defenses
must typify those of the class." Finally, the representative parties
must fairly and adequately protect the classes' interests."
The Fifth Circuit has broadly interpreted Rule 23(a), for ex-
ample, as it applies to employment discrimination claims.' 7 In 1968,
Union, 554 F.2d 876, 14 FE? Cases 1494 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 15 FE? Cases
1184 (1977); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 1 FE? Cases 328 (5th Cir. 1968).
7 E.g., Oatis, 398 F.2d at 499, I FE? Cases at 330.
Id,
9 Id.
" See Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482-83, 44 FEP Cases 938, 942-43 (11th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1729 (1988).
" Oatis, 398 F.2d at 499, 1 PEP Cases at 330.
12 FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a). Rule 23 states in pertinent part:
(a)Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Id.
" FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a)(1).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
16 FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a)(4).
17 See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124, 2 FEP Cases 231,
232-53 (5th Cir. 1969) (across-the-board approach to Rule 23 recognizes the similarity in
discrimination in the workplace despite the fact that the claims arise from different types of
employer discrimination); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498-99, 1 FEP
Cases 328, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1968) (single-filing rule).
Given the split in the Fifth Circuit creating the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in
October 1981, the Eleventh Circuit has accepted all former Fifth Circuit decisions prior to
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the Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., adopted
an "across-the-board" rule." Under this approach, injured parties
could join as members of a class if all of the parties alleged discrim-
ination in the workplace, despite the fact that the parties may have
suffered varying forms of discrimination." The court held that the
parties suffered from essentially the same injury because they were
all victims of discrimination in the workplace. 2°
In 1982, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the across-the-board rule in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon. 2 ' In Falcon, the respondent instituted a class action asserting
that the employer's promotion and hiring practices discriminated
against Mexican-Americans. 22 The Court recognized the similarity
of injuries to parties suffering discrimination in the workplace."
The Court, however, held that discrimination alone does not suffi-
ciently satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) in certifying a class of
plaintiffs. 24 Thus, the Supreme Court found that the class had been
improperly certified by the district court and remanded the case."
October 1981 as binding. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981) (en bane).
'" See Johnson, 417 F.2d at 1124, 2 FE? Cases at 232-33.
In Johnson, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted an across-the-board
approach to class action suits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Id. The
court in Johnson reasoned that the injuries suffered by the class in that case were of the same
general type of racial discrimination, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had been injured by
the operation of different policies. Id. Rather than limit the class to similar injuries such as
all hiring discrimination claims or job promotion claims, the court noted that all of the
plaintiffs were victims of racial discrimination in the workplace, which was sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23 for private class action suits. Id.
1 " See id.
20 Id.
21 457 U.S. 147, 28 FEP Cases 1745 (1982).
22 Id. at 150-51, 28 FEP Cases at 1746-47.
23 Id. at 157, 28 FEY Cases at 1749-50.
24 Id. at 157-58, 28 FEP Cases at 1750.
25 Id. at 160-61, 28 FEP Cases at 1751. In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
the United States Supreme Court specifically overruled the Fifth Circuit across-the-board
approach announced in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., by requiring a class action
to satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23(a). Id. While recognizing that racial discrimination does
constitute discrimination against a class of individuals, the Court nonetheless rejected the
across-the-board approach that sustained a class action on the general grounds of racial
discrimination. Id. at 157-58, 28 FEY Cases at 1750.
In so ruling, the Court noted the reasons for the development of the use of class action
suits in the law. Id. at 155, 28 FEP Cases at 1749. or primary significance, the Court
recognized the fact that class action suits provide an efficient, economical means of resolving
issues common to a substantially large number of individuals. Id.
The Court noted that Title VII allows the EEOC to sue on behalf or groups of individuals
suffering discrimination in the workplace without having to satisfy the strictures of Rule 23.
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During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit ruled, in Griffin v. Dugger, that injured plaintiffs
who had failed to satisfy the filing requirement under Title VII
could not use the single-filing rule to bring or participate in a class
action claim unless the named plaintiffs satisfied the requirements
of numerousity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of represen-
tation outlined by Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 26
 In addition, the court held that the non-filing plaintiff could
not use the single-filing rule to bypass Title VII's procedural re-
quirements unless the plaintiff filirig charges with the EEOC had
standing to assert the non-filing plaintiff's claims. 27 The Griffin court
found that the lower court improperly joined the non-filing plain-
tiff, Alvin Smith, to the class action because this plaintiff alleged
that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) failed to hire
him due to his performance on an examination that adversely af-
fected blacks, while the named plaintiff, Peners Griffin, alleged that
the FDOG declined to promote him due to his race," Although the
Eleventh Circuit recognized the common thread of discrimination
in both claims, the court nonetheless followed the Supreme Court's
decision in Falcon and decertified the class so as to exclude the non-
filing plaintiff, Alvin Smith." The court reasoned that the claim of
the class representative, Griffin, did not properly embrace the claim
of the non-filing plaintiff in accordance with Rule 23(a)." The court
further emphasized that Smith, the non-filing plaintiff, could not
use the single-filing rule to bypass Rule 23(a) to salvage his own
claim and allow him to become a class representative. 9 ' The court
at 155-56, 28 FEP Cases at 1749. The Court further noted, however, that Title VII
creates no special rules governing the procedures for private parties and, therefore, these
private parties must meet the more stringent demands of Rule 23, Id. at 156, 28 FEP Cases
at 1749. As a result, the Court stated that the class representative(s) must have similar interests
and suffer the same injuries as those individuals on whose behalf the representative maintains
the action. Id.
While noting that racial discrimination is often class discrimination, the Court empha-
sized that Rule 23 must be complied with prior to the certification of a class. Id. at 157-58,
28 FEY Cases at 1750. As a result, the Court held that the class must satisfy the standards of
numerousity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation provided by Rule 23(a).
id. at 156, 28 FE? Cases at 1749. .
26 See Griffin v, Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1487-91, 44 FEP Cases 939, 946-49 (11th Cir."
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1729 (1988).
27 Id. at 1492-93, 44 FEP Cases at 950-51.
28 Id.
" Id. at 1493-94, 44 FEP Cases at 951.
" Id. at 1490-91, 44 FEY Cases at 949.
31 Id. at 1493, 44 FEP Cases at 951.
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found that Griffin, the filing plaintiff, did not have constitutional
standing to assert the non-filing plaintiff's claims. 32
In Griffin v. Dugger, the Florida Department of Corrections
(FDOC) hired the named plaintiff, Peners L. Griffin, in April 1971;
he became the first black Road Prison Officer at the Tallahassee
Road Prison," In 1973, Griffin began unsuccessfully applying for
promotions for higher level positions in the FDOC. 34 Claiming dis-
ciplinary infractions, Griffin's supervisor fired him in 1974. 35 Be-
cause the supervisor failed to adhere to proper termination proce-
dures, the Regional Superintendent reinstated Griffin." Again, in
1975, the FDOC terminated Griffin's employment for disciplinary
reasons." On appeal, the State of Florida Career Service Commis-
sion overturned the termination for lack of just cause."
Once reinstated in his former position, Griffin filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ex-
plaining the events leading up to his allegedly discriminatory dis-
missals. 39 The EEOC sent Griffin a right-to-sue letter in July 1979,
and Griffin subsequently filed suit in the District Court for the
Northern District of Florida against Louis Wainwright (Secretary of
the FDOC), the FDOC, and the State of Florida.'" Griffin's com-
plaint alleged discrimination in a number of FDOC practices. Ini-
tially, Griffin claimed that the FDOC failed to promote him due to
his race." Griffin also alleged that the FDOC relied on race as a
factor in both its promotion and hiring decisions. 42 In addition to
the subjective discrimination in the decision-making process, Griffin
further alleged that the hiring practices of the FDOC were discrim-
inatory due to an entry-level examination for correctional officers
that had an adverse impact upon blacks applying for positions.°
In accordance with Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Griffin sued on behalf of all those similarly situated,
seeking injunctive relief as well as money damages." In defining
33 Id.
" Id. at 1479, 44 FEP Cases at 939.
" Id.
" Id.
36 Id.
37
 Id.
39 Id.
3,7 Id .
40 Id. at 1479, 44 FE]) Cases at 940.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id,
44 Id.
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the class to be represented, Griffin asserted that the group was
composed of "all past, present and potential black American citizens
and residents who have been, are or may be employees of the
Defendants or applicants for employment."'" Griffin later amended
his complaint on June 17, 1980 in order to add Henry L. Dejerinett
as a party-plaintiff and class representative." Dejerinett's discrimi-
nation claim focused on the FDOC's failure to hire him for a clerical
position. 47
The defendants filed a "Notice Regarding the Adequacy of the
Preliminary Class Certified" in June 1982, in order to decertify the
class represented by Griffin and Dejerinett on the grounds that the
plaintiffs could no longer rely on the across-the-board rule to raise
dissimilar discrimination claims." In an attempt to block this poten-
tial decertification, Griffin and Dejerinett, on July 8, 1982, moved
to join Alvin Smith as an additional named plaintiff and class rep-
resentative." Initially, the FDOC turned down Alvin Smith for a
position as a correctional officer because he had no high-school
diploma. 50 Upon obtaining his GED, Smith again applied for the
position, but was turned down when he failed the entry-level ex-
amination. 5 ' Smith, however, never filed a timely complaint with
the EEOC. 52
The district court rejected the defendants' motion to decertify
the class and allowed Smith to intervene in the suit as a named
plaintiff and class representative." The district court held that,
despite Smith's failure to file a complaint with the EEOC within 180
days, Smith's discrimination in hiring claim was allowable under the
single-filing rule." Because Griffin and Dejerinett had both filed
timely complaints and alleged discriminatory hiring practices, the
court found that Smith's failure to file a timely complaint with the
EEOC was not fatal to his motion to intervene as a named plaintiff
and class representative in the suit. 55
45 Id. at 1479-80, 44 FEP Cases at 940.
"Id. at 1480, 44 FEP Cases at 940.
47 Id.
'a Id. at 1480, 44 FEP Cases at 940-41. See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 28 FEP Cases 1745 (1982) (Supreme Court rejected across-the-board approach .
used to liberalize class action requirements in discrimination cases).
49 Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1480, 44 FEP Cases at 941.
w Id.
51 Id. at 1480-81, 44 FE? Cases at 941.
"Id. at 1481 n.8, 44 FE? Cases at 941 n.8.
" Id. at 1481, 44 FEP Cases at 941.
" Id.
55 Id.
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On July 30, 1982, the district court granted the plaintiffs partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability over the written exam-
ination because it had a disparate impact on class members. 56 In the
subsequent trial, the court entered judgment for the defendants on
all the issues except the testing claim." The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit granted an interlocutory appea1. 58 On appeal,
the court vacated the district court's order certifying the class. 5°
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
named plaintiffs seeking to represent the classes' interests must
satisfy two prerequisites in order to constitute a private class action
under a Title VII employment discrimination claim. 6° The court
first held that the named plaintiffs must have standing to assert the
claim and they must also have satisfied the procedural requirements
outlined by Title VII for bringing a claim against an employer. 61
Secondly, to bring a private class action, the plaintiffs must meet
the requirements of numerousity, commonality, typicality, and ad-
equacy of representation provided by Rule 23(a), and their action
must be one of the three types delineated in Rule 23(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 62
"Id. Disparate impact and disparate treatment are fundamentally different concepts.
Disparate treatment involves employer practices that are motivated by racially discriminatory
or other impermissible grounds while disparate impact involves facially neutral practices that
adversely affect one or more particular groups. See Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv, 318, 319 11.6 (1987).
57 Griffin, 823 F.2d at. 1481, 44 FEP Cases at 941.
50 Id.
" Id. at 1481-82, 44 FEP Cases at 941-42.
60 1d. at 1482, 44 FEP Cases at 942.
61 Id.
02 Id. See also FED. R. CR% I'. 23(a), 23(b). Rule 23(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on groUnds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
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Prior to addressing the requirements of a class action embodied
in F.R.C.P. Rule 23, the court noted that the initial inquiry in Griffin
revolved around the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims and more
importantly, the plaintiffs' standing to assert the claims." The court
stated that in class action suits, the claims presented will be sustained
only if at least one named plaintiff has standing to assert the claim."
The court held that it is not sufficient that the plaintiffs demonstrate
that the defendant's actions were injurious to someone. 65 Instead,
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that at least one of the named
plaintiffs was a victim of the action in question." In addition, the
court held that the fact that a named plaintiff has suffered injury
does not automatically convey standing for that plaintiff to assert
other injuries of the same general nature if that plaintiff was not a
victim of the other injuries. 67
Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the court held
that Griffin lacked standing to assert a testing claim because the
injuries complained of by Griffin involved discrimination in the
promotion process, not discrimination in the hiring process." Grif-
fin already had employment with the FDOC at the time of the
alleged injury." As a result, he lacked standing to assert a discrim-
ination claim based on the adverse impact of the entry-level exam-
ination used in the correctional officer hiring process."
After addressing the issue of standing, the court turned to an
analysis of Rule 23. 71 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Falcon, the Griffin court rejected the across-the-board approach, and
instead looked to the requirements of Rule 23(a) to determine if
the district court properly certified the class. 72 Applying the require-
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
" Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1482, 44 FEP Cases at 942.
6" Id. at 1483, 44 FEP Cases at 943.
65 Id. at 1483, 44 FEP Cases at 943 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982)).
b6 Id.
67 Id.
66 Id. at 1483-84, 44 FEP Cases at 943.
69 Id .
70 Id.
" Id. at 1484, 44 PEP Cases at 944.
72 Id. at 1486-87, 44 FEP Cases at 945-46.
December 1988] ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 255
ments of Rule 23(a), the court held that the district court improperly
certified the class." Although the class was numerous, given the
broad framing in Griffin's complaint, the other requirements of
Rule 23(a), commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation,
were not satisfied."
The court of appeals criticized the district court's commonality
analysis as resting on the erroneous assumption that racial discrim-
ination claims involve common questions of law and fact. 75 Fur-
thermore, as to typicality, the court found that Griffin's claim re-
volved around discrimination in the decision-making process for
promotions, not discrimination as a result of an entry-level exami-
nation for the position of correctional officer. 76
 The court of appeals
noted that the claims were entirely different and could hardly be
lumped together as typical claims of the individuals in the class."
Based on these factors, the court of appeals held that Griffin could
not adequately represent the members of the class who raised dis-
crimination claims based on the examination because Griffin raised
only a claim of discrimination in promotion."
The court, having rejected Griffin as a class representative for
those individuals with testing claims, looked to Dejerinett to deter-
mine if he, as a named plaintiff, could represent the individuals
with testing claims. 79 The court dismissed Dejerinett as a class rep-
resentative for individuals with testing claims because Dejerinett
was a victim of alleged discrimination in the hiring process for a
73 Id. at 1489-91, 44 FEP Cases at 947-49.
74 Id. at 1487-88, 1489-90, 44 FEP Cases at 946, 948.
78 Id. at 1490, 44 FEY Cases at 948.
77 Sri,
 id.
78 Id. at 1491, 44 FEY Cases at 949. In applying Falcon, the court of appeals recognized
an exception to the rejection of the across-the-board approach, Id. at 1487, 44 FEP Cases at
946. In Footnote fifteen of the Falcon decision, the Supreme Court recognized that plaintiffs
with different injuries, such as plaintiffs with claims of discrimination in promotion practices
and plaintiffs with claims in hiring practices, could he certified as a class if both types of
discrimination involved the same or similar practices. General Tel, Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15, 28 HP Cases 1745, 1750 n.15 (1982). For example, the
Falcon Court explained that if an objective examination was used for all those seeking
employment and promotions, the plaintiffs could be certified as a class. Id. Also, the Falcon
Court continued, if employment and promotions were conditioned on a subjective process
such as interviewing, the plaintiffs could again be certified as a class. Id. The court of appeals,
however, noted the differences in plaintiffs' claims since each plaintiff complained about
different practices. Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1490-91, 44 FEP Cases at 949. Thus, the court of
appeals held that the district court's certification could not be salvaged by footnote fifteen of
the Falcon decision. Id.
7" Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1491, 44 HP Cases at 949.
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clerical position." The application process for clerks did not involve
the use of the entry-level examination, as was used for those apply-
ing for jobs as correctional officers.'" The court observed that the
FDOC engaged in a subjective decision-making process for Dejeri-
nett, unrelated to the process normally administered for those seek-
ing to become correctional officers. 82 As a result, the court held that
Dejerinett, who had never even taken the entry-level examination,
lacked constitutional standing to raise the testing claim. 83 In addi-
tion, even if Dejerinett did have constitutional standing to assert
the testing claim, the court further held that he lacked the capacity
to represent the testing claims under Rule 23(a) because his claim
was based on subjective factors and thus, could not be likened to
the objective testing claims."
The court then addressed the claims of intervenor Alvin Smith
to determine if Smith could represent the class of individuals with
testing claims. 85 The court held that, although Smith had constitu-
tional standing to assert the testing claim, he could not adequately
represent the class of individuals asserting similar claims for a num-
ber of reasons. The court stated that Smith failed to follow the
appropriate filing procedures for asserting a private claim against
an employer in accordance with section 2000e-(5)(e) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 86 Although Griffin purported to raise
a discrimination claim concerning the testing procedures in his
earlier complaint, plaintiff Smith, according to the court, could not
rely on Griffin's allegation to justify his failure to abide by the Title
VII filing requirements. 87 The Griffin court thus rejected the single-
filing rule's applicability88 to this case. 89
The court also held that even under the single-filing rule, Grif-
fin did not represent adequately the class members with testing
claims. 9° Although Griffin and Smith both asserted claims of racial
discrimination, the court stated that the similarities between the
°° Id. at 1492, 44 FEP Cases at 950.
81 Id. at 1491, 44 HP Cases at 949.
82 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1491-92,44 FEP Cases at 950.
85 Id, at 1492, 44 FEP Cases at 950.
" Id.
" Id. at 1493,44 FEP Cases at 951.
88 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text for a description of the single-filing rule.
" Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1492,44 FEP Cases at 950.
90 Id. at 1492-93,44 FEP Cases at 950-51.
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claims were very tenuous.•' Griffin's claim focused on the subjective
decision-making process of the FDOC in granting promotions, while
Smith's claim attacked the entry-level examination for correctional
officers as discriminatory, and Dejerinett asserted a subjective hiring
claim. 92 As a result, the court held that the single-filing rule could
not salvage Smith's objective testing claim and allow him to maintain
the class action on behalf of those individuals raising a testing claim
against the FDOC.`-'s Thus, since Griffin, Dejerinett, and Smith
failed to represent adequately the claims of individuals asserting
discrimination as a result of the entry-level examination, the court
reversed the district court's order certifying the class of plaintiffs. 94
In his dissent, Judge Hatchett criticized the majority's approach
in decertifying the class for failure to satisfy the requirements of
the single-filing rule.`-°' Judge Hatchett argued that the court incor-
rectly superimposed standing requirements onto the single-filing
rule. 96 Judge Hatchett noted that the named plaintiff, Griffin, did
state a claim of discrimination for those individuals adversely af-
fected by the entry-level examination for the position of correctional
officer.`-'° The court, however, refused to recognize this particular
claim as far as Griffin was concerned because Griffin lacked consti-
tutional standing to assert the claim." Judge Hatchett, focusing on
the purposes underlying the Title VII filing requirements, stated
that the primary purpose was to encourage out of court settlement
of disputes through the EEOC.99 As a result, Judge Hatchett argued
that the stringent standing requirements imposed on a plaintiff in
court proceedings need not be applied as vigorously for the pur-
poses of filing a claim with the EEOC.'" The court, according to
Judge Hatchett, ignores the purposes underlying the Title VII filing
requirements and instead uses standing to decertify a class when
one of the named plaintiffs fails to satisfy the filing requirements,'°'
In those circuits following the single-filing rule, Griffin v. Dugger
may have a significant impact on the maintenance of class action
91 Id. at 1493, 44 FEP Cases at 950-51.
92 1d.
93 Id. at 1493, 44 FEP Cases at 951.
• 1 Id. at 1493-94, 44 FEP Cases at 951.
55 Id. at 1494, 44 FEY Cases at 951-52 (Hatched, J., dissenting).
96 Id.
"7 Id. at 1494, 44 FEP Cases at 951 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
5" Id. at 1493, 44 FEY Cases at 951.
99 Id. at 1494, 44 FEP Cases at 952 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
m° Id. at 1494, 44 FEP Cases at 951-52 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1494-95, 44 FEP Cases at 952 (1-1atchett, J„ dissenting).
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suits involving parties that have not properly followed the Title VII
filing requirements. By requiring that a named filing plaintiff have
standing to assert a claim that a non-filing plaintiff seeks to utilize
under the single-filing rule, the Eleventh Circuit has in effect tight-
ened the restrictions on maintaining class action suits. As a result,
the Eleventh Circuit has completely excluded a class of plaintiffs
who have inadvertently failed to abide by Title VII's procedural
guidelines and who are now unable to salvage their claims through
the single-filing rule and the class action process.
In announcing its ruling, the court of appeals focuses on the
validity of the plaintiff's maintaining a particular claim in an em-
ployment discrimination lawsuit when analyzing the claims pre-
sented in the named plaintiff's complaint. 102 The court's approach
revolves around the plaintiff's ability 'to successfully litigate the
claim before allowing the single-filing rule to apply to those plain-
tiffs asserting the same claim who have failed to adhere to the filing
requirements of Title VII. 103 The court's opinion takes a retrospec-
tive approach to the single-filing rule. If a court determines that a
plaintiff lacks standing, then that determination invalidates the
claim at the moment that it was filed for purposes of the single-
filing rule.'" The court's rejection of the single-filing rule's use in
cases where the filing plaintiff lacks standing to assert the non-filing
plaintiff's claim indicates that the court seeks to deter plaintiffs
from filing frivolous claims or framing their pleadings too broadly.
By limiting the single-filing rule, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that
perhaps the plaintiff, Griffin, ought not have filed a claim on behalf
of those individuals with testing claims and, in fact, because of
Griffin's lack of standing, the court treated the testing claim as if it
had not been filed for purposes of the single-filing rule. 105
The dissent, in contrast, takes the approach that any claim
stated or framed in the pleadings should give effect to the single-
filing rule despite the fact that a court may later determine that the
filing plaintiff lacks standing to raise the issues. 106 Under this ap-
proach, the dissent argues that the policies underlying the Title VII
filing requirements seek to further the role that the EEOC plays in
resolving employment discrimination disputes. 107 Instead, the court
'° 2 See id. at 1482-83,44 FEP Cases at 942-43.
1 " See id. at 1493-94,44 FEP Cases at 950-51.
16' See id. at 1493,44 FEP Cases at 951.
'"s See id, at 1493-94,44 FEP Cases at 951.
1 " See id. at 1494-95,44 FEY Cases at 951-52 (Hatcltett, J., dissenting).
'°7 See id. at 1494,44 FEP Cases at 952 (1-latchett, J., dissenting).
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has now turned these requirements around to create a statute of
limitations that will exclude a number of non-filing plaintiffs at-
tempting to litigate their claims through a class action suit.
Although the court recognized the need to dissuade plaintiffs
from bringing frivolous claims, as well as the corresponding need
to encourage plaintiffs with employment discrimination claims to
follow Title VII's appropriate procedural requirements, the Elev-
enth Circuit emphasizes the process' efficiency at the expense of its
fairness. As noted in the dissent, the filing requirements apply to
plaintiffs filing a claim before the EEOC, not a Federal court.'" As
a result, the court has not clearly explained why the standing re-
quirement must be applied vigorously to claims filed before the
EEOC. For example, the Supreme Court in General Telephone Co. of
the Southwest v. Falcon noted in dicta that deviations from the pre-
requisites For a class action suit embodied in Rule 23(a) may be
appropriate when the EEOC takes up the claim of a class of indi-
viduals, rather than allow those individuals to pursue a private class
action.m Given the EEOC's primary purpose of settling employ-
ment discrimination disputes, the dicta in Falcon implies that the
more rigid procedures applied to private suits need not apply with
equal vigor when the EEOC actively participates in the dispute.
In the Griffin case, Griffin actually filed the hiring discrimina-
tion charges, hence respondent FDOC received notice of the
claims."° Although a strict reading of section 2000e-(5)(e) of Title
VII might lead a court to exclude Smith's claim from the class action
because of his failure to follow the proper procedures in conjunc-
tion with Griffin's lack of standing, a closer examination of the
underlying purposes of that section would command the opposite
result." The purposes of section 2000e-(5)(e) is to encourage the
speedy resolution of disputes by requiring parties to file their claims
within a six-month time frame. By requiring plaintiffs to file within
180 days, the EEOC can begin to process the complaint and settle
108
109
 General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-56, 28 FEP Cases
1745, 1749 (1982).
"D Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1479-80, 44 FEP Cases at 940.
I" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e) (1982). The statute reads in pertinent part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the
charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful
employment practice) shall he served upon the person against whom such
charge is made within ten days thereafter ....
Id.
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the dispute. In addition, the claim is fresh and thus the necessary
evidence to support a finding of discrimination or, conversely, up-
hold the employer's practices, is also fresh and perhaps more ac-
cessible. Finally, the 180-day filing provision requires the plaintiff
to serve notice on an employer so that the employer can begin to
prepare a defense to the employment discrimination charge. 112 Al-
lowing Smith to intervene in this case would not compromise any
of the above purposes because Griffin had filed the appropriate
claim and served notice on the employer that the alleged discrimi-
nation complained of included discriminatory hiring practices.
The court of appeals also seems to be rejecting the very logic
of the single-filing rule. That rule, announced in Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., suggests that a minor departure from the proce-
dural requirements of Title VII should not invalidate the valid claim
of a non-filing plaintiff in a class action suit."" The single-filing rule
provides a means around the strict 180-day filing requirements.
The court of appeals, however, limits this exception, thus excluding
a class of plaintiffs with viable claims for technical reasons.
While the Oaks court discussed an individual's standing to raise
a claim, the court of appeals in Griffin applied the stringent consti-
tutional standing requirements." 4 Indeed, the Griffin court rejected
a looser requirement that could better facilitate the single-filing
rule." 5 For example, the dissent's view recognizes the important
distinction between filing claims before the court and filing them
with the EEOC.' 1 G Although plaintiffs must have constitutional
standing to litigate claims in court, the dissent suggests that, for
112 Id.
"3 See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498-99, 1 FEP Cases 328, 329-
30 (5th Cir. 1968).
Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1493 n.37, 44 FEP Cases at 951 n,37 (defines standing as applied
by court).
15 In Oatis, the charging party was also the class representative and therefore, as class
representative, he needed to have standing to maintain the action. See Oath. , 398 F.2d at 498-
99, 1 FEP Cases at 329-30. In Griffin, however, the charging party, Griffin, is not the class
representative. Smith is the best representative for class members with testing claims and he
could maintain the class action in court. See Griffin. 823 F.2d at 1492, 44 FEP Cases at 950.
The Griffin court seems to ignore this discrepancy and therefore, reads the reference to
standing in Oath as a requirement that a filing plaintiff have standing to maintain the non-
filing plaintiff's claim in court as a prerequisite to the application of the single-filing rule,
rather than recognize the fact that the charging party, Griffin, asserted the claim that Smith
seeks to litigate as a class representative. Id. at 1493, 44 FEP Cases at 951. Because Griffin
asserted the testing claim in the complaint that he filed with the EEOC, Smith should, under
the single-filing rule, be able to point to that charge and be certified as a class representative.
16 Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1494; 44 FEP Cases at 951-52 (1-latchett, J., dissenting).
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purposes of the single-filing rule, the plaintiff need not satisfy the
standing requirement when filing claims with the EEOC. " 7 The
limitation imposed totally contradicts the purposes of the rule.
Rather than require every plaintiff in a class action suit to file a
claim with the EEOC in the relevant time-frame, the Oatis court
recognized a viable exception by developing the single-filing rule. " 8
The Griffin court, however, injected the standing requirement into
the single-filing rule"' which undercuts the utility of that rule.
Because standing is an issue raised after a claim is filed, cautious
plaintiffs will not take chances that the named plaintiff and class
representative in a class action suit can adequately represent their
claims and interests. If the plaintiffs rely on the single-filing rule as
a means of joining a class action suit, a subsequent judicial deter-
mination of a lack of standing on behalf of the named plaintiff will
obliterate their chances to obtain a remedy for the discriminatory
actions of the employer. Rather than reduce the number of filing
plaintiffs, as the single-filing Ku le attempted to do for the sake of
judicial expediency and efficiency, the Griffin decision increases the
number of filing plaintiffs by demonstrating the dangers for a non-
filing plaintiff relying on the single-filing rule. Thus, the court of
appeals' approach in Griffin implicitly revokes the logic of the single-
filing rule and renders that rule useless as a practical matter for
plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate claims through the class action device
unless their claims are virtually identical to those of the named
plaintiff and class representative.
In summary, Griffin v. Dugger has important procedural rami-
fications for practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit as well as those
circuits that adopt the single-filing rule. By injecting the rigorous
constitutional requirements of standing into the rule, the court of
appeals has in effect undercut the procedural efficiency of the
single-filing rule by sending signals to plaintiffs in a class action suit
that non-filing parties cannot rely on the class representatives who
have properly adhered to the procedural requirements of Title VII
in order to adjudicate their claims, unless the filing plaintiffs have
standing to assert the claims of the non-filing plaintiffs. As a prac-
tical result, plaintiffs should file their claims with the EEOC in
accordance with section 2000e-(5)(e) unless they are convinced that
the class representative will be determined by the court to have
" 7 Id,
" See Oath, 398 F.2d at 498,1 FEP Cases at 329-30.
" 9 Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1493-94,44 FEP Cases at 951.
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standing to assert their claims. Cautious plaintiffs will be reluctant
to rely on the rule to adjudicate their claims for fear that a subse-
quent judicial determination of lack of standing by the class rep-
resentative will obliterate their claim and preclude their chances for
obtaining a remedy. In attempting to limit the applicability of the
single-filing rule to class action suits, the Eleventh Circuit has ele-
vated the sanctity of the procedures to a level greater than that of
fairness to the individual and has, in fact, deprived a class of plain-
tiffs of judicial remedies to employment discrimination.
II. HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION*
A. Safety Risk and the Meaning of "Otherwise Qualified Handicapped
Individual" Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.'
In passing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act), Congress
primarily sought to encourage the employment of handicapped
individuals in the public and private sectors.' To accomplish this
purpose, section 504 of the Acts prohibits any program receiving
federal assistance from discriminating against an otherwise qualified
handicapped individual solely on the basis of his or her handicap. 4
The Act's broad definition of "handicapped individual" evinces
Congress' desire for extensive protection of the handicapped. 5 The
Act defines "handicapped individual" as any individual who has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially affects one or
more major life activities or who has a record of such impairment. 6
The definition further provides that a person will be a handicapped
* By John R. Caterini, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,
' 107 S. Ct. 1123, 43 FEY Cases 81 (1987).
2 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976).
3 Section 504 of the Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
29 U,S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 794 provides, in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his for her]
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or any program or activity conducted by an Executive agency
of the United States ....
Id.
6 Id. § 706(7).
Id. §§706(7)(B)(1)—(B)(ii). It should be noted that the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services include employment in the definition of a "major
life function." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c) (1985).
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individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act if he or she
is "regarded as having such an impairment." 7
Although the Act does provide a definition for "handicapped
individual," the Act does not provide a definition for "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual." The Department of Health and
Human Services, however, has promulgated regulations which state
that a "qualified handicapped individual" with respect to employ-
ment is a handicapped person who can perform the essential func-
tions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation for
the handicap, and who can do so without endangering his or her
own health and safety or other's health and safety.8 The Supreme
Court of the United States, interpreting section 504 of the Act in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, held that to be an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual one must be able to perform the
duties of a position in spite of the handicap in question."
The Supreme Court has not spoken on whether a handicap
which poses a potential safety risk will preclude a person from being
otherwise qualified within the meaning of the Act. Lower courts,
however, have discussed the safety risk imposed by a handicapped
individual. 10 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Doe
v. New York University, has enunciated a "reasonable probability"
29 U.S.C. § 706(13)(iii). Section 706(7)(B) provides in relevant part:
[TJhe term "hanidcapped individual" means ... any person who(i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded
as having such an impairment.
Id.
" 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(1') (1985). Specifically, section I613.702(f) provides:
(f) "Qualified handicapped person" means with respect to employment, a hand-
icapped person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the
health and safety of the individual and others . . . .
Id.
It is an affirmative duty for any recipient of federal assistance to make reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped individual. 45 C.F.R. § 1232.10 (1986).
442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)1 In ruling that to be otherwise qualified a handicapped
individual must be able to perform the duties of a position in spite of a handicap, the Supreme
Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding that to he otherwise qualified a handicapped
individual must be able to perform his or her duties except for the handicap. Id.
t° See, e.g., Bentivegna v. United States, 694 F.2d 619, 622, 30 FEP Cases 875, 877 (9th
Cir. 1982); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1410, 32
Hi' Cases 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 487 F. Supp. 1088, 1103,
23 FEP Cases 1253, 1264 (D. 1-law. 1980); see also Perras & Hunter, Handicap Discrimination
in Employment: The Employer Defense of Future Safety Risk, 6 J.L. & Com. 377, 389-97 (Winter
1986); 1985-86 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 28 B.C.L.
REV. 187 (1986) [hereinafter 1985-86 Survey].
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standard, under which predictions about future behavior can justify
a handicapped person's exclusion." In contrast, the Third Circuit,
in Srathie v. Department of Transportation did not endorse Doe's "rea-
sonable probability" standard, requiring instead an "appreciable risk
of harm" before an individual's handicap would render him or her
not otherwise qualified.' 2 In Mantolete v. Bolger, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit suggested yet another standard, holding that
an employer's concern for safety will only justify the determination
that a handicapped person is not otherwise qualified if such a hand-
icap poses a "reasonable probability of substantial harm."" Thus,
although a uniformly applied standard has emerged regarding the
issue of when a safety risk precludes an individual from achieving
"otherwise qualified" status, lower courts have recognized that con-
cern for future safety is a valid consideration in determining
whether a handicapped individual is otherwise qualified.' 4
During the Survey year, in School Board of Nassau County, Florida
v. Arline, the Supreme Court of the United States considered
whether an individual who is a carrier of a communicable disease
is a handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, and whether an employer can discharge such an individual
on the grounds that risk of disease transmission poses a safety risk.' 5
The Court held that an individual who has a record in his or her
medical past of carrying a communicable disease is a handicapped
individual under the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. 16 Stating,
however, that an employer, when determining whether an individ-
ual is "otherwise qualified," cannot "meaningfully distinguish" the
disease's physical effects in terms of ability to perform the job in
question and the disease's physical effects in terms of possible trans-
mission to others, the Court held that an employer cannot merely
point to the contagious effects of a disease as justification for ter-
" 666 F.2d 761, 775 (1981); see also Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Retardation Comm'n
704 F.2d 1402, 1409-10, 31 FEP Cases 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that substantial,
reasonable basis for prediction about effect of plaintiff's mental health is sufficient justifi-
cation for the determination that plaintiff is not otherwise qualified).
12
 716 F.2d 227, 232, 32 FEP Cases 1561, 1565 (2d Cir. 1983).
" 767 F.2d 1416, 1422, 38 FEP Cases 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985).
14
 See 1985-86 Survey, supra note 10, at 187-89, which suggests that the trend has been
toward a stricter standard. It should be noted, however, that no cases have dealt specifically
with the issue of when safety risk posed by a contagious disease is a handicap, notwithstanding
the question of whether such disease, if a handicap at all, would render an individual not
otherwise qualified.
15
 107 S. Ct. 1123, 43 FEP Cases 81 (1987).
M Id. at 1127, 43 FEP Cases at 84.
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mination.' 7 The Court recognized, however, that in deciding
whether an individual who is handicapped by virtue of carrying a
communicable disease is "otherwise qualified," the courts can give
weight to the "legitimate concern" of avoiding serious health or
safety risks." According to the Court, however, the ultimate deter-
mination of whether such an individual is otherwise qualified must
not lie with the employer, but rather with the "reasonable medical
judgment" of public health officials." By holding that an employer,
on the grounds of possible safety risk, cannot terminate an em-
ployee who has a communicable disease without first obtaining rea-
sonable medical judgment, the Arline Court thus reinforced the
principle that an employer cannot discriminate against an employee
on the basis of uninformed prejudice or stereotypes. Because the
Arline decision deals specifically with communicable diseases as a
handicap, it will 'prove particularly relevant in the very likely event
that the communicable disease in question is Acquired immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
Arline involved an elementary school teacher, Gene Arline, who
worked for the Nassau County, Florida school system since 1966. 20
Arline had been hospitalized in 1957 with tuberculosis, but the
disease had been in remission since then. 2 ' In 1977, a culture re-
vealed that the disease was again active in her system.22 After she
suffered a second relapse in the spring of 1978 and a third relapse
the following winter, the school board suspended Arline with pay. 23
The board subsequently terminated Arline, however, giving as their
justification her continued recurrence of tuberculosis. 24
Arline filed suit, and the district court held that Arline was not
a handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act
and therefore not under its protection. 25 The district court further
stated that even if Arline were handicapped within the meaning of
the Act, she was, because of the safety risk posed by the contagious-
ness of her disease, not qualified to teach elementary school. 2" The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, however, find-
" Id. at 1128, 43 FEY Cases at 84.
18 Id. at 1131, 43 FEY Cases at 86.
1,, Id. at 1131, 43 FEP Cases at 87.
"Id. at 1125, 43 FEP Cases at 82.
21 Id.
22 Id.
V 5 Id,
2.1 Id.
25 Id. at 1125, 43 FE!' Cases at 82-83.
26 Id.
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ing that Arline's hospitalization for tuberculosis in 1957 revealed a
record of physical impairment which substantially limits a major life
function and, furthermore, that her employer "regarded her" as
having such an impairment. 27
 Turning to the question of whether
Arline was "otherwise qualified," • however, the Eleventh Circuit
found the facts before it insufficient, and remanded the case for
further determination. 28
 The school board petitioned a writ of cer-
tiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. 29
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision." Looking to both the language of the Act and De-
partment of Health and Human Services Regulations, the Court
found that Arline fell under the Act's definition of a handicapped
individual. 31
 The Court first noted that the Act defines "handi-
capped individual" as an individual with a physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits a major life function. 32 The
Court pointed to the regulations, which include in their definition
of "physical impairment" any "physiological disorder or condition
affecting [the] respiratory [system]," and concluded that Arline
had a physical impairment because Arline's tuberculosis affected
her respiratory system." Such an impairment, the Court continued,
required hospitalization, and this fact was "more than sufficient" to
indicate that the impairment limited a major life activity." Arline,
the Court determined, was therefore a handicapped individual. 35
The Court then addressed the school board's argument that it
had not discriminated against Arline because of any discriminatory
perception that her handicap rendered her unable to perform her
duties, but rather had dismissed her because her handicap was a
threat to the health and safety of others. 36 The Court, however,
27
 772 F.2d 759, 764, 39 FEP Cases 9, 13 (1985) (citing 29 U.S.C. 706(7)(B) (1982); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)
(1982)). The court, in deciding that Arline was regarded as having an impairment which
substantially limits a major life function, noted that the disease can severely impair the
respiratory system. Id.
2' Id. at 765, 39 FEP Cases at 14.
29 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
3U
 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1132, 43 FEP Cases 81, 87 (1987).
3' Id. at 1126-27, 43 FEP Cases at 83-84 (citing 29 U,S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982)); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1982)).
32 Id. at 1126, 43 FEP Cases at 83 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982)).
" Id. at 1127, 43 FEP Cases at 84 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1982)).
" Id. at 1127, 43 FEP Cases at 84. The Court, however, did not base its finding on
whether Arline was regarded as having a substantially limiting handicap.
" Id. at 1127, 43 FEP Cases at 84.
3" Id. at 1128, 43 FEP Cases at 84-85.
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stated that when a recipient of federal funds decides whether an
individual is otherwise qualified, discrimination based on an em-
ployer's perceptions about the contagious effect of a disease cannot
be "meaningfully distinguished" from discrimination which relates
to an employer's perception regarding the effect of the disease on
ability to perform successfully on the job." The Court observed
that Congress was as concerned with a handicap's effect on others
as with the physical effect of the handicap on the individual, 38 and
that to allow discrimination based on the perceived possibility of a
disease's communicability would be inconsistent with the Act's goal
of ensuring that handicapped individuals are not denied employ-
ment because of misconceptions or unfounded prejudices. 38. Some
persons with contagious diseases may pose a serious threat to others,
the Court said, but that is not grounds for excluding the Act's
coverage to all individuals who carry a contagious disease." The
Court therefore concluded that the board terminated Arline be-
cause of her handicap, thus bringing her under the protection of
the Rehabilitation Act.'"
The Court then turned to the problem of determining when a
recipient of federal funds can exclude from employment an indi-
vidual with a contagious disease because such individual poses a
safety risk to others." The Court first noted that significant health
and safety risks are "legitimate concerns" when determining
whether a handicapped individual is otherwise qualified." Without
discussing a standard for the safety risk in general, the Court agreed
with the American Medical Association, which filed an amicus brief,
that the particular determination of when contagiousness as a safety
risk precludes a handicapped individual from being "otherwise
qualified" should include a finding of fact based on reasonable
medical judgment given the state of medical knowledge." The rel-
evant considerations, the Court noted, include the nature of the
disease's transmission, the duration of the risk of transmission, the
severity of the risk, and the probability that the disease will in fact
" Id. at 1128, 43 FEY Cases at 84.
38 Id. at 1128, 43 FEY Cases at 85.
" Id. at 1129, 43 FEY Cases at 85.
40 Id. at 1130, 43 FEY Cases at 86.
41 Id, at 1128, 43 FEY Cases at 84.
42 Id. at 1130-32, 43 FEY Cases at 86-87.
43 Id. at 1131, 43 FE13 Cases at 86.
"Id. at 1131, 43 FEY Cases at 87 (thing Brief for American Medical Association as
Amieus Curiae 19).
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be transmitted. 45
 The Court also stated that, in making these find-
ings, a court should defer to public health officials' judgment. 46 The
Court then decided that in this case the evidence was not sufficient
to make a finding as to whether Arline was otherwise qualified, and -
remanded for further findings of fact. 47
In a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that the Court should not read the Rehabilitation Act as
broadly as it did." Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that legisla-
tion which imposes obligations exclusively on recipients of federal
funds should be treated as a contract, 49 and that the receipt of
federal funds in this case was therefore a quid pro quo for providing
the handicapped with employrnent. 50 Along these lines, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist contended that a recipient can only accept and be
bound by those terms of a quid pro quo which Congress has made
unambiguous:" Because the regulations, the legislative history, and
the language of the Act are silent on the issue of whether a carrier
of a contagious disease is a handicapped person, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist argued that the inclusion of people with contagious diseases
in the category of handicapped individuals was not such a clear,
unambiguous term in the "contract" for receipt of federal funds. 52
Chief Justice Rehnquist also observed that Congress had left the
states significant leeway to legislate regarding the spread of conta-
gious disease, and the Court in the past, when faced with extensive
state regulation, had declined to read the Rehabilitation Act
broadly.53
Significantly, the Court, in deciding whether the safety risk
posed by contagiousness rendered Arline unqualified, did not refer
to the large body of lower court decisions which discussed safety
risk." The Court therefore did not resolve the dispute in the lower
45 Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 19).
Id. at 1131, 43 FEP Cases . at 87.
" Id. at 1131-32, 43 FEP Cases at 87.
48
 Id. at 1132-34, 43 FEP Cases at 87-89.
'° Id. at 1132, 43 FEP Cases at 87-89 (citing Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S, 1 (1981); Board of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).
" Id.
" Id. at 1132, 43 FEP Cases at 87-89
52 Id. at 1132-33, 43 FEP Cases at 87-88.
55 Id. 43 FEP Cases at 88.
" E.g., Doe v. New York, 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767
F.2d 1416, 1422, 38 FEP Cases 1081, 1086) (9th Cir. 1985); Bentivegna v. United States, 694
F.2d 618, 622, 30 FEP Cases 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-
Retardation Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1402, 1410, 31 FEP Cases 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983); Strathie
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courts over which standard should be employed generally in deter-
mining whether a safety risk renders a handicapped person un-
qualified.'
Furthermore, the Court's ruling that the safety risk inquiry
should include the consultation of "reasonable medical judgment"
is expressly limited to the safety risk imposed by contagious dis-
ease,' 8 and it is therefore unlikely that courts will read the "reason-
able medical judgment" standard as the relevant standard in all
safety risk cases. Furthermore, one can easily conceive of situations
where the "reasonable medical judgment" standard would not be
helpful. For example, courts would not necessarily answer the ques-
tion of whether an individual with vision in only one eye is "oth-
erwise qualified" to be a railroad trackman by consulting reasonable
medical judgment." In such a case, the employer's judgment may
be more valuable and more relevant. The Supreme Court's decision
in Arline therefore does not resolve the conflict in the lower courts
concerning the appropriate standard for determining when a safety
risk renders a handicapped individual unqualified generally. 58 Only
in the specific instance where the potential safety risk is communi-
cation of a disease will employment of the Arline "reasonable medical
judgment" standard be necessary.
v, Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232, 32 FEE' Cases 1561, 1565 (3d Cir. 1983); E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103, 23 FEP Cases 1253, 1264 (I). Haw. 1980);
see also Perras & Hunter, supra note 10, at 389-97; 1985-86 Survey, supra note 10, at 187.
"See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2cl 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents
of the Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 1 7.2d
1416, 1422, 38 FEY Cases 1081, 1086) (9th Cir. 1985); Bentivegna v. United States, 694 F.2d
618, 622, 30 FE? Cases 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Retardation
Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1402, 1410, 31 FEP Cases 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983); Strathie v. Depart-
ment of Transp,, 716 F.2d 227, 232, 32 FEP Cases 1561, 1565 (3d Cir. 1983); E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103, 23 FEI' Cases 1253, 1264 (D. Haw. 1980); see also
Perras & Hunter, supra note 10, at 389-97; 1985-86 Survey, supra note 10, at 187.
56 107 S. Ct. at 1133, 43 FEP Cases at 86-87 (1987) (the Court delivers the "reasonable
medical judgement" standard as one which applies ''in the context of the employment of a
person handicapped with a contagious disease").
57
 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Commonwealth, 452 A.2d 301, 36 FEP Cases 599
(Pa. Commw. Ct, 1982) (refusal to hire railroad trackman with vision in only one eye upheld).
"See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ,, 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents
of the Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d
1416, 1422, 38 FEP Cases 1081, 1086) (9th Cir. 1985); Bentivegna v. United States, 694 F.2d
618, 622, 30 FEP Cases 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Retardation
Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1402, 1410, 31 FEP Cases 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983); Strathie v. Depart-
ment of Transp,, 7111 F.2d 227, 232, 32 FEP Cases 1561, 1565 (3d Cir. 1983); E.E, Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103, '23 FE? Cases 1253, 1264 (D. Haw. 1980); see also
Perras & Hunter, supra note 10, at 389-97; 1985-86 Survey, supra note 10, at 187.
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In the context of contagious diseases, the most obvious and
pertinent question after Arline is whether the Rehabilitation Act will
cover an individual suffering from Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). The Court deliberately left this question open."
It seems likely, however, that an individual already suffering from
AIDS will be considered a handicapped individual, because the
disease often results in severe pneumonia, 60 which is certainly a
"physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting [the] . respira-
tory [system]."6 ' A mere carrier of AIDS who has not actually con-
tracted the disease may have more difficulty showing that the Re-
habilitation Act protects him or her. Negative public sentiment
regarding the disease, however, increases the likelihood that an
individual who is only a carrier of AIDS will be "regarded as having
. . . an impairment [which substantially limits a major life function],"
thus bringing such an individual within the Act's coverage. 62 Fur-
thermore, because the Act's purpose is to prevent unwarranted and
prejudicial discrimination, the negative public reaction to people
with AIDS might make such people particularly in need of the
Rehabilitation Act's protection.
The more difficult question which Arline leaves open is whether
an individual who has AIDS or who is a carrier of AIDS will be
"otherwise qualified," or whether a safety risk posed by the possible
infection of others will allow an employer to conclude that such an
individual is not "otherwise qualified." The Court suggests that
employers consult "reasonable medical judgment" when consider-
ing the safety risk in the contagious disease context. The Court's
decision compels the recipient of federal funds to consult outside
judgment, thereby reducing the risk that the recipient will discrim-
inate against a carrier of AIDS on the basis of unfounded fear or
prejudice. Thus, although the Arline Court specifically declined to
decide whether an individual with AIDS is protected by the Act,
the decision can be read as strong support for the likelihood that
the Rehabilitation Act protects AIDS sufferers.
" 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1128 n.7, 43 FEY Cases 81, 84 n.7 (1987). The Court said specifically
that it would not comment on whether a carrier of AIDS would come under the protection
of the Act. Id.
6° Titus, AIDS as a Handicap Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973," 43 WASH. & Let:
L. REV. 1515, 1515 n.5. Author notes that AIDS often causes pneumoncystic cariniis, a
respiratory ailment caused by a parasitic infection of the lungs. Id.
61 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1985). The Court relied on this regulation in concluding that
Arline was a handicapped individual. 107 S.Ct. at 1127, 43 FEP Cases at 84 (citing 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1985)).
62 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
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In Arline, the Court gave a specific standard, the "reasonable
medical judgment" standard, for determining whether individuals
with a contagious disease would be otherwise qualified with respect
to employment within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. In light of the varied and inconsistent lower court decisions
regarding the standard for safety risk, 63
 such a definite standard
for safety risk in the context of contagious diseases will provide
needed guidance. Although Arline does not discuss the question of
AIDS as a handicap nor the question of whether an individual
suffering from AIDS qualifies as a handicapped individual under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Court did provide that an in-
dividual who has suffered from or is presently suffering from a
contagious disease would be protected by the Rehabilitation Act,
which is strong support for the conclusion that the Act will protect
AIDS victims.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. *Statistical Evidence of a Manifest Imbalance in a Traditionally
Segregated Job Category Can Protect a Voluntary Affirmative Action
Plan from a Title VII Challenge: Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 2
 Congress intended Title VII to
65
 Along with the cases discussed in this article, see Bentivegna v. United States, 694 F.2d
618, 622, 30 FEP Cases 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Retardation
Comm'n, 794 F.2d 1402, 1410, 31 FEP Cases 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1983); Strathie v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232, 32 FEP Cases 1561, 1565 (3d Cir. 1983); E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103, 23 FEP Cases 1253, 1264 (D. Haw. 1980); see also
Perras & Hunter, supra note 10, at 389-97; 1985-86 Survey, supra note 10, at 187.
* By John P. D'Amato, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
L 107 S. Ct. 1442, 43 FEP Cases 411 (1987).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Title VII provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice For an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
272	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:99
prevent invidious discrimination based on racial or other imper-
missible classifications3 and to correct historical patterns of discrim-
ination against women and minorities in the work place. 4 These two
objectives can conflict when an employer adopts a voluntary affir-
mative action plan that takes race, sex, or other impermissible clas-
sifications into account to correct the underrepresentation of
women or minorities in certain job areas. 5
Balancing these competing objectives, the United States Su-
preme Court first interpreted Title VII to protect equally male and
female employees, white and minority employees. 6 In 1978, how-
ever, the Court decided, in Steelworkers v. Weber, that Title VII did
not prohibit all voluntary, race conscious affirmative action plans.'
In Weber, the Court did not establish clear rules distinguishing
permissible affirmative action plans from impermissible plans, 8 but
instead listed several factors that contributed to the plan's validity
in that case. 9 The Court mentioned such factors as the nonexistence
in the plan of any requirement to fire non-minority workers in
order to hire or promote minorities, the availability of some ad-
vancement opportunities for non-minority workers, and the plan's
temporary character.'° Subsequently, courts have looked to these
factors as guidelines in validating other voluntary affirmative action
plans. t I
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California that
an employer could defend an affirmative action plan against a Title
VII challenge by pointing to statistical evidence of a manifest im-
3 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 3 FEP Cases 175, 177 (1971); McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 12 FEP Cases 1577, 1579 (1976).
4 United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-04, 20 FEP
Cases 1, 5-6 (1979).
5 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 775-76 n.4 (2d ed. 1983); see
also Weber, 443 U.S. at 201, 20 FEP Cases at 5.
6 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 3 FEP Cases at 177 ("Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely ... what Congress has proscribed."); see also McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 12 FEP Cases 1577, 1580 (1976) (Title VII
prohibits discrimination against white employees with the same standards as would apply to
black employees).
7 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
Id,
9 Id. at 208-09, 20 FEP Cases at 7.
,0 Id.
" Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 969, 26 FEP Cases 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) (Court recites guidelines listed in the text after stating:
"[t]he specifics of the plan approved in Weber indicate some guidelines for private affirmative
action plans.").
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balance in a traditionally segregated job category.' 2 The Court stated
that in demonstrating such a conspicuous imbalance an employer
need not identify an imbalance great enough to support a prima
facie case of discrimination against the employer." Rather, accord-
ing to the Court, an employer need only compare the minority or
female percentage of the employer's work force with the minority
or female percentages of the relevant labor market.' 4 To further
Title VII's goals of eliminating the effects of past discrimination
without unduly trammelling the rights of non-minority or male
employees, the Court also affirmed the Weber requirement that the
conspicuous imbalance must occur in a traditionally segregated job
category. 1 • In Johnson, the Court further ruled that the employee
challenging an affirmative action plan under Title VII must bear
the burden of proving that the plan is invalid.'" Additionally, the
Johnson decision marked the first time that the Court approved a
public employer's affirmative action plan under Title VII analysis."
Because of Johnson, employers will be better able to defend
voluntary affirmative action plans from Title VII challenges. Em-
12
 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1453-57, 43 EEP Cases 411, 419-22 (1987). While Johnson involves a
gender discrimination claim under Title VII, the Court's opinion applies equally to claims
based on other "impermissible" classifications, Id. at 1454 n.13, 43 FEP Cases at 419 n.13.
Johnson involved only a Title VII challenge. Id. at 1449, 43 HP Cases at 416. Justice
Scalia suggests in his dissent that the affirmative action plan in Johnson might be unconsti-
tutional under fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis. Id. at 1472, 43 FEP Cases
at 434 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist., C.J., dissenting): The majority never addressed the issue of
whether or not the fourteenth amendment prohibited the plan in Johnson, Id. at 1449-50
n.6, 43 FEP Cases at 416-17 ti.6. Therefore, practitioners should not conclude that the plan
in Johnson would necessarily withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Id. at 1452, 43 FEP Cases at 419.
14 Id. at 1452, 43 FEP Cases at 418.
1 " Id. at 1452, 43 FEP Cases at 418-419. The Weber requirement that the imbalance exist
in a traditionally segregated job category does not impose a heavy burden on employers.
Once an employer can demonstrate a conspicuous imbalance, courts have been willing to
presume that the job category has been traditionally segregated. Scin.E1 & GROSSMAN, supra
note 5, at 860.
16 Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449, 43 FEP Cases at 416. In placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, the Court extended to Title VII actions the rule it established one year earlier
for constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans. Id. The Court decided in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education that the ultimate burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality
of an affirmative action plan rests with the plaintiff. 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848, 40 FEP Cases
1321, 1325 (1986).
"'Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1471, 43 FEP Cases at 433 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent in Johnson considers the approval of a public employer's voluntary
affirmative action plan to be a major step. Id. Other authorities, however, have long assumed
that the same standards apply to public employers as private employers. SCALE' & GROSSMAN,
supra note 5, at 840; see Detroit Police Officer's Assoc. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689 tt.7, 20
FEP Cases 1728, 1739 n.7 (6th Ci'r. 1979); see also Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F2d 897,
900, 20 FEP Cases 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
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ployers will not need to prove a prior history of discrimination to
justify an affirmative action plan. Rather, employers may simply
point to a manifest statistical imbalance. Moreover, in Johnson, the
Court placed no explicit limits on how large a manifest imbalance
needs to be in order to justify an affirmative action plan.
In December 1978, the District Board of Supervisors of the
Santa Clara County Transportation Agency adopted an affirmative
action plan designed to comply with the county's general affirmative
action plan.' The Agency plan provided that, in making promo-
tions, the Agency may consider the gender of the applicants as one
factor in its decision provided that the position exists within a tra-
ditionally segregated job classification and that women are signifi-
cantly underrepresented in that job category.' 9 To determine
whether women were significantly underrepresented, the Agency
compared the percentage of women in each of its seven job cate-
gories to the percentage of women in the local labor market. 2° The
Agency found that women were underrepresented in the Agency
as a whole and in five of its seven job categories. 2 ' Most strikingly,
in the Skilled Craft Worker category, all 238 employees were men.22
The Agency attributed these disparities in part to the limited op-
portunities in the past for women to work in these job classifica-
tions."
In light of this background, the Agency adopted the long-term
goal of attaining, in all of its job categories, a work force that
reflected the proportion of women in the local labor force. 24 To
reach this goal, the Agency sought to achieve a measurable yearly
improvement in the hiring and promotion of women in those job
categories in which women were underrepresented." The Agency
recognized several obstacles to achieving measurable yearly im-
provements, including the low turn-over rate in some jobs, the
heavy labor involved in others, the limited number of entry level
positions in the Technical and Skilled Craft Worker classifications,
and the limited number of qualified female applicants for positions
"Johnson, 107 S. Ct, at 1446, 43 FEP Cases at 414.
19 Id.
2" Id. Women made up 36.4% of the local job market. Id.
" Id. Women made up only 7.1% of Agency Officials and Administrators, 8.6% of
Professionals, 9.7% of Technicians, and 22% of Service and Maintenance Workers. /d.
Id.
2 ' Id.
" Id, at 1447, 43 FEP Cases at 414.
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requiring specialized training and experience." Because of these
obstacles, the affirmative action plan called for the establishment of
realistic short-term goals which the Agency would adjust annually
to guide its employment decisions. 27 The plan stressed the impor-
tance, in establishing these goals, of determining the availability in
the local labor market of women who have the necessary training
for the more technical or skilled positions." The plan did not set
aside a specific number of jobs for women. 29 Rather, the plan au-
thorized the Agency to consider gender as one factor in evaluating
qualified candidates for jobs in which women or minorities were
poorly represented. 3°
In December 1979, the Agency announced a road dispatcher
vacancy, a job classified as a Skilled Craft Worker position. 3 ' The
plaintiff, Paul Johnson, applied for the job along with Diane Joyce
and ten other employees. 32 Johnson, Joyce and seven other appli-
cants possessed the necessary qualifications for the job." A two-
person board interviewed the candidates and assigned them each a
score based on the interview. 34 To proceed in the hiring process, a
candidate needed to score at least a 70 on the interview." Seven
candidates received scores between 70 and 80 with Johnson tied for
second at 75 and Joyce ranked next with 73. 36 A panel of three
Agency supervisors then interviewed the seven remaining candi-
dates and recommended Johnson for the position. 37
Before interviewing with the three person panel, Joyce con-
tacted the County Affirmative Action Office." The Affirmative Ac-
tion Coordinator recommended to the Director of the Transpor-
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1447, 43 FEP Cases at 415.
25 Id. at 1447, 43 FEP Cases at 414-15.
" Id, at 1447, 43 FEP Cases at 415.
56 Id.
"Id. The position required at least lour years experience as a dispatcher or road
maintenance worker. Id.
52 Id.
" Id. at 1448, 43 FEP Cases at 415.
" Id.
55 Id.
50 id .
57 /d.
55 Id. Joyce had previous unpleasant dealings with two of the supervisors on the panel.
Id. at 1448 n.5, 43 FEP Cases at 415 n.5. Joyce had earlier filed a grievance against one of
the panel members for his mistreatment of her when she worked on his road maintenance
crew. Id. She also had several prior disagreements with another panel member when she
chaired the Agency's Road Operations Safety Committee. Id.
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tation Agency that Joyce be selected to receive the promotion."
After considering the recommendations of the panel and the Affir-
mative Action Coordinator, the Director of the Agency awarded the
position to Joyce. 4 °
After losing the promotion, Johnson filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the
Transportation Agency denied him the promotion on the basis of
sex in violation of Title VI1. 4 ' The EEOC issued him a right-to-sue
letter on .March 10, 1981.42
 Shortly thereafter, Johnson filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia." The court found that Johnson was better qualified for the
position and that sex was the determining factor in the Agency's
decision to promote Joyce instead of him.44
 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and held that the
Agency's affirmative action plan was lawful because it addressed
itself to a conspicuous imbalance in the work force and did not
unnecessarily violate other employees' rights. 45
 The Ninth Circuit
also held that the plan's frequently expressed goal of attaining rather
than maintaining an appropriate level of female employment would
end the preferential treatment for women as soon as women
achieved an appropriate level of employment within the Agency. 4 "
In response to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Johnson petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari. 47
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in a six to three decision, 48
 upholding for the first time an
employer's voluntary affirmative action plan without requiring the
39 Id. at 1448, 43 FEP Cases at 415.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1449, 43 FEP Cases at 416.
42 id.
Id.
44 Id. Johnson had previously worked for seventeen years as a dispatcher in the private
sector. Id. at 1468, 43 FEP Cases at 431 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting. He had
worked as a Road Yard Clerk for the county for eleven years. Id. at 1448, 43 FEP Cases at
416. Johnson also worked two years as a Road Maintenance Worker for the county. Id. Whets
the job in this case opened up in September, 1979, the Agency assigned Johnson to tempo-
rarily fill the vacancy until the Agency reached the final promotion decision. Id.
Diane Joyce had worked for the Agency for nine years. Id. at 1447, 43 FEP Cases at
415. For her first five years, she worked as an account clerk. Id. For the next four years, she
worked as a Road Maintenance Worker. Id. Like Johnson, she occasionally worked out of
class as a road dispatcher. Id. at 1448, 43 FEP Cases at 415.
45 Id. at 1449, 43 FEN Cases at 416.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1446, 43 FEP Cases at 414
is
	 at 1445, 43 FEP Cases at 412.
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employer to establish a prior history of' discrimination. 49 Writing
for the Court, Justice Brennan addressed several of the issues in-
volving Title VII claims based on "reverse discrimination." First,
the Court held that employees challenging an affirmative action
plan bear the burden of proving that it violates Title VII. 5" Once
an employee establishes a prima facie case that an employer consid-
ered race or sex in an employment decision, the employer must
present a nondiscriminatory rationale for considering race or sex. 5 '
According to the Court, the affirmative action plan in Johnson pro-
vided such a rationale. 52 Once the Agency presented such a ration-
ale, the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to prove that the plan
was invalid." The Court noted that while employers will probably
try, as a litigation tactic, to present evidence that the affirmative
action plan is valid when they first present the plan, they do not
bear the burden of proof. 54
Second, the Court relied on justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Weber to hold that an employer need not establish its own prior
discrimination to justify an affirmative action program.• Rather, an
employer need only identify a manifest imbalance in a traditionally
segregated job category to justify affirmative action. 50 When consid-
ering jobs that require no special expertise or training programs
designed to provide expertise, the Court stated that employers
should compare the percentage of women in a given job category
with the percentage of women in the local labor poo1. 57 When
4" See id. at 1469, 43 1 7 E1' Cases at 431-32.
50 Id. at 1449, 43 17 E1' Cases at 416.
" Id.
52 Id.
53 Id,
" Id,
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken
into account in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The exis-
tence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is
articulated as the basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is
invalid.
Id.
55 Id. at 1451, 43 FEP Cases at 418.
56 Id
57 Id. at 1452, 43 FEP Cases at 418. The Court relied on its previous decisions in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 n.17, 14 PEP
Cases 1514, 1520 n.17 (comparing the percentages of minorities in certain cities with the
percentage of minorities employed by the defendant as truck drivers in these cities) and
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-C10-CFC v. Weber 443 U.S. 193, 198-99, 20 PEP
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considering jobs that require special training, however, the Court
stated that employers should compare their percentage of female
employees with the percentage of qualified women in the local labor
pool.58
Although the Agency had not yet completely established its
short-term hiring goals in the Skilled Craft Worker category when
Diane Joyce received her promotion, 59
 the Court stated that specific
short-term goals were not necessary for the Agency to recognize
that having no women at all in that category constituted an obvious
imbalance. 6° The Agency attributed the underrepresentation of
women in several of its job categories to the historically limited
opportunities for women in these jobs. 61
 Thus, the Court held that
the promotion did not violate Title VII because the Agency pro-
moted Diane Joyce to redress a manifest imbalance in a traditionally'
segregated job category. 62
The Court also decided that Diane Joyce's promotion did not
unnecessarily trammel male employees' rights. 63
 The Court noted
that the Agency did not set aside a specific number of positions for
women or minorities." Rather, the Agency's plan authorized the
Director to consider gender as one of many factors in making an
employment decision. 65
 Furthermore, the Court noted that Johnson
had no entitlement to the position. 66
 Because the Director of the
Agency could have promoted any one of the seven candidates who
scored 70 or above at the first interview, Johnson had no firmly
rooted claim to the promotion. 67
 Finally, the Court held that the
Cases 1, 3-4 (1979) (applying a similar comparison to minority candidates for on the job
training programs).
"Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452, 43 FEP Cases at 418. The Court relied on its decision in
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308, 15 FEP Cases 1, 6 (1977)
(comparing percentage of minority teachers in the school system with the percentage of
minorities who were qualified to teach in the public school system).
69
 Under the affirmative action plan, the Agency considered the percentage of qualified
minorities or women in the labor market when it set its short term goals. See supra text
accompanying notes 27 and 28. Johnson argued that because the short-term goals were not
completed when the Agency made the promotion decision, the Agency should not have
considered its general policy in favor of affirmative action. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1454, 43
FEP Cases at 420.
"'Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1455, 43 FEP Cases at 420.
Id. at 1453 n.12, 43 FEP Cases at 419 n.12.
" Id, at 1457, 43 FEP Cases at 422.
"Id. at 1455-56, 43 FEP Cases 421-22.
64 Id, at 1455, 43 FEP Cases at 421.
66 Id.
66
 Id.
67 Id.
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lack of a specified termination date for the affirmative action plan
did not violate the rights of male employees reasoning that such
end dates are more necessary for plans that set aside specific posi-
tions for women. 68 Thus, because the Santa Clara plan set aside no
specific positions for women, a specific end date for the plan was
unnecessary to protect male employees' rights.°
The Court also stated that a manifest imbalance sufficient to
support an affirmative action plan need not be so egregious that it
could establish a prima facie Title VII claim against the employer. 70
The Court reasoned that such a standard would discourage em-
ployers from adopting affirmative action plans because to justify
the plan, the employer would have to accumulate evidence that
others could use against the employer in a Title Vii suit.'' The
Court noted that this result would run counter to Title VII's policy
of encouraging employers to eliminate the vestiges of discrimina-
tion . 72
Although Justice Stevens joined in the majority opinion, he also
filed a concurrence.'" Justice Stevens emphasized that the majority's
opinion did not impose any outer limits on an employer's ability to
establish voluntary affirmative action programs. 74 Justice Stevens
emphasized the need to leave management sufficient "breathing
room" to remedy past discrimination through its own initiatives: 78
Justice Stevens also noted that he did not believe that courts should
interpret the factors listed in Weber as limits on an employer's ability
to implement a voluntary affirmative action plan. 76
Justice O'Connor also filed a concurrence. 77 Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the lack of any women in the Skilled Craft Worker
job category in Johnson would suffice to establish a prima facie Title
VII case against the Agency." Thus, she concurred with the Court
in upholding Diane Joyce's promotion." In her opinion, she argued
that to justify an affirmative action plan, an employer should have
l'" Id. at 1456, 43 FEP Cases at 421-22.
69 Id. at 1456, 43 FEP Cases at 422.
" hi. at 1452, 43 FEP Cases at 419.
71 Id. at 1453, 43 FEP Cases at 419.
72 Id.
"Id. at 1457, 43 FEP Cases at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 1457, 43 FEP Cases at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 1459, 43 FEP Cases at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1458 n.3, 43 FEP Cases at 423 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1460, 43 FEP Cases at 425 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7" Id. at 1465, 43 FEP Cases at 428 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 1465, 43 PEP Cases at 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to prove that a firm basis existed for believing that an affirmative
action plan was necessary. 8° In Justice O'Connor's view, an employer
must show either previous discrimination against women in that job
classification, or a great enough statistical disparity, between the
percentage of female employees and the percentage of qualified
women in the local labor market, to establish a prima facie Title
VII claim against the employer. 81
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined and in which Justice White joined in part. 82
 In his
dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's decision in Weber
incorrectly interpreted Title VII. 83
 The dissenters relied on the
plain language of Title VII to prohibit any consideration of gender
in employment decisions. 84
 The dissenters would, therefore, have
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson and overruled We-
ber. 85
The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson removed several of
the barriers that employers who wish to implement voluntary affir-
mative action plans previously have faced. Allowing an employer to
justify a voluntary affirmative action plan with statistical evidence
8°
 Id. at 1461, 43 FEY Cases at 425 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81 Id. The prima facie standard for supporting a Title VII action that Justice O'Connor
advocated is highly complex. The Supreme Court outlined this standard in the Hazelwood
case. 433 U.S. 299, 309-10, 15 FEP Cases at 5 (1977). The Court uses statistical analysis to
establish an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. Under this analysis, one should be able to
establish an expected number of successful job applicants from the protected class. Id. One
then compares the actual hires to the expected hires. Id. Some differences between these
figures are permissible. Id. Others are too large to be permissible. Id. According to the Court:
The measure of the predicted fluctuations from the expected value is the
standard deviation, defined for the binomial distribution as the square root of
the product of the total number in the sample ... times the probability of
selecting a
	 . [member of the protected class] times the probability of selecting
a ... member of the non-protected class] ....
Castaneda, Sheriff v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977). When the actual deviation
is two or three times the standard deviation, a prima facie Title VII violation exists. Hazelwood,
433 U.S. at 309-10, 15 FEP Cases at 5.
"Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465, 43 FEP Cases at 429 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White joined in Parts I and II of Justice Scalia's
dissent but not in Part III. Id. Justice White would also over-rule Weber, though on different
grounds. Id. Justice White stated that the plan in Weber was valid in that it remedied previous
discrimination by the employer and the union. Id. Justice White objected, however, to the
majority's decision to approve the plan in Johnson, because, Justice White asserts, that plan
does not remedy previous discrimination but, rather, only a manifest statistical disparity. Id.
For these reasons, Justice White dissented in Johnson and believed that Weber should be over-
ruled. Id.
83 Id. at 1472, 43 FEP Cases at 434 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
84 Id. For the precise language of Title VII, see supra note 2.
"Johnson, at 1472, 43 17E1' Cases at 434 (Scalia, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
December 1988] ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 281
of a manifest disparity provides a much easier standard for ap-
proving these plans than requiring a showing of previous discrim-
ination. Further, the Court provides no guidance on how large a
disparity need be to qualify as "manifest."
Although uncertain standards may often serve as a breeding
ground for litigation, the Johnson Court's decision to place the bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff may discourage Title VII challenges
to these plans. Plaintiffs in these cases may find it difficult to prove
these plans invalid under Johnson analysis. As Justice Stevens
pointed out, without response from either the majority or the dis-
sent, the Court's opinion nowhere defines the outer limits of an
employer's discretion to implement a voluntary affirmative action
plan. 86
 With no stated outer limit on an employer's discretion once
that employer can point to a statistical disparity, a plaintiff will have
little authority to support a claim that the employer abused its
discretion in implementing an affirmative action plan.
The Johnson Court, however, did clarify which labor market an
employer should look to in assessing any disparities in the compo-
sition of his work force. The Court stated that for technical jobs an
employer should look to the pool of qualified workers in the area.
The Johnson Court did not, however, clarify how an employer
should define "local." This definition is crucial when an employer
is in or near a major urban center with a high minority population. 87
For example, in Hammon v. Bally, the crucial question in a Title VII
challenge to an affirmative action plan was whether, for the pur-
poses of finding a statistical disparity, the public employer should
compare its work force to the labor pool in Washington, D.C. or
the entire Washington metropolitan area. 88
 Thus, employers can
anticipate that future challenges to the validity of their volubtary
affirmative action plans will focus on a claim that the employer
found a statistical disparity by comparing its work force to the wrong
"local" labor pool.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California removed several difficulties that em-
ployers faced in justifying voluntary affirmative action plans. The,
Court stated that an employer could justify its affirmative action
plan by introducing statistical evidence of a manifest disparity.
Moreover, the Court placed the burden of proof on the challenger
'" Id. at 1457, 43 FEP Cases at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"7 See, e.g., Hammon v, Barry, 826 F.2(1 73, 44 FEP Cases 809 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
"" Id. at 77, 44 FEP Cases at 874.
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to an affirmative action plan. Thus, employers can expect fewer
successful challenges that attempt to establish that the employer had
no basis for adopting an affirmative action plan. The Court did not,
however, give any guidance on the question of what constitutes the
"local" labor market for the purposes of deciding if a manifest
disparity exists. Employers should, therefore, anticipate more of the
Title VII challenges to voluntary affirmative action plans to focus
on the question: what exactly is the "local" labor market?
